891.00/12–947
The Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)
informal—official
Dear George: I think my letter of December 4 in part answered yours of November 241 about your difficulties in answering queries [Page 993] regarding the alleged difference between our policy towards Iran and our policy towards Greece and Turkey. The essential difference, as you have pointed out to your questioners, is that Iran has never officially requested the type of support we are giving to Greece and Turkey. This, of course, is only a temporary answer, but it ought to be pretty conclusive until the Iranians make up their own minds.
It might be useful to recall, also, that our program of aid to Greece and Turkey was brought about by the critical, urgent necessity of filling a gap left by the British withdrawal. No such situation has come about in Iran.
I think I can say that we in NEA, at least, regard Iran as completely on a par with Greece and Turkey so far as its importance to the United States is concerned. This attitude is, I believe, shared by the Service Departments, and is concurred in by our own high command in the Department. I do not know what Army and Navy think about the relative strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and the Turkish Straits, but my own inclination would be to agree that the oil fields are at least as important as the Straits. The big question is: what can we do about it, and what are the best methods to employ in trying to protect Iran? As I indicated in my last letter, I am far from convinced that Iran’s safety can best be promoted by arraying her unequivocally and irrevocably in the Western camp in opposition to the Soviet Union. If I could think of a way to give real assistance to Iran without automatically forcing her into open opposition to the USSR, I would start pushing it immediately.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
As ever,
- Neither printed.↩