891.00/12–447
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division, of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
Subject: Desire of the Shah of Iran for Increase of His Constitutional Powers.
There is attached the text of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Tehran1 on the above subject. You will note that the Foreign Office would be glad to learn our views.
When I discussed this subject briefly with you recently, I understood your feeling to be that the matter was a purely internal one for Iran and that we should not express any view to the Shah or the Iranian Government. As for the desirability of the Shah acquiring [Page 991] the power to dissolve the Majlis, which is the particular constitutional revision he seems to have in mind, I recall that you pointed out that such an increase of power might not be a bad thing since strong governments in countries bordering the Soviet Union have generally been better able to resist Soviet domination, e.g., Poland before the war and Turkey today.
Since our conversation, Tom Bromley2 has pressed us for our views and we in GTI have given considerable thought to the matter. I have concluded that in this, as in other related matters, we should have a clear view of what is desirable and, with that view in mind, decide what to communicate to the Iranian Government, the British Embassy, or our Embassy in Tehran. We do not feel that any increase of the Shah’s constitutional powers is desirable and we think that this view should be communicated, upon request, to the British Embassy for information and to George Allen under instruction.
The subject is not, in fact, as new as it might appear. When Clyde Dunn was in Tehran in May, the Shah deplored the lack of progress in Iran and attributed it to his personal lack of constitutional power. Subsequently the Shah stated his views on the subject in a personal letter to Ambassador Ala who, in turn, during the course of an informal conversation with Mr. Dunn at the Embassy, asked his views on the matter. Mr. Dunn limited his reply to the personal observation that stability seemed to be the greatest need in Iran at the present time in the face of a continuing crisis and that any proposal of constitutional change might well produce serious contention in Tehran and, therefore, just the instability which the Soviet Union would welcome, I understand that Ambassador Ala agreed with Mr. Dunn’s informal position and indicated his intention to state it as his own in replying to the Shah.
As for the desirability of an increase of the Shah’s constitutional power, I recognize that political wrangling in the Majlis among selfish aspirants for power does appear to delay the execution of a program of economic and social reform in Iran; that Iran is a backward country and not fully prepared for democratic processes valued among the western democracies; and that the Shah has, by philanthropic actions, shown signs of interest in the welfare of his people. At the same time, I feel that the Majlis, by its very nature as a public forum of popular leaders, is inherently both a safeguard against concerted Soviet pressure upon any single source of power in Iran and also a factor conducive to sympathetic public opinion in this country; that Iran enjoys the prospect of such development as would make democratic processes more productive; and that the Shah’s record is not one to inspire [Page 992] confidence in the personal rule which would probably follow the constitutional change he has in mind. . . . As for the effectiveness of strong periphery governments in resisting Soviet pressure, it must be recognized that Shah Reza’s régime, undermined by popular dissatisfaction and financial instability, collapsed completely in 1941; and, I believe, the strength of Turkey must be attributed fundamentally to a popular nationalism espoused by young leaders in the country rather than the continuing leadership of any one man. We doubt, therefore, that any constitutional change giving the Shah increased authority is either necessary or desirable for the furtherance of economic and social reform in Iran.
As for what we should communicate to others on the subject, I feel that we should indicate to the British Embassy our concurrence with the views expressed in the attached Foreign Office telegram, namely, that the proposed constitutional change would at this time endanger the stability of Iran; and that we should make clear to Ambassador Allen our views as to what is desirable, with the instruction that he communicate our thoughts, if his views are requested by the Shah, along that line.
The more I think of the matter, the more I feel that we would be on safe grounds, not only in our assessment of the situation in Iran, but also in strengthening and maintaining support of American public opinion for our objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Middle East, in following the above course.
If you indicate your concurrence, we will tell the British Embassy that we agree in general with the reasoning in the attached Foreign Office telegram and will draft a telegram to George Allen setting forth our views as to what is desirable in the premises with the instruction that he communicate those views to the Shah on appropriate occasion.