891.00/12–2746: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 27—4:06 p.m.]
4476. Paris telegram 6202, December 20.34 While we would not exclude possibility that Azerbaijan rebel collapse was due to USSR having abandoned Tabriz for oil deal with Qavam Government, we are more inclined to accept obvious interpretation that Shah and Qavam called Tabriz bluff and that USSR, caught unprepared in Azerbaijan, decided not to show its hand by interfering openly on behalf of its puppet (Department’s 2177, December 2435). British Minister Counselor here also believes that Tabriz collapse was not result of a Moscow–Tehran deal.
Essential factor causing Tabriz collapse was that when Tehran had mustered its quailing courage, and calling upon United Nations, had suddenly challenged Tabriz to showdown, USSR decided to let its Azerbaijan stooges fall rather than overtly support them—and thereby show its hand. Had, however, Tabriz made any show of determined stand, USSR might well have come to its aid with at least a major propaganda campaign.
To us, most surprising element in situation was weakness camouflaged Soviet military and political machine in Azerbaijan. Granting that regime had alienated masses, it still seems strange that USSR had not organized in province forces composed, if necessary, largely of Soviet Azerbaijani adequate to resist timid tentative Iranian advance. Poor organization and overconfidence may account for this Soviet failure.
If USSR lacked inside Azerbaijan reliable instrument to defend its interests there, only alternative by which it could retain control would be to march Soviet Army back into that Iranian province. Had issue been solely between USSR and Iran, Soviet Army might now be in Zenjan. But because of Qavam’s appeal issue threatened to become concern of UN with USA actively interested in it. It was these considerations which presumably gave Kremlin pause. Iran is no stronger than UN and UN, in last analysis, is no stronger than USA. [The Soviet Union?] for a complex of external and internal reasons is not willing on ground which is not well prepared to face at present a showdown with USA.
Collapse of Azerbaijan house of cards was a major victory for UN—and for a firm policy toward USSR.
[Page 567]It must not be thought, however, that Kremlin will resign itself to this humiliating reverse. It will continue to maneuver not only for oil concessions but also for political (and strategic) ascendency in Iran.
Department, please repeat Tehran as Moscow’s 151 and Paris, as Moscow’s 459.