861.24691/3–2246: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
[Received March 24—12:49 p.m.]
383. National Bank Governor Ebtehaj called on me late evening March 21 to report that new Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov had seen PriMin afternoon of March 20 only few hours after reaching Tehran and had suggested that Soviets might withdraw troops from Iran if Shah and PriMin would sign letter to him assuring Russia that arrangements would be made for joint Irano-Soviet exploitation of north Iranian oil. Ebtehaj said he had not learned this from Qavam but from intermediate source in whom he had absolute confidence. He feared Qavam might be tempted by offer and be tricked into some agreement which would leave loophole for Russians to run out on their part of bargain. He was, therefore, anxious for me to see PriMin before latter saw Shah at lunch today.
[Page 370]I had two and half hour conversation with PriMin this morning which he asked be kept completely confidential. (I again assured him that leak on Soviet Chargé’s threat32 had not come from American source.) To induce him to talk I opened by telling Qavam of Gromyko’s letter to Lie requesting postponement of Security Council meeting and of President’s public statement that meeting would not be postponed. I also reminded him of Stettinius’ statement at London SC meeting that US Govt considered withdrawal of foreign troops from any country which requested it should not be subject to any conditions.33 I stressed importance of this position.
PriMin did not explicitly confirm Ebtehaj version of his talk with Sadchikov but from his remarks I am sure that account was substantially correct.
According to Qavam Sadchikov expressed himself as having been surprised and upset on learning at Baku of Iranian appeal to SC saying he had thought it had been understood that he was coming to Tehran to continue Moscow negotiations. PriMin replied by reminding Sadchikov of him [his] protest filed at Moscow against continued occupation of Iran and of changes he (Qavam) had insisted on making in proposed communiqué in order to show that negotiations were not to be continued Tehran. He thought he had made it clear that presence Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 tied his hands so far as negotiations were concerned. Sadchikov said Stalin felt it was regrettable that during Moscow talks Iran had made no single gesture favorable to USSR, especially with respect to oil. PriMin answered by saying he had not rejected any Soviet proposals, since law did not permit him consider proposals regarding oil. He further said that if Soviet Govt pressed him to do anything against law his only course would be to resign. New PriMin could hardly be more favorably disposed to USSR than he.
Qavam then asked me hypothetical question which confirms my belief in Ebtehaj story. He said (in effect): What would you do in my place if Soviet Ambassador should offer to effect withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for an understanding regarding exploitation of oil in northern Iran? I said I could only speak personally but felt he should be extremely careful about any sort of written agreement or exchange of letters exclusively involving Iran and USSR. He had already had experience in which Soviets had broken pledged word embodied in formal treaty and should have even less reason to depend on any less formal, bilateral, understanding. However, if he could induce Russians to commit themselves before SC to withdraw [Page 371] by certain date he would have more binding assurance. I also suggested it would be well for him to leave way open for Soviets to save face if he could do so while safeguarding Iranian interests.
See, for example, the statement made by Mr. Stettinius at the Twenty-First Meeting of the Security Council on February 15, 1946, SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 301.
Essence of Qavam’s thinking as it developed in course of conversation was:
- 1.
- He fears that if SC censures USSR and asks withdrawal of troops Russians will vent their wrath on himself and on Iran, which could be harrassed in many ways by Soviet Govt, and that UNO could not provide adequate protection.
- 2.
- He considers that from viewpoint of practical politics understanding with USSR on northern Iranian oil is long overdue. He asserted that Soviet complaints that Iran had discrimmated in favor of Britain by granting AIOC34 concession were hard to meet in light of fact controlling interest in AIOC is held by British Govt. He believes any future Majlis will approve concession to Soviets and that such concession is inevitable.
- 3.
- He believes he can get around law prohibiting oil negotiations by arranging for a joint Irano-Soviet Company with the two Govts snaring control. He admits even such company would ultimately need Majlis’ approval for its operations but is confident this can be obtained. Meanwhile during period before new Majlis assembles, he asserts approval can be granted by Cabinet decree subject to later Majlis confirmation. (I would hesitate to pass on correctness of his legal position in this reasoning, which seems to me open to grave doubt. However he might be able to carry it off in circumstances.)
- 4.
- He is considering preparation of an agreement in very general terms which would provide in principle for joint Irano-Soviet oil exploitation as inducement for Soviets to withdraw troops. He would draft this very carefully to make troop withdrawal a condition precedent. He added this agreement might be expanded to include subjects other than oil.
PriMin was to lunch today with Shah and Hosein Pirnia (Motamen-Ol-Molk) an outstanding elder statesman and patriot. He was to see Sadchikov again at 5:00 this afternoon. Unless Shah dissuaded him I believe he planned to suggest to Sadchikov some sort of arrangement such as that indicated above, to be conditioned on Soviet pledge to SC that troops would be withdrawn by specified date not more than 6 weeks distant.
Sent Department as 383; repeated Moscow 191; London 72.