Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

861.24591/3–2346: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

Tehran, March 23, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received March 24—8:56 a.m.]

387. As I hope you have gathered from mytel 383, March 22, I have not encouraged Qavam to make any concessions to Soviets in order to obtain withdrawal their troops. I have repeatedly reminded him of our position that evacuation foreign troops from any country should be unconditional. On other hand I have not tried to discourage him from making proposal he has conceived as set forth mytels 383, and 385 March 23⁴¹ although I might possibly have done so. In adopting this course I was influenced by following considerations:

1. Lacking specific instructions from Dept it would have been grave responsibility to attempt interference in vital negotiations of this kind. I could not be sure that US Govt or UNO could save Iran from consequences if I succeeded in persuading PriMin to give up plan which he had himself devised and which appeared to stand some chance of success.

2. I am impressed with fundamental importance of securing withdrawal Soviet troops while at same time creating conditions under which Iran and Soviet Union can live together amicably. From my necessarily limited vantage point here I can see little utility in winning a resounding victory over USSR in SC meeting if it either (a) fails to result in evacuation of Iran or (b) leaves Russians smarting under humiliating defeat and determined to revenge themselves on Iran. Both Qavam and Ebtehaj have pointed out that Iran has long common frontier with Russia and latter would have unlimited opportunities to make trouble for Iran Govt in northern area even it troops left Iran. Ebtehaj pointed out, possibly reflecting PriMin’s thoughts, that Iran could not keep appealing time after time to SC for protection against her powerful neighbor.

3. Realizing that UNO is still in formative stage, I have wished to avoid encouraging any intransigence on part of Iranians which would make its task unnecessarily difficult. I believe it is important to leave way open for Soviets to withdraw gracefully from untenable position they have gotten into.

4. Qavam feels, perhaps correctly, that some sort of oil concession to Russia must and should be made eventually. If this is true it might as well come now when it can help resolve extremely delicate international situation.

5. While Soviet oil concession northern Iran presents obvious danger of Soviet penetration in this country it does not, of course, represent any actual or potential loss to US in oil, since there is no possibility that we could get concession that area. Even if we could it is my understanding its exploitation by us would be commercially impracticable because of great transportation costs to Persian Gulf involved. As shown in mytels 383 and 385 PriMin is aware of dangers Russian entry into field would present and intends to draft agreement so as to minimize them as much as possible.

6. PriMin’s plan is completely in Persian tradition, which accepts as matter of course that justice must be cajoled by special inducements to perform her duties. Considering that Qavam is old style Persian grandee brought up in that tradition it is unlikely that my personal representations against his proposal would have persuaded him to drop it. (This is not to say that powerful official arguments adduced by our Govt, if it is prepared to take such action, might not have effect.)

7. Finally with international relations so strained in all parts of world I would hesitate to reject any solution of Iranian problem which would be reasonably satisfactory and would permit our Govt and UNO to turn to the many other pressing problems confronting them.

In summary much as I regret possibility that Iran will be forced to pay bribe to secure what should be accorded her automatically as of right, I do not feel that proposed solution is too bad. Majority of Iranians themselves would probably accept it with good grace. Ebtehaj seems quite enthusiastic and remarked to me that if Qavam succeeds in his efforts it will bring ray of hope to all other small nations lying within Russian orbit. If plan goes through it should provide reasonable basis for improved Irano-Soviet relations despite fact that it leaves many openings for possible future difficulties. We cannot after all provide Iran with an insurance policy against all potential dangers.

Furthermore, I would consider that contemplated agreement would be at least partial victory for US Govt and UNO, since I am absolutely certain Russians would have forced their demands to limit if it had not been for firm stand taken by America in upholding UNO Charter. Iranians realize that if Russian troops leave Iran it will be solely due to our action and they are immensely grateful.

Sent Dept as 387, repeated Moscow 121; London 74.

Murray

41. Telegram No. 385 not printed; Ambassador Murray advised of a report from Mr. Ebtehaj that the Prime Minister “seemed to have come to decision on questions discussed mytel 383, March 22. He told Ebtehaj he would try to get Soviet agreement whereby Iran and Russia would inform Security Council that Russian troops would leave Iran not only by a fixed date but also according to detailed time schedule. … As inducement for this he would offer Russians executive agreement for joint oil explorations northern Iran.” (861.24591/3–2346)