Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall

March 10, 1946

Informal Statement by the Generalissimo to General Marshall Just Prior to His Departure on March 10th

The Generalissimo made the following statement regarding Government-Communist relations in China, the Manchurian situation and the attitude and intentions of Soviet Russia: He is convinced that the Communist Party is loyal to Soviet Russia and in the final test, on the side of the Russians. He thinks that their intention is to infiltrate into the Government positions primarily for the purpose of gaining control of foreign policy in order to play the Soviet hand. He considers that the Communists look on General Marshall as, in effect, their protector while building up influence in the Government and reorganizing their armies. He feels that their acceptance of the demobilization and reorganization plan is largely for the purpose of obtaining well-trained, organized and equipped 18 divisions. In other words, he is unalterably of the opinion that the Communist Party is for the Communist theory of life and the Soviet-Russia regime.

The Generalissimo is loath to have any representative from Executive Headquarters in Manchuria for the reason that he assumed Communist desire for such representation was based on the idea that the Russians would demand and secure equal representation along with American officers. He considers that the Russians have favored the Communists in every way possible in Manchuria and the Communists on their side have taken every possible advantage of the opportunity afforded to the disadvantage of the Central Government.

The Generalissimo stated, he will be sitting on pins and needles for the next 18 months while the demobilization and reorganization of the armies is being made effective. (In all of his interviews with General Marshall he has voiced the same opinion regarding the intentions of the Communist Party and their dependability.)

The Generalissimo stated that he felt the American policy regarding China announced by the President⁸⁶ was 99 and a fraction percent correct, but the fact that there was a condition mentioned precedented [precedent?] to a loan, of certain requirements in the political reorganization of China, has defeated the entire effect of the message except in so far as it was of great advantage to the Communist Party. He hoped that any loan which might be granted China would have no conditions attached to it. At least there would be no public announcement of such conditions.

The Generalissimo stated that he felt that the outcome of the Manchurian question now depended on the strength of the American stand towards Russia on this subject and that of Iran; that any weakness would mean virtual emasculation of Manchuria as a part of the Chinese nation.

(Note: Despite the pessimistic view of the Generalissimo regarding the Communist position he has accepted the terms of the agreements regarding the Cessation of Hostilities and the Demobilization and Integration of the Army. He is using his great influence to bring the recalcitrant leaders of the Kuomintang Central Committee into line, their determining meeting has been in session since March 1st. These leaders have been exceedingly difficult to handle and have capitalized on the Manchurian situation in every way possible, utilizing anti-Soviet demonstrations to stir up Communist retaliation, at least in editorials and radio comments.)

86. For statement issued December 15, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1945, p. 945, and United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607.