891.00/12–2346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 23—12:35 p.m.]
1619. While view expressed by French officials33 has also been suggested by various persons here, I do not believe it correct. Soviet [Page 565] Govt made strenuous efforts, through its Ambassador here and through Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, to prevent Iranian Govt from sending its troops to Azerbaijan. Both Shah and Qavam considered I these efforts genuine and expected that USSR would assist Azerbaijanis much more effectively than they did. For this reason original military plan of Iranian Govt extended only to occupation of Mianeh. If this could be achieved Iranians planned to wait and see what happened. Sudden collapse of Tabriz movement was obviously as great surprise to Qavam as it was to Shah and everyone else.
Why Soviets failed to give more assistance to their puppets in Tabriz is difficult to judge here. From evidence we can see whole question was badly handled by Soviet officials from beginning. Such help as Soviets gave Azerbaijan regime during past year was rather niggard and accompanied by close bargaining. Soviets made Azerbaijanis pay high prices in wheat and other commodities for such supplies as were accorded. While considerable amounts of automatic rifles, ammunition, and light equipment were furnished, no heavy armament was included. Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, instead of guiding regime unobtrusively, demonstrated his control in brazen and swaggering manner, thus depriving Pishavari of the considerable local support he gained among Azerbaijanis during early days of regime. As result, when Iranian forces entered province local people themselves overthrew regime. Of the large number of persons sent into Azerbaijan from Caucasus, only two, Pishavari and Daneshyan, appear to have had much ability.
Soviet Ambassador here or his principals in Moscow misjudged Qavam’s psychology and overplayed their hand by threatening him personally. Qavam had been wavering on question of notification to SC but Soviet threat angered him. When he received word that US concurred in his right to notify Council he decided to do so on the spot, without even consulting his Cabinet.
It is suggested that Soviet failure to send combat units to support Azerbaijan may have resulted from fact that Azerbaijan regime collapsed too fast, from internal considerations in USSR, from broader questions of foreign policy connected with Europe, from fear of SC and world opinion censure, or combination of all of them. General impression here is that SC saved Iran from invasion.
Department requested repeat to Moscow if appropriate. Moscow’s views regarding foregoing would be useful to us.
Sent Paris repeated Dept as 1619.
- Telegram 6202, December 20, 5 p.m., from Paris (repeated to Tehran and Moscow), reported that French officials had expressed the view that the Soviet Union had come to an understanding with the Iranian Prime Minister under which it abandoned the Tabriz regime and secured a firm promise from Qavam that the Majlis would ratify the Soviet oil concession at an early date (891.6363/12–2046).↩