Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union, Volume VI

874.00/11–1446

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George L. West of the Division of Southern European Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] November 15, 1946.

Participants:	Mr. Herbert M. Sichel, First Secretary of the British Embassy
	Mr. Barbour, SE
	Mr. West, SE

Mr. Sichel called at his request yesterday afternoon and presented the attached memorandum. Mr. Barbour expressed his general concurrence with the memorandum and its conclusion and pointed out, with respect to the statement that the recent Bulgarian elections “do not make ultimate recognition any more difficult”, that the election of 101 Opposition representatives to the Grand National Assembly at least had the merit of making the situation more fluid than it had been at any time since the Cabinet reshuffle of last Spring. The participation of the Opposition in the elections and its acquisition of 101 seats in the Grand National Assembly could now be used by the Soviets and their Fatherland Front confederates—if they so chose—as justification for including representatives of the Opposition in the Government.

With reference to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of October 9, 1946⁵ (which expressed the view that the British Government considered it best to recognize the Bulgarian Government at the time of the signature of the peace treaty), Mr. Sichel stated that the legal experts of the Foreign Office were endeavoring to determine whether the British Government could sign and ratify a treaty with a government which it did not recognize de jure, and that until the experts had arrived at their conclusions the Foreign Office would defer the definite formulation of British policy with respect to recognition of the Bulgarian Government. Mr. Barbour observed that we—in EUR, at least—were perhaps somewhat less concerned with the legal niceties involved, and that we would probably make up our minds on the basis of practical considerations and then see if the legal points did not conform to the selected pattern. He stated that both the Secretary and Mr. Cohen took a personal interest in this matter, and that if any decision with respect to the Department’s course was arrived at during the present session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it would undoubtedly be reached at New York. We are therefore keeping the Secretary currently informed concerning developments in Bulgaria.

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Washington, 14 November, 1946.

Memorandum

His Majesty’s Government have received reports from Sofia which show that conditions on polling day itself were relatively satisfactory and certainly no worse than is usual on Balkan election days. The reports show, however, that the result of the elections cannot be considered to give a true indication of the Bulgarian people’s views owing to the steps taken by the Government before polling day to make sure that they should be successful.

As for the actual results of the elections, the fact that the Government allowed the opposition to win as many as 100 seats is possibly due to the sustained Anglo-American interest in the matter and possibly to a dawning realisation by the Communists that a 100% vote in their favour is not always convincing to the outside world. Probably also the Bulgarian Government wished to do what they can to convince waverers in the United Kingdom and the United States of America as to the Bulgarian Government’s respectability and thus make it more difficult for the British and United States Governments to secure public support for a policy of continued non-recognition. Any good effects, however, which the election may have had in this direction are likely to be obliterated by developments such as the report that Mr. Lulchev and 22 other Social Democrats were recently arrested on charges under the Law for the Defence of the People’s Power.

The election results would seem to call for little change in the policy of His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government towards Bulgaria. They clearly do not provide any justification for early recognition. On the other hand, they do not make ultimate recognition any more difficult should we and the Americans decide that on other grounds it was desirable to accord recognition.

5. For substance of the British Embassy aide-mémoire of October 9, see telegram 5412, Secdel 1084, October 9, to Paris, p. 152.