Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

501.BB Korea/12–2947

The Acting Secretary of State to the Canadian Prime Minister (MacKenzie King)⁷

December 30, 1947, 9:15 a.m.

secret

Mr. Prime Minister: The President has asked me to present to you in some detail the considerations which led to our grave concern over the possibility that Canada might decline participation in the work of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

The question of Korea was placed before the General Assembly of the United Nations by the United States in the sincere hope that the United Nations might find ways and means of resolving the impasse which had developed over the past year and a half between the United States and the USSR with respect to the creation of a free and independent Korea. In his opening statement to the General Assembly, Secretary of State Marshall indicated that we were unwilling to let the failure of ourselves and the Soviets to reach agreement deprive the Koreans any longer of their independence under a government of their own choice. When the matter was taken up by the First Committee of the Assembly, the United States Representative presented our suggestions in the form of a draft resolution, not because we were convinced that we had a single right answer, but because we considered it incumbent upon us to indicate to our fellow members the main lines of a solution which we ourselves thought might most speedily result in the emergence of an independent and democratic Korea. This was necessary because our position in Korea laid upon us the responsibility to furnish information and to put forward such suggestions as we might have. We were anxious, however, to obtain the views of others, and objected to the Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces at the beginning of 1948 only because we were convinced that such a proposal if accepted would lead to the early establishment of a dictatorship in Korea. No suggestions substantially different from those we presented were put forward from any other source and the Assembly, as you will recall, accepted the United States proposal by a vote of 46 to 0, with 6 abstentions. The First Committee adopted the United States draft resolution as amended on November 5, 1947, with Canada included as a member of the proposed Commission. The Assembly action on Korea took place on November 14, and the Assembly itself did not adjourn until November 29. Thus there was a period of 24 days within which the matter might have been raised for reconsideration or arrangements made for substituting membership on the Commission.

The General Assembly Resolution in brief calls for:

a. the election by March 31, 1948 of representatives of the Korean people with whom the UN Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people;

b. the formation of a National Assembly by the elected representatives;

c. the establishment by the National Assembly of a National Government and the constitution by that Government of its own security forces and the dissolving of other military or semi-military forces not included therein;

d. the taking over by the National Korean Government of the functions of government from the present governments in south and north Korea, and then;

e. the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Korea within 90 days, if possible;

f. the Commission to facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing program for the attainment of the national independence of Korea, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea;

g. a report by the Commission, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly or to the interim committee with respect to the application of the resolution in the light of developments;

h. the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities.

In pursuance of the foregoing provisions, the Secretary General of the United Nations has formulated plans which envisage the arrival of the Commission in Korea on or about 7 January 1948.

Nothing has yet occurred which has obstructed the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly regarding Korea. It is true that the Ukraine stated from the outset that it would not be able to serve on the Commission. It is also true that such indications as we have suggest that the Soviet Union will not cooperate with the Commission with respect to north Korea or the formation of a national Korean government, but it would be premature to conclude that such obstruction will inevitably materialize. In any event, Mr. Prime Minister, would you not agree that the responsibility for the failure of the policy approved by the General Assembly with respect to Korea should not be allowed to rest upon the Assembly itself or the governments members of the Commission named by the Assembly, but rather upon those governments which in fact bar the path to Korean independence? It is equally clear that the General Assembly has not given the Commission precise instructions as to its course of action if it is impeded in its work. The Assembly provided, however, that the Commission might consult with the Interim Committee in such a contingency.

It is the view of the United States that, as a minimum, the Korean Commission should survey the situation in Korea, consult with Korean leaders and with the present military governments of the two zones, make the facts and its conclusions available to the General Assembly, and consult with the Interim Committee as to whether there is any course of action which, in the circumstances, might seem likely to advance the cause of Korean independence. Thus, the Commission has a free hand to use its best judgment in the light of the situation.

I do assure you that the United States would greatly appreciate and strive in every possible way to meet the views of the Commission. We have no purpose in Korea but to give effect to the pledges made by the Allied governments during and after the war. We think it a matter of the greatest importance that the United Nations do what it can in behalf of the Korean people themselves in this situation. At the same time a great deal will have been accomplished if this point of irritation among the great powers can be alleviated by the work of the Commission.

In all sincerity, I assure you that in the view of the Department of State, in which the President concurs, it will be difficult indeed for others to understand the basis for Canada’s withdrawal from the work of the Commission at this stage. Although there is a generally recognized shortage everywhere of men of great experience and competence in international affairs, we are confident that Canada could produce an entirely suitable representative, particularly in light of the fact that Canada has repeatedly demonstrated that it can make one of its greatest contributions to the United Nations in the high qualities of leadership and competence of its representatives on United Nations bodies. Canada’s prestige in international affairs and recognized interests in the peace of the Pacific would enhance the standing of the Commission. The United States views the participation of the Canadian representative in the work of the Commission as essential to such success as the Commission might achieve.

The reluctance of Canada to participate in the work of the Commission is especially difficult to understand in the light of the fact that Canada is one of those nations which, as evidenced by its membership in the Far Eastern Commission, have a direct and urgent interest in the restoration of peace and stability in East Asia. Even were this not the case, Canada’s nonparticipation under existing circumstances would be difficult to understand in the light of its assumption of the responsibilities of membership in the Security Council, involving a willingness to contribute to international peace everywhere and not merely in regions of special interest. I may add, Mr. Prime Minister, that, although the United States is not a member of the Korean Commission, it is apparent that we on our part are carrying a very heavy share of the responsibility for the future of Korea.

We are also concerned lest those unfriendly both to the United States and to Canada should find, if Canada does not see her way clear to participate in the work of the Commission, grounds for propaganda to the effect that Canada’s action reflected irritation and difference of view with the policies of the United States. While we ourselves are confident that no such element would in fact be present, we recognize that speculation along this line would inevitably ensue.

There remains the question as to whether your Government’s abstention would denote the view that the course of action determined upon by the General Assembly is the wrong course or that in some fashion a new situation has arisen which makes that course now inappropriate. I venture to indicate again that the Commission itself is in no way bound by its terms of reference to follow any particular course of action if it is unable to follow through with the program outlined by the General Assembly. If there is doubt that the original course of action itself should not be followed, the means for giving effect to that view might be either action in the Commission itself or action to convene a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the Korean question.

In the light of the foregoing, which I venture to present to you with the utmost of frankness, I trust that it may be possible for your government to review the situation having in mind particularly the effect upon the United Nations itself of Canada’s withdrawal from the work of the Korean Commission in its most important initial stage. I feel certain that you, as well as we, are gravely concerned lest the calculated policy of boycott on the part of those who may be trying to destroy the United Nations will succeed in seriously crippling the work of the Organization, and we are confident that you share with us the belief that those of us who support the United Nations and strive for its success must exert extra effort during this crucial phase.

7. Telephoned to Ambassador Atherton at 9:15 a.m., December 30.