891.00/3–2046: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)
most immediate
239. We are not in a position, in view of uncertainty of course of events in Iran, to give you definite instructions in reply to urtel 371 [Page 376] Mar 20.42 We leave to your discretion the reply you should make to Shah or Govt if you are approached for advice as to whether they should remain in Tehran or move to some other place. We have full confidence in your judgment and are sure you will not give any advice which will entail responsibility or obligation on the part of this Govt. While we believe it would be better for Shah and Govt to remain in Tehran even if this involves some danger or inconvenience, it is recognized that circumstances may develop which make this inadvisable.
If Shah leaves Tehran with his court for purpose of setting up Govt at some other place in Iran, you may find it advisable to designate a secretary of Embassy to accompany him. If however he leaves Tehran merely to take refuge elsewhere it seems to us that it would be preferable not to detail a secretary to accompany him. We leave this, however, to your discretion.
The question of the recognition by this Govt of a new Govt in Iran will of course depend on circumstances. In general we would not recognize a new Govt brought about by duress.
Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.
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Not printed. It read in part as follows:
↩“Although passage of time without any Soviet move to occupy Tehran may indicate that such move is less Ukely, I feel we should keep in mind that it is a possibility. If it should materialize there is further possibiUty that Shah and Cabinet might flee to some other part of the country …
“Since both Qavam and Shah recently have consulted me frequently on questions of policy I think it most probable that they would ask advice of our Government in connection with any plan to leave capital. I request therefore that Department consider question and inform me at earliest possible moment what I should say if I am approached on subject by either Shah or Prime Minister. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“In view of grave potential dangers involved in flight of Iranian Government, Department may wish to consider whether it could find means to fortify Government against Soviet pressure if Shah and Cabinet remain in capital regardless of Soviet occupation. In my opinion, if this could be done it would be preferable solution.
“I should further appreciate instructions regarding course to be followed if Government decides to leave capital. Would Department wish a representative of this office to accompany it? My own feeling is that we would have to maintain some contact with Shah and Prime Minister. …” (891.00/3–246).