874.00/11–846
The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)1
Dear Doc. I refer to our telephone conversation of a couple days ago about Maynard Barnes’ suggestion in his telegram no. 888 of November 5 that the Secretary discuss the Bulgarian situation with Mr. Molotov. This telegram was repeated to you in New York and you probably have its text before you. For easy reference purposes, however, I enclose a copy of this telegram as well as Barnes’ 859 of October 252 and his 885 of November 4, both of which are referred to in his telegram of November 5.
Wally Barbour and I have given a good bit of thought to this whole matter. We agree with Barnes’ proposal in his telegram 888 of November 5 that on balance it would be desirable for the Bulgarian opposition to be represented in the Bulgarian Government. We also agree that it would be useful if this matter could be discussed with the Soviet representatives in New York. I know how busy the Secretary is and I realize that it would be out of the question to expect him to take up this matter at this time with Mr. Molotov. I wonder, however, whether it might not be possible for you and Ben Cohen3 to discuss it with Mr. Vyshinsky.4
Yours sincerely,
- Mr. Matthews was serving as Special Political Adviser to the United States delegation at the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at New York, November 4–December 11, 1946.↩
- Not printed, but see the second paragraph of telegram 888, November 5, from Sofia, p. 166.↩
- Cohen served as Counselor to the United States delegation at the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at New York.↩
- Attached to the source text, which is the signed copy received by Matthews, are two handwritten, undated memoranda exchanged between Matthews and Cohen. Matthews’ memorandum to Cohen reads as follows: “I am not inclined to feel that any useful purpose would be served by approaching the Russians re Bulgaria now. However, I pass the suggestion on for your reaction.” Cohen’s memorandum reads as follows: “I think we will just have to bide our time for the right opportunity. In many ways it is a good time for the move to be made by the Bulgarian Govt. The problem is how we can help.”↩