Lord Halifax left with the Secretary a memorandum containing a
message from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary94 asking
clarification of certain points in the American note on bases.
With regard to the disputed places, the Secretary told Lord Halifax
the United States does not believe these places to be of particular
value but in as much as the United States has built military
installations on them during the war, he thinks it would look good
for the entire negotiations if the asserted claim were settled. It
would create the impression that the British, having a claim, have
denounced it in favor of the United States.
Lord Halifax said Mr. Bevin had mentioned another matter which he had
not included in the note—Mr. Bevin is concerned over difficulties
that will arise if New Zealand and Australia are not consulted about
these bases. He wants to be at liberty to mention to them what is
involved and what is being discussed.
The Secretary agreed that they should be consulted and wondered if it
would be better for the US to approach them. Lord Halifax thought it
might be and said he would communicate with Mr. Bevin to ascertain
his views on this.
[Annex]
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of
State
Message for the Secretary of State From Mr.
Bevin Dated November 15th
I am glad to have received from Mr. Byrnes total claims which the
United States Government is making on us but it is obvious that
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this raises a very
difficult problem to decide and while you in your telegram said
it was for me alone it was obvious that I could not deal with it
without advice. I therefore privately consulted Chiefs of Staff
and asked them to look into it from military angle.
Meanwhile pending their report there are certain points upon
which perhaps Mr. Byrnes can help to clarify my mind.
The first—and this rather attracts me—is proposal to deal with a
number or all of these places jointly. To what extent would Mr.
Byrnes be willing to reciprocate by allowing a wider area of
joint use over some of the already United States owned bases,
for instance Manila?95 It would go
better with the British people if it were felt that this was a
mutual arrangement.
The next thing is, how much is wanted for military purposes and
how much for civil aviation, because it seems to me that a
number of these places have no military value at all. Obviously
if a commercial proposition is involved, the question will have
to be dealt with on two different grounds.
The next thing is, Mr. Byrnes has told me what bases he wants in
our own territory and as regards support by us in Iceland and in
Portuguese territory. Does he want anything from other countries
such as France or Holland?
With regard to the Azores this raises separate problems on which
I will telegraph later.
With regard to India, it is virtually a sovereign state in all
these matters and I really could not handle India in the way
suggested.
As to the disputed places mentioned in paragraph 3 of Mr. Byrnes’
aide-mémoire, I am having this
question examined, but could you tell me what is at the back of
Mr. Byrnes’ mind? Are the United States Government thinking of
establishing military bases in them (and if so, under United
Nations system) or what is special value attached to them by the
United States, e.g. is civil aviation at the bottom of it?
Now I come to the real crucial point. As far as joint bases are
concerned in British territory is it really necessary to
formalise the existing arrangements in advance of international
system of security under United Nations charter?96 I cannot see that
there is any conflict with United Nations or with Russia so long
as in the event of aggression the joint base would be open for
use by the Security Council. Surely what we want to do is at the
right moment to formalise the existing United States position in
British territories in question, as joint users of the bases, in
the United Kingdom’s “special agreement” with the Security
Council under Article 43 of
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the Charter. I am concerned at the risk of
harming United Nations Organisation (and of giving the Russians
serious ground for complaint) by attempting to formalise the
existing arrangements in advance and appearing to face them with
a fait accompli. The same applies to the
arrangements about the future of the disputed Pacific Islands. I
have made a declaration in the House that all my policy must
square with the obligations we have entered into, and this
preliminary series of dealings about bases and territories will
look to the world like sharp practice and I do not want my
foreign policy to be guilty of that. Therefore it would mean
careful study.
There are two places which are mandated territories. Can we
fortify mandated territories without the organisation which is
taking the place of the League of Nations? That is another
worry.
Finally, when I have had the thing studied in all its aspects I
will communicate with you again, but although I have entered
into what looks like criticism, again let me thank Mr. Byrnes
for being so helpful and letting us see the picture as a whole.
If he does not mind my putting a few daubs of paint on it from
our angle, so as to make it a better picture I will be glad.
