Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting of Military Sub-Committee, Held at the Office of the Aide to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, March 9, 1946, 3 p.m.

March 9, 1946, 3 p.m.

Present:	General Chang Chih Chung
	General Chou En-lai
	General Marshall
Also present:	General Kuo
	Colonel Pee
	Mr. Chang
	General Gillem
	Colonel Shinkle
	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Eng

General Marshall: I understand General Chou wanted this meeting.

General Chou: General Chou says that we have left two problems behind. The one is the transfer of Communist troops in the Hupeh-Honan area to some other place and second one is regarding the Communist forces in Kwangtung province and he asks whether we should take it up today.

General Chang: If General Chou likes to bring up this point today, of course there will be no objection from General Chang. Regarding the situation in Kwangtung area, the Commanding General, General Chang Fa Kwei is here in Chungking, but he is ill at this time so General Chang has not yet had a chance to talk to him so he doesn’t think it is necessary to bring it up today, but to wait until he sees General Chang Fa Kwei, then he can talk this over with him. General Chang thinks the reconstruction, the reopening of railroad seems to need our discussion today. General Chang is of the opinion that it is better to arrange a meeting of General Chang, General Chou, and General Chang Fa Kwei to have a discussion first. If we can make an agreement, there is no need to bring up to this committee. If they cannot reach some agreement then they will refer to the Military Sub-Committee.

General Marshall: What about the discussion on Communist troops north of Hankow?

General Chang: Regarding the transfer of troops in Hupeh area, that had been discussed in Hankow. During part of that meeting, General Marshall was absent so he didn’t hear the proceedings of that meeting. General Chang thinks just for both sides to bring up the points, the reasons and their arguments, this afternoon again, so we will try to reach some sort of agreement.

General Chou: The reasons for the request for transfer has been explained in the meeting in Hankow and I am only repeating in brief the main points. The area controlled by the Communist forces is very narrow. It runs east–west only 180 lis and north–south 180 lis and in certain places the strip is only 60 lis. In this small area 40,000 to 50,000 troops are concentrated. Then in the western part to the west of the railway line there are also two small pieces of land controlled by the Communist forces, each reported to the American representative of the field team, so the total number of Communist troops amounts to 60,000 men and that has also been put down on the map shown to us that day. The Government forces surrounding this Communist force amount to 9 armies and the food supply was very difficult and the situation is tense and since we have in mind that both armies should be reorganized and demobilized so it is very difficult to carry it out in such a small strip of land. Not only because of difficulty of food, but also because of the intense situation. Therefore, we suggest that in the initial stage of reorganization, 40,000 of the Communist troops should rather be transferred to some other places to carry out reorganization and demobilization. We can leave a balance of about 20,000 men there which we are thinking to be demobilized and sent back to the adjacent places of that region according to the demobilization plan. As to the rest of the 40,000 they shall be transferred to other places and we have the following references for carrying out this transfer. Firstly the personnel themselves are mostly native from other places. Mostly from north and also a part from northeast and at Hankow we have suggested that they should be transferred to Wuho but that is only a proposed place. If the Government should have difficulty in letting them pass through the places controlled by the Nationalist forces, then we can also consider to transfer them to some other places controlled by the Communist forces. Secondly, in the talk between the Communist and Government representative they agreed to withdraw from, that Communists should withdraw from, Honan-Hupeh. Thirdly, if the troops are transferred to some other place, then food will be readily available because in other places under Communist troops they are the local authorities and they have stores of food. Of these troops a part will be reorganized into the regular forces and the rest will be gradually demobilized. So they can easily find employment. In this way we can work it out in accordance with the reorganization plan and also decrease the burden imposed upon the people. Otherwise if the time goes on, the burden will be too heavy for the people. Before I departed from Hankow we have made a loan from the Government but that will only last for a few days and after that food still has to be bought from the people and this cannot last for a long time. Now on our side we have worked out a plan as to the date of transfer, place of transfer, and hour. If the Government entertains fear that it might create uneasiness among the people and army located in the line of transfer, then we can also consider to carry out the transfer by railroad. In that case we will work out plans on how to get them out of Chaotsu and to speed up the repair work of the railroad. If the transfer is made on railroads then, of course, we will save the passing through the area covered by Government forces. If we have agreed to a certain principle here then we can work out a detailed plan for the transfer. I also suggest that the field teams should go together when the transfer is going to be carried out. The field team will then supervise the movement of the troops. Afterwards, the 9 armies of the National Government garrison in the neighboring region can also be reorganized and we have to work out some sort of plan so they can also be transferred because it appears to me that it would be difficult for the Government side to carry out the reorganization at that place because I think it would be easier to effect the reorganization in some cities.

General Marshall: General Chang, what is your observation regarding the plan of movement by railway to gradually evacuate these troops having in mind General Chou’s proposal to use all necessary methods to expedite the production of coal for the reestablishment of the railroads?

General Chang: General Chang views the point, the reason for the Communist side bring up the question of transfer of those troops in Honan to some other places because there is a lack of food in that area. He thinks if we can relieve the food situation, if we can solve the supply problem, then there is no need for such a movement because such a movement would involve so many complications and create so many problems. General Chou suggested two places for the discussion. One is Wuho, Anwha and Anyang, Honan. That is the latter place by movement by rail.

General Marshall: That is north of Taiyuan.

General Chou: North of Hsinsiang.

General Chang: General Chang understands that in both places there is not an abundance of food stores at all, so by movement he doesn’t think we can solve the supply problems. The first place General Chou mentioned, Wuho, is well over 400 miles en route. En route the solution will be difficult because there will be very little food and the distance is great.

General Marshall: I only asked about the railway movement.

General Chang: On the movement to Anyang, General Chang says he hasn’t enough data for that, but according to his information that he got in Hankow saying that the transport capacity of that railroad is very limited and rolling stock and coal is very limited so even if we stop all civilian traffic on that railroad it may take several months to move 40,000 men.

General Marshall: Won’t coal be moving south and the empty cars moving north?

General Chang: As far as transport is concerned, General Chang has to make inquiry about the capacity of the railroad so that we can discuss intelligently. That is as far as food and transportation capacity are concerned, General Chang mentioned those difficulties. Then, furthermore we take this point of view of the movement of those Communist troops from Hupeh to somewhere else which is different from that of the Communists. The first consideration is that no matter where they move their troops they have to pass the area garrisoned by National forces and it has to cover long distances taking several months, so we can hardly guarantee that disturbances and uneasiness will not occur during that long period over that long distance. Furthermore, in that long period, it will be bound to create uneasiness among the people and among the armies. The second consideration is that we, or most of our field commanders, do not think that the Communist proposal is to solve the food problem. They think that the movement is only to concentrate the Communist troops, concentrate their troops in another area. The National commanders in the past have asked repeatedly for troop concentrations in the area under their command, but we did not grant their request.

(General Chang then cited several cases where various commanders had asked for troop movements, but had been denied their request.)

In view of the situation we can hardly convince our commanders that we stopped them to have their troops concentrated, if we allow those 40,000 Communist troops to concentrate in some other area. So in that case it will jeopardize our effort in cessation of hostilities movement of our troops. General Chang did not bring up this point in Hankow but he thinks it is time to take it up because it is too paramount a point so we must take care of it. So General Chang thinks the best way out is to try by every means to relieve the situation and to supply the Communist troops with food instead of moving those troops out to somewhere else. General Chang thinks that in Hankow the second largest city in this country with all its communications we can solve that problem more easily than anywhere else in this country. In other words, if we can not get food in Hankow then it would be more difficult to solve that problem somewhere else. So he hoped the Communist will give up their idea of transfer of those troops and General Chou likes to make the statement that he proposed that because he does not like to create more problems. He has no other prejudice or other meaning behind his statement. It will jeopardize our effort we have made in the past. Before General Chang left Hankow he gave very specific instructions to General Kang in that area, the commanding officer in that area, for him to contact the Communist officer to solve the problem and to assist the Communists to solve the food problem. So, regarding that problem, if we work on the angle that we only try to solve the food situation there it is much more simpler and easier than to consider the problem of transfer of troops.

General Marshall: I assume that in the process of demobilization, extensive movements of individuals, even troops, will become necessary under the instructions to be carried out by the Executive Headquarters. Within 10 days we should receive a list from the Communist Party of the first troops to be demobilized during the first 2 months. General Chou, I believe, stated that 40,000 of the 60,000 men were to be demobilized.

General Chou: Demobilization will be carried out in two stages not the 40,000 men at one time.

General Marshall: Is 40,000 the total of people he has down there. That is over the 20,000 he is leaving down there.

General Chou: Altogether there are 60,000.

General Marshall: 40,000 to go, 20,000 to remain. Let us suppose that on the list to be supplied by the Communist Party within the next 10 days appears units representing 40,000 for the initial demobilization. I am just supposing this. Then what is General Chang’s solution for that situation. Do we demobilize them or do we leave them there indefinitely in the future or is Executive Headquarters permitted under the plans to move them somewhere. Is everyone that is to be demobilized to remain in the same place he is demobilized—demobilization should start within the next 10 days. Are the Commanders in the field going to resent any movement or demobilization.

General Chang: General Chang thinks that for the movement of demobilized personnel it will come under the over-all plan of demobilization, but the point raised by General Chou this afternoon is to move troops from one place to another place at a particular area. In the over-all demobilization plan we will move troops of deactivated personnel, that will be undergone presently, there will be no distinction of spot at all, but this advises a particular spot, so he says it is different. General Chang mentioned in Hankow that it is better to leave that problem until the carrying out of the over-all plan of demobilization, that is solve that problem within the scope of the demobilization plan, so he thinks his idea is very close to that of yours. So General Chou thinks that the problem under question will not exist when we carry out that detailed plan of demobilization.

General Marshall: General Chou, you have within your option to designate a certain portion of that group for demobilization. You have it within your privilege to state when and the process of demobilization implies the movement of individuals to their home districts. That process should commence in the next two weeks. If the food question is solved during the interim period would not the demobilization procedure permit a solution on a principal part of the problem. I would assume it is not desired to leave these men there in a demobilized state in that particular region.

General Chou: I think there are two considerations involved in this problem. Regarding the plan for demobilization we should have a separate plan applicable to the Hupeh region and this has to be fixed and the demobilization in this part will be carried out at an earlier time. In connection with this question, the demobilized personnel will not remain in that area, but have to be sent to other places and which involves a quite large number of people and before their departure the personnel in those areas still have to be fed there in this narrow area and this problem still has to be solved. Now the second consideration is a large part of the troops now stationed in this area will be reorganized into the regular army because these troops have a high fighting strength and is rather well-equipped and after the reorganization has started it is not conceivable to leave this army as a division in this place because it appears to me that the division has to at least be located in the vicinity of the city, since the city is not within the control of this army so it seems rather impossible, so we still have to consider the problem of transfer of Communists to some other places, because it is very unlikely that the reorganization can be carried out in the rural area as it is now, because it would be difficult to have them all assemble to one spot. So today we have the problem of supply food and tomorrow we will consider the problem of reorganization and all this has to be solved in order to reach complete solution of this matter and General Chang has just said that the headquarters at Hankow will assist in provisioning food to the troops, but that would only assist in some way to solve the problem, but it would not give a certain ultimate solution to this problem, otherwise a serious situation will occur. In raising this problem I have in mind to reach a solution satisfactory to all and since we have to solve it once and for all, I think we better solve it either today or some time in the future.

General Marshall: General Gillem, you have been working on this problem of demobilization procedure, have you any comments to make on this?

General Gillem: It seems to me that a temporary solution could be arrived at by the transportation of food in the area available through transport in this area. Within several weeks the lists of units to be retained will be received at the headquarters here in Chungking. At that time it can be determined whether the units involved in the area under discussion are to be retained.

General Marshall: It will be on the list wanted.

General Gillem: The disposition of remaining troops must be determined at that time. Can this problem be postponed until those lists are examined and the units designated? If that is so, the decision as to the disposition of the remaining troops can be arranged at that time. It seems obvious that in the reorganization we will incur troop movements. Therefore in the interim the commanders in command should be informed of this change or other changes and instructions can then be issued. Does General Chou think the postponement is too hazardous to await this time, several weeks?

General Chou: General Chou inquires about the food problem. It seems to him that your statement has not clearly indicate on [defined?] the food problem.

General Gillem: General Marshall conferred with the UNRRA representatives the morning we left Hankow. Assurance was given at that time that priority effort would be made to relieve the situation in this area. If this city and the surrounding transportation systems is utilized, the situation should be simpler of solution than the other areas where transportation is not so varied. Can we await the period which will bring in the lists without jeopardizing the situation. In the meantime efforts will be made to determine the status of the UNRRA assistance.

General Chou: Now as General Chou understands the UNRRA is only to supply the civilians but is not the agency to feed the armies. When General Chou was in Hankow he made inquiry as to the supply and they have told him that the food situation is very difficult. We should take definite matters for the food supply of those troops and if the army should take food from the people which obtained the food from the UNRRA then the relation between the army and the people would be very bad. General Chou is especially anxious about the food matters which we will have to work out so as to insure the supply to the troops.

General Chang: General Chang thinks the problem is rather simple. Let us not get into making it complex. Regarding movement of troops, wait until the detailed demobilization plan has been worked out then the movement will also of course be solved. When the over-all plan has been worked out then we will carry that plan out then that movement will be a part of the over-all plan. So the point to settle now is the food problem. Regarding the food supply, General Chang promised to discuss with General Chou in order to get effective solution. The food problem does not exist in just one spot, that is the Hupeh area, nor has it existed for the past few weeks. It has been a problem for the past six months. That is a problem to many many localities. General Chang thinks that to tackle the food problem in Hupeh is far easier than to tackle those problems somewhere else in some other areas in this country. General Chang wishes to make this proposal. Regarding movement of troops, wait until the implementation of the demobilization plan. There is no need to discuss at this moment. Regarding the food supply he will get responsible officers in the Ministry of War together and work out an effective plan with General Chou.

General Marshall: That would seem to take care of the food problem. Is General Chou willing to delay the solution of movements until the lists are in?

General Chou: General Chou says that if the food problem can be solved within the short interim period before the detailed plan on demobilization will be worked out in two weeks then he thinks that is acceptable, but if the food problem is still left unsolved at that time he would raise the question again.

General Marshall: What is the next issue to be discussed?

General Chou: Regarding the Kwangtung problem General Chou has before commented, but was then interrupted by General Chang, but he thinks that while General Marshall is still here, it is very important to settle the question in relation to that. This time we have cancelled part of our trip to cover Canton in accordance with the Generalissimo’s directive that General Chang Fa Kuei come here so it can be discussed in Chungking. I have contacted General Chang Fa Kuei the commander in the Canton area, this morning and so far as I could determine he does not recognize the directive issued by the National Government to him, directing him to recognize the status of Communist troops there and to reach a solution. He told me that the part south of the Yangtze River does not come under the provision of the cease fire order and I told him that the cease fire order does not come into effect only in certain extent as far as it affects the troop movements only for the purpose of troop reorganization, but it does not justify him to fight the Communist troops even though the Communist troops are only a very small number. Only at the end he conceded that if the Government would give him a new directive then he would act accordingly. Therefore, I wish to repeat my suggestion that even though the Communist troops in Kwangtung are very few they should be recognized. One of the men of the Communist side has arrived in Chungking yesterday and he knows the whereabouts of that unit, but I regret to say that he is not in a position to state possibly where they are right now because if he reveals their location they probably would again be attacked since they only amount to a very small number, but I can state that we can find them and we are willing to evacuate them from that place because if they would remain there they would again be attacked as bandits and they would have to resist. I would suggest that the restoration be done by sea so we would avoid any conflict. I hope that I can have General Marshall’s assistance in this matter.

General Marshall: It seems to me that this problem resolves into 2 or 3 different considerations. The first one is General Chang Fai Kwei who according to General Chou, maintains that the cease fire order does not apply south of the Yangtze. It seems to me that it is not for him to interpret—it is up to the Government to interpret and as far as I am concerned the basic plan did include south China. In the second place, if the comments of General Chang Fa Kwei that these men are not Communists, that is a matter for discussion here between General Chang and General Chou or the Government and the Chairman of the Communist Party will become involved. However, it seems to me there is no excuse in the delay in the interpretation. If it does not apply to that region, it does not apply to a lot of other regions where I think it is intended to apply. I wrote most of the paper myself. Now it seems to me at the present situation the quickest way to solve the delicate situation is to do as General Chou has suggested. To transport these people to some other place by sea, say Chefoo or some other place. If that were an acceptable solution I would undertake to find out from Admiral Cooke if he could arrange the shipping. I brought up that problem first myself with Chairman Mao Tse-tung to see if they would entertain any such procedure before I considered the matter with Admiral Cooke. Now I brought it up to the meeting. If that were to be done we would have to designate a specific time and with the American representative as the head should have the authority to arrange the procedure of collection and embarkation. Any comments?

General Chang: General Chang raised no objection to either General Marshall’s or General Chou’s views, but according to his understanding that before we took the trip that it was intended for him and General Chou to confer with General Chang Fa Kuei, but unfortunately General Chou went to see General Chang Fa Kuei without notifying him so he understands nothing of the situation at all and today he gets all these reports and he regrets very much that he is not intimate with the situation he cannot give any better explanation. It is not a question of interpretation of the cease fire order. Of course it will govern south of the Yangtze River and the field team is now at Canton and the Government has sent instructions for the field team to proceed to work there. So at this moment we have to consider how to solve the problem. It is not a matter of interpretation of the paper.

General Chou: General Chou comments that he agrees with General Chang’s views that there is no use to argue now, but we should try to reach a solution.

General Marshall: I proposed one. I assume that General Chang would still like to consult with General Chang Fa Kuei.

General Chang: General Chang likes to contact General Chang Fa Kuei simply to find out the situation and he is not to leave Chang Fa Kuei to decide on these matters.

General Marshall: I don’t understand what he meant. I proposed a solution, but I assumed that he would like to speak to General Chang Fa Kuei before he makes his decision.

General Chang: General Chang heard from General Chang Fa Kuei that we have difficulty in locating the Communists.

General Marshall: I understand General Chou promises to locate them.

General Chou: Provided General Chang Fa Kuei will give him freedom to meet them.

General Marshall: I assumed the located would wish to do it in the presence of the team. The team would be a guarantee of what we call safe conduct.

General Chang: General Chang thinks there is not a point of issue for it only involves 2 or 3 thousand men.

General Marshall: Well, if they are being shot at it is quite an issue with the 2 or 3 thousand men. If I were one of them I would be greatly interested. Now if agreeable to you gentlemen I will go ahead and make an inquiry of Admiral Cooke as to what the possibilities are. It will save that much time.⁸⁴

General Chang and General Chou agreed.

General Marshall: We would probably have to have a stipulated area to collect because the Navy will not take men that have not had certain injections. If we could find some place where a LST could put its nose in that would suffice. We need a little more than a protected beach. What is the next subject to be discussed?

General Chang: Regarding the reopening of railroad communications we have received report from the Ministry of Communications up to the 7th of this month.

Colonel Pee then read a list of accusations against the Communists for setting up in various area railway administrative areas.

General Chang thinks that the administration should be done by the Ministry of Communications. General Chang thinks it is urgent to abolish those jurisdictions on those strips in order that the administration will not be divided.

General Chou: On this problem I think there will be no question for the repairing work there will be no objection to that for the various parties it has already been made clear and the Executive Headquarters on coming back to Peiping will also issue orders and according to this report they also admitted in certain places that repair work is under way and it did not need orders from Yenan. Secondly, as the railway administration and the personnel problem I have raised this question at the discussion on the restoration of communications and at that time I suggested that we should lay down some principle here to avoid dissension in the lower level, but that time we referred it to the Executive Headquarters and the Executive Headquarters in its turn again delayed the matter saying that it should be taken up after the repair work has been started and so no solution has yet been reached and according with this table it has raised many points regarding separate administration set up. However, I note that a large section of this the Communists have set up a bureau and I don’t understand why it has not been included on the list. Probably I assume that the Ministry of Communications is willing to cooperate with that Communist bureau. I suggest that the railway problem should be considered as a whole and the Railway Control Section of the Executive Headquarters should get together with the representatives of the Ministry of Communications in Peiping. There is no doubt that the personnel should be selected according to their abilities and I regret that up till now no solution has yet been made. Therefore, I still suggest that the Railway Control Section of the Executive Headquarters should immediately confer with the representatives of the Ministry of Communications to reach a solution about the administration.

General Marshall: I am writing instructions for the Executive Headquarters.

Captain Eng then read the text as follows (translating it into Chinese):

“The Committee of Three directs that Executive Headquarters should immediately require the Railway Control Section to confer with Ministry of Communications on question of unified administration of all railroads. It is the view of the Committee that Communist personnel who are proving their qualifications by active performance of such duties at present time should be given favorable consideration for continued employment.”

General Chang: General Chang suggests to add the following: “Abolish the existing Communist administrative organizations.”

General Marshall: I understand. What is General Chou’s comment?

General Chou: It is not the station organization but the administration because some of those stations are still actually within Communist territory.

General Marshall: My proposal implies directly a unified control so unless General Chang feels that it will all be placed under the Communists it will, of necessity, be either accepted or abolished.

General Chang: General Chang insists on addition of the sentence.

General Marshall: I think that sentence confuses the issue as represented in this paragraph. This directs an immediate conference with a railway administration [to] produce a unified administrative control. The question is whether it is the view of this committee that those Communist individuals who are now discharging the duties efficiently should be given favorable consideration for employment. Now the addition of that sentence throws a confusion really into what this is. The sentence settled it before they confer. This says a unified control, this says Communist individuals shall be considered, given favorable consideration and it puts it on the basis of an arrangement between the Railway Control Section and the Ministry of Communications. That single sentence that General Chang proposed obviates the necessity of saying anything of this. It is a mandatory order. Otherwise there is no possibility of having any of this as we just say the Communists are out. There is no basis of conference then. I think this makes it possible for them to arrange the thing in an orderly manner. I don’t mean that this wording is as correct as it should be, but that is the idea. I am sorry to say that the Generalissimo wishes to see me and I will have to withdraw. I have to go down to the country to see him. If you wish to have a meeting with me Monday some time, I will be very glad to meet. If you decide now on Monday morning and let me know I will arrange my day accordingly. Meanwhile if you will excuse me and continue your meeting.

General Marshall then departed and turned the meeting over to General Gillem.

General Chang: General Chang says that he has to report to the meeting in the morning.

General Gillem: What time suits his convenience.

General Chang: 3 o’clock.

General Chou agreed.

General Gillem: Then we shall continue this on Monday at 3 o’clock.⁸⁵ It is also the desire of the committee to send this message?

General Chang and General Chou agreed to send the message to Executive Headquarters.

84. See telegram No. 306, March 9, from General Marshall to Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, p. 613.
85. For minutes of meeting on March 11, see p. 543.