861.24591/3–2446: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received 1:25 p.m.]
392. Last night I learned from American correspondents of press conference given yesterday by Qavam in which latter was understood to say that it did not matter whether Security Council meeting was [Page 377] delayed week or two and that he had reprimanded Ala for opposing postponement.43 Correspondents received impression Prime Minister felt problem might be settled without SC action.
I saw Qavam this morning and expressed surprise and concern that he should have made public statements of this kind. I remarked that it seemed curious time for him to appear to belittle importance of SC in light of stand taken by US Government and fact that even Stalin had just emphasized importance he attached to it.
Qavam replied that correspondents must have misunderstood his remarks which were general in character and that he had not intended to convey impression they seemed to have received. (Since Mozaffar Firuz44 who is fast becoming Qavam’s evil genius acted as interpreter I can believe Prime Minister’s remarks may have been distorted in translation.) On my urging he summoned another press conference this morning to correct impression given yesterday. To ensure against distortion this time I left my own confidential interpreter Saleh to handle translation.
Qavam said he had not sent any new instructions to Ala regarding presentation of Iranian case to SC and that he did not intend to do so unless and until he reached some satisfactory agreement with Soviets here.
In reply to my question Prime Minister said he had not definitely presented to Soviet Ambassador proposal for joint oil exploitation as inducement for withdrawal Soviet troops. However, he still had this idea under active consideration and did not believe Russians would evacuate without this concession. He did not indicate when he planned to broach his suggestion to Sadchikov but it would seem time is too short for anything to be done this regard before SC meets tomorrow.
He asked my counsel regarding proposed agreement. I said I could give him no advice. I agreed that it was important for Iran Government to build satisfactory basis of understanding with USSR but he must make his own decision as to advisability of offering oil rights to achieve this. Once again I reminded him that US did not consider it should be necessary for Iran to purchase withdrawal of foreign troops.
[Page 378]I saw Shah last night and learned that he favors Qavam’s contemplated deal with Soviets as does Motamen-Ol-Molk. Shah also remarked that he did not think Soviets would agree to any multilateral scheme for development of northern Iranian oil.
To Department as 392 repeated Moscow 123, London 76.
- In telegram 388, March 24, 8 a.m., Ambassador Murray reported: “Department may be interested to know that Qavam has expressed to Ebtehaj strong annoyance at Ala’s action in announcing that Iranian Government opposed delay in Security Council meeting. He said this statement was made without authorization and considers it was unnecessary since President Truman had already declared American position to this question. … Essentially Qavam has been trying to soothe Russians whenever possible and he feels Ala has not grasped this clearly.” (861.24591/3–2446)↩
- Assistant to Prime Minister Qavam and Director of Propaganda in the Iranian Government.↩