Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Statement Made by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall Regarding Chinese Communist Position Toward Manchuria, March 10th, 194687
Regarding the Northeastern problem it was not our party that was to be blamed for giving rise to it. From the very outset we have been willing to see it solved along with the overall problem of China, and we have drawn a sharp distinction between what is domestic and what [Page 530] is external affairs. Such was our consistent attitude. Accordingly we have never interfered with the negotiation conducted between the National Government and Soviet Russia; this you can readily verify from government people in charge of the negotiation. As to the domestic aspect of the matter, we have never rejected consultation. If the opponent party would only express a desire for settlement, we had been eager to meet that desire. For example, in early December, when the Nationalist troops are moving along the railway section between Chin-chow and Mukden, the government representative in the Northeast Chang Chia-ngau called on Tung Pi-wu, one of our representatives here, to talk the matter over. Tung Pi-wu then made it very clear to him, that if the Nationalist troops are moving toward Mukden for the purpose to take over the sovereignty of places under Soviet control, then the Chinese Communists shall not meddle in their business. But he also warned them not to move westwards, with a design to attack the Communists, and thereby unleash the war. This shows that at that time the government forces would meet no opposition, if they were bound for Mukden. But what actually happened later was that the Nationalist forces changed the course of their troop movement and launched an attack westward toward Jehol, which was stopped only shortly after the issuance of the Cease Fire Order. This testifies that even before the truce we have never refused to discuss directly with the government over the Northeastern problem, though, we have strong objection to any complication of the domestic affairs with the external affairs.
However, the propaganda of the Kuomintang was since the very beginning directed to the opposite end, they confuse the domestic with the diplomatic aspect of the matter. Ever since the situation of the Northeast has become critical, the government in the last three months—not in February alone—has deliberately endeavored to mix up domestic matters with matters relating to diplomacy. To all these moves we kept silent, instead to voice any reaction, because we were then concerned to bring the PCC to a successful end. This again proves that from the very beginning we have not been inclined to let the Northeastern problem grow to such alarming proportions as to jeopardize the success of the PCC.
As to the speedy growth of the Communist forces in Manchuria, it will be easily apprehended, if a frank explanation is made to you. When the Japanese surrendered, the government denied the Communist troops any area of receiving surrender, or the right to participate in receiving surrender. All the large cities were taken over by the Nationalist forces with U. S. assistance of transportation means. Under such circumstances, the Communist forces in seeking a way out moved northeastward across the Hopei and Jehol border. At that [Page 531] time the Northeast was largely a vacuum, seeing that the Soviet forces were mainly distributed along the railways, consequently there was much room left for the Communist forces to conduct activities. As a result we disarmed many puppet troops there, managed to get the people organized, and before the Nationalist forces moved in, set up many local popularly-elected civil authorities. All this is very logical to the situation. And yet the Chinese Communists have not because of that ignored the point that the Nationalist troops may enter Manchuria to effect the taking over of sovereignty from the Soviet troops. Provision to this effect has in fact been laid down in the truce agreement. Nor have the Chinese Communists asserted that hostilities should not be stopped there. This was also provided for in the agreement. Since we have been willing to commit ourselves to that agreement, it readily proves that we have never entertained the intention of demanding a separate status for the Northeast. To your suggestion made toward the end of January that a field team should be sent to Yingkow, we have promptly expressed our agreement, this further proves that we have not considered the Northeast as an exceptional case not to be covered by the general agreement. However, the despatch of field team was delayed for over a month, without a decision having been made. Meanwhile National forces kept on pouring into Manchuria. Whereas following the stipulations of the truce agreement, the government should have reported daily to the Executive Headquarters about the troop movements there, that has never been complied with. These incidents show that the government is deliberately evading any discussion on the Northeastern problem, and denying us any chance to raise that question. The result then was that the issue has been hanging for over a month, and we were left in such a situation that somehow we have to clarify our position in Manchuria ourselves. But in clarifying our stand, we definitely adhered to the following principles:
- (1)
- We will not have ourselves involved in the external affairs in connection with the Northeast, instead we draw a sharp distinction between the domestic and external aspects of the matter.
- (2)
- We desire a simultaneous solution of the military and political matters pertaining to the Northeast. Since in the military field we have assented to the despatch of field teams, it implies of course that the five armies sent up by the government are entitled to take over certain places, and it further implies that after peace is restored in the Northeast, we may take the next step of reorganizing the armies. In the basic agreement we have conceded, that the government may maintain five armies in the Northeast, even down to the final month, which by that time would constitute one fourth of the total armed strength of China. It means that we have conceded to an overwhelming military supremacy on part of the government in Manchuria, and laid no claim over the maintenance of a strong regular [Page 532] Communist force there which would have appeared rather well-grounded, seeing that right now we are maintaining a huge force in that part of China, instead, we demand only for political democracy, the application of the PCC decisions to the Northeast, the reorganization of the Northeastern Political Council and the various provincial governments, and the implementation of the provisions of the Joint Platform88 with respect to local self-government.
In view of the above, it appears to me, that there has been nothing wrong with our party to publish such a statement.
As to the situation prevailing in the last three weeks, all can be easily understood. Even before the announcement of Yenan, the CC clique of the Kuomintang has in February attempted to link up everything pertaining to Soviet Russia with us. As I have stated, for three whole months we have completely ignored the propaganda and the allegations of the Kuomintang. I even have not cared to talk about it to the pressmen. But in the demonstrations staged in February, many things without slightest connection with the Chinese Communist party, were charged upon us. At this instant, a series of incidents occurred, thus we have had the mass rally bloodshed, the demolition of the Hsin Hwa Jih Pao and Democracy press, the mob action at Peiping Executive Headquarters, the destruction of the Hsin Hwa paper agency in Chengtu, and the disturbance at the Sian office of the Eighteenth Group Army. These rowdy elements have taken no action whatsoever against the Soviet embassy and consulate, instead they made us their sole target. All the time we remained reticent, until we made a last reply only recently. For two months the irreconcilables have misused us, followed by illicit actions, and the sole reason given by them for their actions was that we have advocated separate status for the Northeast, that we want the Northeast to be exceptional not to be covered by the general agreements. As a matter of fact, our desire is just the very opposite of that; we strongly oppose the view that Northeast should be an exceptional case not to be covered by the general agreements; we want to make all the agreements governing cease fire, army reorganization, protection of people’s rights, reorganization of the government, joint platforms etc., etc. applicable to the Northeast. While they allege that we rely on Soviet Russia, the actual truth spoke the very opposite. If we had really relied on Soviet Russia, then the Chihfeng incident would never have occurred and we would never have requested the despatch of field teams and your personal trip to the Northeast. Just because in the past we had been so extremely reluctant to give explanation on this matter publicly, it became possible for the irreconcilable elements to mobilize [Page 533] scores of newspapers to slander the Chinese Communists, to hoodwink the people, and to stage a series of demonstrations against us.
For example, in front of the building of the Chinese Communist Delegation, demonstrations passed by for many days incessantly, and every one of us was insulted by them. But even in the afternoon of February twenty second, when the Hsin Hwa press was demolished, I came amid the big mass to the meeting of the military sub-committee. Through four hours’ efforts, we reached final settlement on the terms of the army reorganization plan. On the following Monday, we signed the official document.89 But in all those days, our people were condemned and beaten by the irreconcilable element. By then, the Central Committee meeting of the Kuomintang was not yet convened.
As I do not want to bother you with those domestic strifes, I have not cared to talk about it to you, nor to furnish you with any kind of materials in connection with that. However, the CC cliquers, and a part of the San Min Youth Corp elements have maliciously misused us for two whole months. Being thus insulted and beaten, Yenan finally replied; a part of those statements have subsequently been reprinted in the Hsin Hwa Jih Pao. However, all of them were of a defensive nature. As to myself, I have never made any public statement on the Northeastern problem yet. Even before we took the trip, I specifically asked what unanimous answer there should be when questioned by the press on the Northeastern problem. My motive then was that I like to avoid anything that might be construed to be a piece of propaganda.
From the above it is clear, that the responsibility of the provocations for the last two months lay solely on the party agencies of the Kuomintang.
As to the Kuomintang Central Committee meeting, their attempt is to upset all the decisions laid down by the PCC; they are opposing not only the Chinese Communist Party but also all the people within Kuomintang who are for peace, democracy and unification. In the Session of the past few days the CC cliques upbraided others almost everyday. This is something which not even General Chang Chih-chung cared to deny. The other day Dr. Sun Fo and Mr. Shao Li-tze also did not deny this when we were discussing the Draft Constitution at Dr. Sun Fo’s residence. It is therefore not the Communist propaganda and statement that would have spoiled some of the achievements of the past; the case is: these reactionary elements first started the fuss, and they even demanded to recall the Kuomintang PCC delegates. Mr. Chen Li-fu, though he himself is a PCC delegate, directed the reactionaries to oppose the PCC from behind the scene. They are opposing Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Mr. Shao Li-tze, General Chang Chun [Page 534] and Dr. Sun Fo, and they even oppose General Chang Chih-chung, Dr. T. V. Soong and Dr. Wong Wen-hao. In fact they oppose everybody who does not belong to their clique. All these have no direct relations with the Chinese Communist Party and the Northeastern problem. The CC cliquers are aiming to overturn the decisions of the PCC; they deem that these decisions are to the disadvantage of their own clique. Because of these very facts, I am afraid that these PCC decisions may be overturned by them. They want to change all the PCC decisions, especially the Principles for Revision of Draft Constitution so that the constitution will become something to maintain a totalitarian rule instead of a democratic one. As to the government reorganization they want, on the one hand, to expel those Kuomintang members who are in favor of peace and democracy out of the government; on the other, they want all the lists of the non-Kuomintang members who are to take part in the government, to be passed by the Kuomintang Central Committee. As to the National Assembly they want to change the apportionment of representatives. As to the Joint Platform, they want the Communist controlled areas to be taken over by their despatched officers and forbid general election. They further demanded that the decisions of the PCC should not be binding on the representatives of various parties of the National Assembly. All these also have nothing to do with the Northeast.
So in my opinion, the Northeastern problem is only their pretext, and as a matter of fact, the irreconcilables are reluctant to give up the power of one-party dictatorship. This is the essential cause. It is because of my anxiety over the future of China, that I find it necessary to work out a solution on the Northeastern problem, and I hope to work it out before you leave China. Our party has no intention of making the Northeast an exception or to have a separate status there. This has no connection whatsoever with the diplomatic problems. If objection is made to the solution of this problem then it is tantamount to let the Northeastern problem form an exception, and this entails the danger of civil war. But this is not our inclination, and to this we have been persistently opposing.
I like to explain our attitude with two examples. One month ago several American correspondents came to me to ask about our attitude about the question of Soviet withdrawal from the Northeast. These correspondents were well acquaintanced with me so I told them frankly that if we are only considering our own interest, we think the sooner the Soviet troops withdraw the better. Because if the Soviet troops withdraw and the government troops are not yet arriving, of course the places from which the Soviets have withdrawn will be taken over by our troops. If the Soviet troops will not withdraw, then at last the places will certainly be taken over by the Government troops. [Page 535] However we don’t like to announce this publicly lest we might be giving others the wrong impression as if we want to monopolize the whole Northeast. The next day, the A. P. correspondent made a brief report on this saying that I am in favor of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But this had never been mentioned nor published by the Kuomintang papers, because it could not fit into the pattern of their propaganda.
Besides, during this tour you have received many anti-Communist materials while we declined to offer you the anti-Kuomintang materials. In fact I also got many materials to that effect, which are at hand to give you to read. However I did not do so; the reason is in case the Northeastern problem has already been solved, there will not be any need to mention it. I have talked with you in the same way; that is to try to solve the problem and not to make the problem more complicated or to cause trouble. I think you will admit it is true.