Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

867N.01/12–2746

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)⁹

top secret

[Washington,] December 27, 1946.

Subject: United States Policy Regarding Palestine

The Palestine question and the related question of the future of the Jewish DP’s form an open sore, the infection from which tends to spread rather than to become localized. Moreover, the almost world-wide feeling of insecurity felt by Jews, results in something like a cosmic Jewish urge with respect to Palestine. But the development of our Palestine policy up to this time in regard to these questions and pressures, however well-intentioned, has not contributed anything concrete to their solution, and seems unlikely to do so in its present form. Not only is our Palestine policy of no real assistance to the Jews (whatever it may afford them in the way of moral encouragement), it keeps us constantly on the edge of embroilment with the British and the Arabs. Therefore, it is desirable to reconsider our policy in order to see whether it cannot be improved.

The main defects appear to be these:

1. We advocate and press for the admission of 100,000 Jewish DP’s into Palestine. By so doing we have pleased the Jews. But they now probably realize that it is unlikely that we are going either to force these Jews upon Palestine by direct action, or to exert decisive pressure upon the British to do so. Since the British remain adamant against all Jewish immigration save for a trickle (1,500 a month), in the absence of an overall solution for Palestine, most Jews have now completely rationalized illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine, which they assert is as legal, or as justified, as the Boston Tea Party. This is a situation from which no good can be expected.

Moreover, the 100,000 figure has lost meaning. Originally, at the time of the Harrison report, this was the approximate number of Jews in DP camps in the American and British zones in Europe for whom the Jewish Agency requested certificates in June 1945. The number is now probably over 250,000, which is certainly too many for Palestine over a short period of time, even neglecting political considerations. An examination of the DP and political situations as a whole might indicate more or less than 100,000 but there is no longer, in the absence of a re-assessment, any persuasive reason to rest on a particular figure.

2. Our position on a political settlement for Palestine is qualified and to some extent indefinite. While it has given some satisfaction to the more moderate “viable state” Zionists, it does not go as far as they would like. It is definitely out of line with the Biltmore program which envisages a Jewish state in all of Palestine, and even more out of line with the Revisionist program which includes Trans Jordan. Therefore, our policy is only moderately satisfactory to the Zionists.

3. Our policy, while not meeting the demands of the Zionists, is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicaps and may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world.

It seems true to say that our policy has gradually taken form, though it is still somewhat indefinite, as the result of the pressures that have been applied to us from various directions. We go as far as we can to please the Zionists and other Jews without making the Arabs and the British too angry.

The main point which it is desired to make in this memorandum is that our policy, as it stands, is one of expediency, not one of principle. Time after time we have been maneuvered into acceptance of more or less specific propositions: 100,000 immigrants; a compromise between the Goldmann and British Government schemes, and we have then had the task—not always easy—of finding principles to justify them.

In the formulation of any policy which is really worth while, the procedure must be the exact opposite. We ought to proceed from principle to the specific, not vice versa. Operating a policy of expediency is an uncomfortable and dangerous business which we ought to get out of with all speed possible.

What should our Palestine policy, based on principle, be? First let the main premises be stated. These seem to be:

(1) Palestine is an A Mandate. As such, it was to be prepared for independence. Were it not for the complication of the Jewish National Home, it would be independent today, as all the other A mandates have become. Arabs and Jews live there and must, sooner or later, come to some sort of a political agreement based on a minimum of mutual confidence and give-and-take, if they are to govern Palestine.

(2) The Jewish National Home was and is a new concept, undefined. The British statesmen who worked out the Balfour Declaration thought that the Jewish National Home would probably develop into a Jewish state, but they underestimated or misjudged the Arab reaction (Balfour did not realize that Arabs lived in Palestine).

(3) The Jews could run Palestine if it were full of Jews; the Arabs if it were full of Arabs.

(4) The Jewish DP problem, as well as the almost universal Jewish feeling of insecurity, presses powerfully and perhaps irresistibly upon Palestine in both the human and political sense.

(5) The reception accorded by Arabs, Jews, or both, to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, to the Grady Mission plan—indeed, to all schemes and plans proposed by third parties—strongly indicates that no third-party plan has any chance of success, unless imposed and maintained by force.

The foregoing, taken together with the considerations mentioned earlier, plus certain general considerations which are in all of our minds, appears to lead to a set of principles which could appropriately constitute our Palestine policy.

The following is an attempt to state them:

(1) The mandate (or trusteeship) for Palestine should be replaced as soon as possible by independence. The form which Palestinian independence takes should be decided by free agreement between interested Arabs and Jews within and without Palestine, and must conform to United Nations principles. Questions relating to representation of Arabs and Jews for the purpose of the negotiations should be decided by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, which will be formulated after hearings. The area of the Holy Places should be placed under a trusteeship administered by the British Government. Immigration and land ownership policies will be determined by the political entity or entities created as the result of the Arab-Jewish negotiations, subject to guarantees agreed upon between Arabs and Jews and approved by the General Assembly of UN on the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council.

(2) The United States will support any political arrangement for Palestine agreed to as the result of the negotiations between Arabs and Jews and approved by the United Nations.

(3) Until the security system of the United Nations is able to provide, directly or indirectly, for the general security of the Near Eastern area, and possibly by virtue and under the authority of that system when in operation, Great Britain should have control, under trusteeship, of an adequate area or adequate areas and facilities in Palestine for the purpose of providing regional security, such areas and facilities to be demarcated and specified by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee (?).

(4) Pending agreement between Arabs and Jews on the future of Palestine, the existing mandate should be replaced by a trusteeship under the United Nations, administered by Great Britain. Detailed immigration and land settlement policy should be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, which will consider the views and claims of those interested, including the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and the International Refugee Organization.

The foregoing is merely in the nature of a suggestion. The important thing is for us to adopt a policy of principle and general procedure which will be approved as fair and reasonable by the general public in this and other countries, and to break away from a policy of attempting to thread a way between the specific projects and plans of the contending pressure groups. A policy of principle and procedure would also be a move in the direction of getting world responsibility and handling for the world problems, which the Palestine and Jewish problems are.

The reasoning in this memorandum is capable of development at various points and can be expanded, if you think it of sufficient interest, along such lines as you may desire. Also, if you think it worthwhile, an estimate can be made as to the probable reactions of the Arabs and Jews to the suggested modification of our policy, and, more fundamental, an assessment can be made of what there would be in it for both Arabs and Jews.

Gordon P. Merriam

9. Transmitted by Mr. Henderson to Mr. Acheson with an undated memorandum which stated: “I feel that you should read the attached memo from Mr. Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division. Of course we have practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in the U.S. in direction of a ‘viable Jewish state’. I must confess that when I view our policy in light of principles avowed by us I become uneasy.” The files do not disclose the reaction of Mr. Acheson.