Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Volume VI

811.24500/11–645

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

Mr. Byrnes⁸² spoke to Mr. Bevin⁸³ on one or two occasions while he was in London about the post-war military base program of the United States.

It will be recalled that the United States Government informed the British and Soviet Governments of its proposed approach to the Icelandic Government in regard to post-war bases before official negotiations were opened with Iceland.⁸⁴ At that time Mr. Bevin sent a letter to Mr. Byrnes⁸⁵ expressing the hope that no action would be taken indicating a lack of confidence in the United Nations Organization just at the time it was getting under way. Mr. Byrnes replied in a note⁸⁶ stating that far from regarding its action in Iceland as indicating lack of confidence in the United Nations Organization, the United States Government feels that its proposed action will reinforce and strengthen the Organization. The United States proposals to Iceland visualize that the bases operated by the United States in Iceland will be made available to the Security Council on its call if the Icelandic Government is agreeable to doing so.

Mr. Byrnes discussed briefly with Mr. Bevin the relationship between the United States post-war military base program and the question of a lend-lease settlement as well as the negotiations between the two countries looking to the opening of a credit for the United Kingdom Government.⁸⁷ At the time of the conversation with Mr. Bevin, he seemed to feel that he would prefer that there be no exact relationship established between these subjects.

Mr. Byrnes has visualized that in the course of the next few months there may well result a number of agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments growing out of the present conversations. He attaches a very real importance to a satisfactory agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom Government in regard to post-war bases. He feels that negotiations looking to such an agreement should be undertaken at once. It would be agreeable to him to have no connection established between the lend-lease settlement and the financial talks and negotiations about bases, other than in the matter of timing.

The things which the United States Government wishes the British Government to do for the United States in connection with its postwar base program are as follows:

1. The United States Government desires an assurance that the British Government will support and assist the government of the United States in negotiations between the United States Government on the one hand and Iceland and Portugal on the other in regard to United States post-war base requirements in those countries. The United Kingdom has been informed in some detail in connection with the United States desiderata in Iceland. It is expected that the United Kingdom Government will be informed in detail in the next few days in regard to the rights which the United States Government desires to obtain in the Azores and Cape Verde islands.

2. There is enclosed a list of the places in territories administered by the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand where the United States Government wishes to obtain long-term military base rights. Included in this list are two places, one under a mandate administered by the Australian Government and the other under a mandate administered by the New Zealand Government. The United States Government has not yet informed the Australian and the New Zealand Governments of its desire to obtain base rights in these places and it requests that the British Government not inform those governments until the British Government has checked informally with the United States Government and has learned that the latter has informed Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, the French Government has not yet been informed about our desire to obtain base rights in Espiritu Santo and it is requested that the British Government not inform the French Government until the United States Government has itself taken up this question with the French Government. It will be observed that three of the places on this list, Canton Island, Funafuti and Christmas Island, are places over which sovereignty is claimed by both the United States and United Kingdom Governments, and which are also dealt with under numbered paragraph four of this aide-mémoire.

The British Government and the United States Government with the assistance of the Indian and Egyptian Governments established during the war a series of military airbases extending through North Africa, Egypt, and the Near East into India and Burma. In many cases such bases were created by enlargement of existing commercial air fields, and wholly or in part by construction financed by Reciprocal Aid. Contribution by the United States Government to such construction in Egypt, India and Burma, however, exceeded $12,000,000. Construction in India appears to have been performed under local arrangements with the Indian Government under which the United States Government agreed to return the bases to the Indian Civil Aeronautics Authority or other appropriate office at varying periods after the close of hostilities.

The Government of the United States would like to have the British Government make mutually available to the military aircraft of the United States on similar terms, any continuing rights which the British Government is able to make permanent for use of such fields in transit and as emergency and refueling stations. The United States would similarly seek to make any such rights it obtains in this area available to the British Government. It is particularly suggested that the British and American Governments jointly enter into prompt negotiation with the Indian Government to secure its agreement to continued use by military planes of the United States and British Governments of the Dudhkundi and Barrackpore airports in the Calcutta area and the Karachi Airport at Karachi, while leaving the control of these airports in the Indian Government. Eights for landing, fueling, repair and if desired, the continuing right to retain, or later station, up to 100 air force personnel of either government should be established.⁸⁸

Mr. Byrnes believes that the provision of the bases mentioned above will contribute materially to the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization in maintaining peace. It is anticipated that in drafting the contemplated agreements for furnishing military facilities to the Security Council of the United Nations Organization, these and other United States bases, along with existing and projected ones of all member nations, would be considered in determining the availability of bases for carrying out such enforcement measures as may be directed by the Security Council.

3. The British Government will recall that over a considerable number of years there has been correspondence between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in regard to territorial claims to Pacific islands. In a note dated August 16, 1939,⁸⁹ Secretary Hull⁹⁰ transmitted “a list of islands in the central Pacific which, in addition to islands in the Phoenix group, are claimed by the United States.” Secretary Hull’s note stated that “the American Government is prepared to discuss its claim and any British claim to each and every one of these islands with the British Government at any time convenient to the latter.”

In an aide-mémoire dated June 8, 1940,⁹¹ the British Government expressed a willingness in principle to enter into discussions regarding the status of the islands specified in Secretary Hull’s note. The British aide-mémoire suggested that the discussions be temporarily postponed because of the war. In a note dated August 10, 1940,⁹¹ Secretary Hull acquiesced in the postponement of discussions in regard to the status of these islands.

[4?] Mr. Byrnes believes that the present would be an appropriate time for the British and New Zealand Governments to sign an agreement with the United States under which those governments would withdraw their respective claims to these islands and would recognize the sovereignty of the United States over them. These islands, which have for many years been the subject of conflicting claims and correspondence, are the following:

• Vostok
• Maiden
• Starbuck
• Caroline Island
• Flint
• Christmas Island
• Atafu
• Nukunono
• Fakaofu
• Penhryn (Tongareva)
• Manahiki (Humphreys)
• Rakananga (Rierson)
• Danger Islands (Puka Puka);
• Nukufetau (De Peyster)
• Funafuti
• Nurakita (Sophia)
• Nukulailai (Mitchell)
• Phoenix Group
  • Canton Island
  • Enderbury Island
  • Phoenix Island
  • Sydney Island
  • Hull Island
  • Gardner Island
  • McKean Island
  • Birnie Island

Secretary Byrnes hopes very much that the British and New Zealand Governments will be disposed to sign such an agreement without entering into a discussion of claims and counter-claims to each island. The strategic importance of these islands to United States defenses in the Pacific as exemplified in the course of the present war requires no comment. Such an agreement would, of course, contain a provision terminating the exchange of notes of April 6, 1939⁹³ between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments providing for a joint administration of Canton and Enderbury islands in the Phoenix group for a period of 50 years.

Mr. Byrnes hopes that the British Government will be prepared to enter into detailed discussions looking to agreements covering the above-mentioned topics at an early date. Both he and the President attach real importance to the early conclusion of such agreements.

Washington , November 6, 1945.

[Enclosure]

List of Places in Territories Administered by the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand Where the United States Government Wishes To Obtain Long-Term Base Rights

Place	Sovereignty	Nature of Rights	Use
Ascension Island	British	Joint*	Air
Canton Island	U.S.-British Joint Control	Exclusive†	Naval and air
Christmas Island	Disputed U.S.British	Exclusive	Air
Espiritu Santo	French-British Condominium	Joint	Naval and air
Funafuti	Disputed U.S.British	Exclusive	Naval and air
Guadalcanal–Tulagi	British	Joint	Naval and air
Manus	Australian Mandate	Joint	Naval and air
Tarawa	British	Joint	Naval and air
Upolu	New Zealand Mandate	Joint	Air
Viti Levu	British	Joint	Naval and air
Dudhkundi and Barrackpore Airports (near Calcutta)	India	Participating rights with British	Air
Karachi Airport	India	Participating rights with British	Air

82. James F. Byrnes, appointed Secretary of State on July 3, 1945, was in London for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 11–October 2, 1945; for documentation, see vol. ii, pp. 99 ff.
83. Ernest K. Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
84. See bracketed note, vol. iv, p. 953.
85. Not printed here.
86. Not printed here.
87. For documentation pertaining to financial discussions between the United States at the United Kingdom, see pp. 1 ff.
88. At the time that he presented the list of bases to Lord Halifax, Secretary of State Byrnes emphasized the importance of the bases in India and indicated his desire that the British Government help to secure their retention for United States use. Lord Halifax demurred, suggesting instead that the United States negotiate with the Government of India concerning civil air rights and approach the Government of India for military base rights through the machinery of the United Nations. (740.00119 FEAC/10–2245) Subsequently, both civil and military air rights were negotiated bilaterally between the United States Government and the Government of India; no record has been found of British intercession on behalf of the United States on the subject of base negotiations in India.
89. See Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. ii, p. 317.
90. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, 1933–44.
91. Not printed.
91. Not printed.
93. Foreign Relations, 1989, vol. ii, p. 313.
94. The long-term right for the United States to use as a military base jointly with the government exercising sovereignty. [Footnote in the original.]
95. The long-term right for the United States to use as a military base under the exclusive control of the United States. [Footnote in the original.]