Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings, Volume III

CFM Files

United States Delegation Minutes

September 4, 1946, 4 p.m.

secret

Present

	U.S.
	Secretary Byrnes
	Senator Connally
	Senator Vandenberg
	Mr. Bohlen
U.S.S.R.		France
Mr. Vyshinsky		Mr. Bidault
Mr. Gusev		Mr. Couve de Murville
Mr. Troyanovski		Mr. Latour du Pain
		Interpreter
	Great Britain
	Mr. Bevin
	Mr. McNeil
	Mr. Jebb
	Interpreter

M. Byrnes was in the chair and said that the only matter on the agenda was the question of the General Assembly. He asked if there were any observations.

M. Vyshinsky said the Soviet Government had thought the matter over and still thinks that it would be extremely difficult for the Soviet Government and for other governments to hold two international conferences at the same time. He, therefore, had two suggestions to make: (1) that the General Assembly be postponed until the first part of November in order to give time to the Peace Conference to complete its work and (2) that it should then be held in Paris if the French Government were agreeable, or in Geneva. In this fashion even if the Peace Conference overlapped the meeting of the General Assembly, it would be possible to hold the two simultaneously. He said the Secretary General of this Conference had already in a letter pointed out the technical difficulties involved in holding two gatherings together and had suggested that the General Assembly be postponed until October 20. The Soviet Delegation, however, felt that the middle of November would be more suitable in order to make sure that the Peace Conference would be over by then. He said there were 32 questions on the General Assembly agenda, some of which were minor but others of great importance which would require extensive preparation.

M. Bevin said the British Government felt that the four powers here could not take the responsibility for postponing what after all was the major body in international affairs. He thought that if an adjustment had to be made, it should be the Peace Conference which should adjust itself to the General Assembly and not vice-versa. However, he did feel that it might be possible to suggest a shorter agenda for the General Assembly, but that frankly he was nervous about the effect of attempting to tell the United Nations that they should postpone their meeting.

M. Bidault said he wished to make it clear that the letter of M. Fouques Duparc had been sent in his capacity as Secretary General of the Conference and did not reflect the views of the French Government which had not been consulted.³⁵ He said he wished to know whether Mr. Vyshinsky’s proposals were alternatives or whether they were cumulative. He said while reserving his right to express the views of his Government later on at this meeting, he felt that whatever the decision, care has to be taken to avoid creating any impression of dictating to the United Nations.

M. Byrnes said he had restated the United States position that we believed it was feasible to hold the General Assembly while the Peace Conference was concluding its work here. We, however, realize the difficult position of some delegations. He inquired whether anyone had discussed the possibility of reducing the agenda and having the first part of the General Assembly deal with technical and non-controversial questions, such as the budget, and then the more important questions at the end of the session the last part of October. He said he heartily agreed with Mr. Bidault that there should be no question of dictation. He said he thought that Mr. Lie could poll the members of the United Nations in regard to their attitude on postponement, and if so for what day. He went on to say that he did not see any advantage in moving the General Assembly to Paris; that the technical difficulties of moving the United Nations Secretariat from New York would be very great. He said that, of course, his country would be glad to welcome the Peace Conference in New York, but he felt that further consideration should be given to the possible reduction of the agenda of the General Assembly. Mr. Lie, for example, had asked the members of the United Nations whether they favored the holding of the United Nations meeting with a reduced agenda on the date set or preferred postponement.

M. Vyshinsky said first of all there was no question of any dictation and that if the four nations here agreed on the matter of postponement, it would not be a decision, but merely a request subject to the consent of the other members. If, however, the four could agree he felt that they exercised sufficient influence to persuade the others without any suggestion of dictation. As to dividing the agenda, he felt that this was impracticable since there was no method of guaranteeing what questions any given delegation would raise. Furthermore, if as all agree it was impossible to dictate the postponement, how could we dictate the agenda? He said frankly that the Soviet Union did not have enough people to do both and that he understood the other delegations, such as the Ukraine, Byelo-Russian, Polish and Czechoslovak, were in the same position. Furthermore, the General Assembly had very important work before it. In fact, Mr. Bevin’s proposal to limit the agenda in effect recognizes the impossibility of holding both simultaneously. If November 15 was not suitable, the Soviet Delegation could agree to November 1, especially if it were to be held in Paris, or in Geneva, where ample facilities existed. He said he recognized the technical difficulties of moving the organization, but as a matter of fact it had already moved once from London. He repeated that the Soviet Government did not have sufficient personnel to have two conferences of such importance going at the same time. There was, of course, no question of setting a precedent or making the move to Europe permanent, but merely to facilitate the work under present circumstances, which were exceptional. He concluded that on looking over the agenda, he found that there were only seven or eight minor questions out of thirty-two. The others were of a serious nature, such as elections, trusteeship and the report of the various commissions, all of which could not be regarded as secondary.

M. Bevin inquired whether Mr. Vyshinsky’s suggestions were two or really one, that is to say, both postponement and transfer, or one or the other.

M. Vyshinsky replied that they were two parts of the same proposal. He said that we must be realistic and recognize that the slow work of the Peace Conference made it doubtful that they would be through by October 20. He said, however, that if the General Assembly was to be held in Europe, there could be some overlapping.

M. Bevin said that if it were necessary to transfer one or the other, he thought it would be more correct to move the Peace Conference to New York.

M. Byrnes said that he felt that the Soviet Union already had able representatives in New York, for example, Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Manuilsky. He said he did not believe there could be any question of moving the United Nations Assembly to Europe.

M. Bidault said that, frankly, the twenty-third of September was a difficult date for him. There was the French Constituent Assembly, shortly followed by the elections in France. As to moving the General Assembly, the French had always felt that it should be on the old continent and that, therefore, they could not oppose the suggestion to hold it in Paris, but nevertheless the decision having been taken the French Government would not depart from that agreement unless everyone was in favor. He thought the way out would be to adopt Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion to consult the other members as to postponement and location. Obviously, no precedent would be established thereby.

M. Vyshinsky stated that it was clear to all that it would be too difficult for some countries to have one delegation in New York and another in Paris. He said the first question was, therefore, that of postponement. The location, however, was not an independent question but was linked to the date. He repeated that if the two conferences despite postponement of the General Assembly should overlap, it would be easier the nearer they were together. He agreed with Mr. Bidault that this would constitute no precedent. The location of the United Nations had been the subject of long debate and there was, therefore, no question of reversing the decision, especially in view of the attitude of Panama, and particularly the Philippines.³⁶

M. Bevin inquired if he was correct in his understanding that Mr. Vyshinsky saw no reason to discuss postponement unless we agree to transfer the General Assembly to Europe.

M. Vyshinsky had thought it was better to join the two questions, that is to say, the date and the location. He said the Peace Conference might not possibly be finished by the new date and that the location was important in order to avoid any danger of a third postponement.

M. Bevin remarked that when he suggested to hold meetings in New York, this was regarded as impossible, but that Mr. Vyshinsky thought it possible to hold both in Europe.

M. Vyshinsky pointed out that this was not his proposal. He merely felt that it was impossible to hold both together, but that there could be some overlapping, and that the purpose of moving to Europe would be to take care of any possible overlapping.

M. Bevin said he wished to know what would happen to other questions, such as Germany and Austria, if the General Assembly was postponed. He said if the General Assembly was postponed, no matter how valid the reason, the people would think it was for some political purpose.

M. Bidault said that having no aptitude for procedural questions, he felt that the real issue was not the date or place, but that of postponement. He said that if we could agree we could use our influence, and that there would be no protest on the part of other nations if it was clear that the proposal for postponement could not come from the Council of Foreign Ministers, but from the United Nations itself.

M. Byrnes said that as he had remarked, we would, of course, be glad to welcome the Peace Conference to America, but seriously he thought that the suggestion to move one or the other of the conferences did not aid in the solution of the question of postponement. He repeated that he felt that this was a matter for the United Nations organization to have its members decide. He wished to avoid any impression that four or five members were attempting to tell the United Nations what to do. He said that any suggestion of postponement should come from the Secretary General of the United Nations and not from the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M. Vyshinsky agreed that any impression of dictation or pressure must be avoided, but that if a blank piece of paper were sent to the various members without an indication of our attitude it would lose time and complicate matters. He felt that we should state our opinion to the Secretary General that we were in favor of postponement and then ask the twenty-one nations represented at the Peace Conference for their views. He felt that there were other delegations in favor of postponement.

M. Bidault inquired whether the twenty-one nations could not be consulted first and then the others afterward.

M. Byrnes replied that he would prefer to have the conference make the request rather than the Council.

M. Bevin said that we were really faced with an extraordinary situation the last time the Secretary General had asked the opinion of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but now we are told to make a suggestion on our own initiative. He felt that it would be a bad precedent for the Council of Foreign Ministers or the Peace Conference to decide the question of the date of the General Assembly. Mr. Spaak and Mr. Sobolev had been in touch with the delegations here on the question, but they had received no communication from the Secretary General. Furthermore, the new question had now been added concerning the place of meeting, which in effect would reverse a previous decision of the General Assembly. He said his Government could not have said this. He said he was prepared to discuss postponement, but not the fundamental issue of location.

M. Byrnes said that the last time Mr. Lie had asked our opinion concerning postponement we had answered, Mr. Sobolev had been here and had talked to all of us. He, for example, had told Mr. Sobolev that from the point of view of the United States, there was no reason to postpone the General Assembly. Furthermore, now that Mr. Sobolev was back in New York it was up to the Secretary General to make his decision after consulting the other members. He said he had talked to Mr. Spaak but to no other delegations. He felt that in view of the apparent impossibility of reaching a unanimous decision, they should tell Mr. Sobolev that it was up to the organization of the United Nations to decide. He said as a matter of fact virtually every member state was represented in New York in some form or other either on the Security Council or on one of the other commissions of the United Nations. He repeated that we saw no difficulty in having two delegations. The only two members who were to be on both were Senators Vandenberg and Connally. Senator Vandenberg had said he would go to the General Assembly, but that Senator Connally had told him he would remain at the Peace Conference. He repeated that he thought the only way was to let the appropriate officials of the United Nations decide the question.

M. Vyshinsky said that in reply to Mr. Bevin he wished to state that Mr. Sobolev had been sent here by Mr. Lie to ascertain our views and that he felt Mr. Lie would not be able to make any decisions without our help. He said that obviously the four here could not decide the question, but he felt that if we expressed a common view in conformity with the realities of the situation, it would be accepted as the sensible decision in the common interest. He said it was true, for example, that at this conference the members of the Council could not do anything without the twenty-one, but, conversely, the twenty-one could not do anything without the Council. This had been revealed at the conference itself, and that whenever the Council was in agreement there were good solid majorities but if they were not, the vote was only of a formal nature and without substance. He said they could adopt the policy of laissez-faire and let the matter drift on, but he felt that this was not realistic.

M. Bevin said that we have two linked proposals before us, one to postpone and one to move the Assembly.

M. Vyshinsky said that he must ask that these two proposals be considered together.

M. Bevin in reply to the Secretary’s question said he was not in favor of Mr. Vyshinsky’s proposals in the form put forward.

M. Bidault said he was not opposed either to delay or to the transfer of the General Assembly, but he felt that it could only be done with the consent of the United Nations. He said he understood that the difference between Mr. Vyshinsky’s and Mr. Bevin’s proposals was largely related to the question of transfer.

M. Vyshinsky pointed out that that was true, but that there was also a difference as to postponement—in other words, there were two differences.

M. Byrnes said it was clear that they would not reach any decision today on it in view of the difference of opinion. He suggested they should think it over.

M. Bidault proposed that at the next meeting on the subject Mr. Spaak, the President of the General Assembly, and China, as a member of the Council, should be present. This was agreed to.

35. Fouques Duparc’s letter of September 2 to the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers had recommended that the General Assembly be postponed in order to give the Peace Conference until October 20 to complete its work (740.0011 EW Peace/9–246).
36. For documentation regarding the permanent location of the seat of the United Nations Organization, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i, pp. 1433 ff.; see also ibid., 1946, vol. i.