860h.00/11–2445
Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Reber) to the Secretary of State 89
Mr. Secretary: All indications point to the likelihood that Marshal Tito will at the earliest moment convenient to him after the convocation of the new Yugoslav Assembly on November 29 propose the abolition of the Yugoslav monarchy and the creation of a Republic.
It will be recalled that the Crimea Conference in February 1945 agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic, the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government, that their agreement of December 7, 1944 be put into effect immediately, that a new unified Government be formed on the basis of that agreement leaving the question of the monarchy open and that free elections for a Constituent Assembly be held within three months of the liberation of the whole of the country. These elections have now been held under conditions that make it difficult for us to admit that they constitute the free choice of the people. Details of the terrorization which preceded them and elimination of the opposition through the operation of the single list of candidates are familiar to all.
Newspaper accounts and a preliminary report from the Embassy indicate however that on the day of voting balloting was conducted with due regard for the outward forms of legality. No coercion was apparent and no disturbances took place. The results of such a plebiscite give the appearance of legality to the newly appointed Constituent Assembly and confirm the present system in power with all of its dictatorial tendencies.
Whereas the methods used to bring about this electoral result are repugnant to our conception of freedom and the right of the people to voice their own selection, the opposition in Yugoslavia has lost ground and is in no condition at this stage to offer any effective check to the trend. We shall be faced, probably shortly after the convocation of the Assembly, with a decision whether to afford recognition to the new Republican form of government, which will undoubtedly be set up under conditions which fail to take into account the guarantees of personal freedom given the Yalta Powers when Tito and Subasic made their agreement. In replying to our communication of November 6 Marshal Tito claims, however, that these obligations have been fulfilled and that the results of the elections release the Yalta Powers from the obligations they considered they had assumed toward the people of Yugoslavia.
At the time of the creation of the Republic a positive indication of the position of this country will be required through the necessity [Page 1290] of reaccrediting our Ambassador whose present letters of credence are to the Royal Yugoslav Government, whereas it would be legally justifiable to withhold this recognition, it is nevertheless thought no useful purpose would be served by thus turning our back on Yugoslavia. Such course of action might also subject us to adverse criticism as evidencing a preference for the monarchy which is of course not the case. Given the character of the Serbian people it seems not too unreasonable to hope that in time their personal traditions of freedom and sense of individualism will effect modifications in the present reign of terror and evolve toward a more representative form of government. On the other hand, it is not considered that we should fortify the Tito regime through unrestricted grants of material support.
Certain steps can now be recommended as possible course of action. At the time the new letters of credence are required for the Ambassador an instruction to him might be prepared, which would govern his relation with the new government and could be made public if desirable. Such an instruction would state that the maintenance of formal diplomatic relations with the regime should not be interpreted to imply approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuming control, or its failure to implement the guarantees of personal freedom promised its people.
It could also be said that we expect that the forces of evolution will provide developments which will make possible those relations, political, economic and cultural between the peoples of Yugoslavia and the United States which we on our part most urgently desire to see.
This would carry the implication that if changes are effective, economic aid and assistance would be forthcoming but in the meanwhile we recommend that no financial loans or credit should be considered. A reasonable commercial exchange on a cash and carry basis would, however, not be excluded. The recommendations in this paragraph would not appear in the instruction to be made public but we feel should be our policy.
You will recall that the British Government proposed that UNRRA relief be curtailed because of the maintenance by Yugoslavia of an excessive army90 beyond the requirements of its own security, which coupled with Tito’s threats against Venezia Giulia and Macedonia threatens the security of his neighbors and implies aggressive intentions in these areas. Furthermore the failure of Yugoslavia to transfer its manpower from the Army to the land shows clearly that Yugoslavia is not exerting all possible effort to help itself. Nevertheless, we do not feel that stoppage of relief to the needy can be [Page 1291] justified on this basis. UNRRA should, however, be required to supervise the distribution of its relief supplies with the greatest possible care to insure that they are not being used for political purposes or to strengthen this type of aggression.
The British Government has furnished us with the attached preliminary expression of its views91 which, as will be seen, do not differ materially from the foregoing, although we do not admit that Marshal Tito has in fact obtained the support of the majority of the peoples of Yugoslavia and we are less optimistic as to the possibilities of creating an atmosphere in which the possibilities for the settlement of the Trieste problem and improvements in the Balkans will be enhanced.
If you approve the foregoing proposals they can be discussed with the British at an early date with a view to arriving at a common policy before we are faced with the accomplished fact of the creation of the Yugoslav Republic.
- Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: “I agree. J. F. B.”↩
- See memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs, October 22, 1945, vol. ii, p. 1032.↩
- These views were presented to the Department in a note from the British Embassy on November 19, 1945, not printed.↩