Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Near East and Africa, Volume VII

740.00119 Council/3–2146

Extract of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, March 21, 1946²⁹

Washington, March 21, 1946

top secret

“I am sure Mr. Byrnes will agree that this question of an immediate invitation to Molotov³⁰ is now inevitably caught up in the tangle over Persia created by Gromyko’s letter of 19th March to the Secretary-General.

2. I do not object in principle to the idea of a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris, indeed I think it would be a good thing provided always that the Peace Conference is held more or less on the date suggested. But I am convinced it would be a great mistake to send the invitation to Molotov at the present moment as it would play straight into Molotov’s hands, since Gromyko’s letter shows that the Russian game is to delay the hearing of the Persian dispute until they can fix matters in Persia in the way they want. The danger I see is that the Russians might seize on the invitation to justify transferring consideration of Persia to the Paris meeting. I am sure that we ought not to allow the Security Council to be sidetracked in this way. So I very earnestly hope Mr. Byrnes will not send the invitation until the Security Council has taken Persia.

3. In my view the Council should meet as planned and decide its agenda and timetable by procedural vote. We would certainly support putting the Persian complaint at the top of the agenda, as Mr. Stettinius has proposed in his letter of 20th March to Secretary-General, and we would press for it to be discussed immediately. We would then naturally ask why there has been no reply to our note to Soviet Government, we have fulfilled our obligation under the 1942 treaty and we are entitled to ask what Soviet troops are still doing in Persia.

4. The vital question is now whether or not the Soviet Government will withdraw their troops in accordance with their treaty obligation. There is no need for the Soviet Government to prepare a case on this simple issue and the Security Council would be failing in its duty if it agreed to an adjournment while Russian troops remained on Persian soil.

5. As regards the question of negotiations between the Soviet and Persian Governments, our evidence is that it is untrue that negotiations are still in progress, and this is borne out by the terms of the complaint which Persian Government have filed.

6. If Soviet Government were to refuse to attend the proceedings on March 25th or walk out if the Persian question is put down for discussion before April 10th, personally I think the Council should go ahead as far as it can without a Russian representative. Such action by the Soviet Government would be a direct challenge to the authority of U.N.O. It seems to me therefore that we have got to face this situation squarely. Any weakening or inconsistency on this fundamental Persian issue would put U.N.O. on a slippery slope. I believe that the whole future of the United Nations is at stake.

7. Please give Mr. Byrnes very urgent message in the above sense.³¹

29. Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on March 21 with the statement: “I enclose an urgent message which Mr. Bevin has asked me to convey to you.”
30. On March 6, the Secretary of State proposed to Mr. Bevin the convening of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the draft treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland in advance of the Paris Peace Conference scheduled for May 1, 1946; see Mr. Byrnes’ memorandum of conversation, March 6, vol. ii, p. 25.

31. In reply Mr. Byrnes stated, in part: “Much disturbed by your recent note. I intend to insist on serious consideration of Iran question at forthcoming meeting of the Security Council. I will attend meeting on behalf of our Government. I regret you do not plan to come because issue is necessarily critical and may affect whole future of United Nations. I should not favor any meeting at Paris which would indicate in advance that final disposition of Iran question was to be delayed. I intend to insist on final disposition now.” For full text of Mr. Byrnes’ reply, see telegram 2740, March 21, 10 a.m., to London, vol. ii, p. 33. For further reply by Mr. Bevin on March 22, see ibid., p. 34.

    Mr. Byrnes directed Ambassador Caffery to emphasize, similarly, to the French Foreign Minister the importance he attached to obtaining final disposition of the Iranian question and his hope that Mr. Bidault would attend the sessions of the United Nations (telegram 1319, March 21, 6 p.m., to Paris, filed under 861.24591/3–2146).