Sir: With reference to my telegram no. 57, July 1, 1945, 3 p.m.,
embodying preliminary findings and recommendations of the Special
Mission at Tirana with respect to the question of the recognition of the
present regime in control of Albania, I have the honor to submit
herewith the final recommendations of this Special Mission under the
title: “Summary of Findings and Recommendations with Respect to the
Recognition of the ‘Democratic Government of Albania’
There is, as mentioned in the Summary, a supplementary, documentary
report consisting of fourteen sections, the titles of which will be
found in Appendix II attached to the Summary. This documentary report
will be submitted by separate despatch18 as it will not
be necessary for the higher officers of the Department considering the
Summary to read this supplementary report although they may wish
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to consult certain sections of
it, especially Section VI—”International Relations”.
Information concerning the officers who assisted in the preparation of
the enclosed Summary, as well as the documentary report, will be
submitted in a separate despatch.
I expect to be in Washington shortly to confer with officers of the
Department concerning the recommendations contained in the Summary.
[Enclosure—Extracts]
Summary of Findings and Recommendations With
Respect to the Recognition of “The Democratic Government of
Albania”
In a telegram dated July 1, 1945, the Special Mission of the United
States Government sent to Tirana to study conditions submitted a
preliminary report of its findings of facts and certain
recommendations with respect to the question of extending
recognition to “The Democratic Government of Albania”, as
follows:
[Here follows text of report contained in telegram 57, July 1, 3
p.m., from Tirana, printed on page
38.]
Having completed its studies, there is attached a final report in
fourteen sections. In addition, there is set forth below a summary
of important facts followed by suggestions and recommendations,
which are essentially the same as those submitted in July and quoted
above.19
. . . . . . .
x. specific recommendations
1. Recognition
The present regime should be recognized by the United States, Great
Britain and the Soviet Union and recognition should be accorded
simultaneously at the earliest possible date subject to the
following conditions and restrictions:
First, the regime recognized shall undertake
to hold a general election at which the people of Albania will
choose representatives to a Constitutional Convention where the
representatives so chosen will decide whether they wish (a) to continue the present form of government
intact, (b) the present form of government
with changes decided
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upon by
them, or (c) some new form of government to
be organized by the said Constitutional Convention, provided that in
any event there shall be proclaimed in the organic law of the
present or any new government a Bill of Eights similar to that
contained in a “Declaration on the Eights of Citizens” adopted at
the Congress of Berat in October 1944, but apparently since
discarded by the present regime.
Note: In connection with the aforementioned
elections, two proposals will inevitably be made, viz: either that
the election be by secret ballot or that it be held in accordance
with the existing electoral laws of the present regime—the town-hall
variety of election. In view of the known attitude of the British
toward the regime, it is almost certain that they will try to insist
upon election by secret ballot. It is believed that either method
would be satisfactory but, as the present regime would be in control
in either case, the simplest procedure would he to conduct the
election according to existing electoral laws. A clear warning
should, however, be given by each of the three powers that the
regime must permit the election to be conducted in an atmosphere of
perfect freedom and that all parties and all persons whether for or
against the government shall be permitted to participate without
threats or fear during or after the elections. In giving this
warning, it should also be stated that the diplomatic
representatives of the three powers, who will be in the country,
will have standing instructions to observe the conduct not only of
the election but also of the Constitutional Convention which will
follow. It is believed that these safeguards should be reasonably
sufficient.
While the British may raise the point, it is not recommended that the
present regime be required to permit Albanian refugees abroad,
political or otherwise, to return to Albania under safe conduct
passes to participate in the election. These refugees constitute a
very small minority of the Albanian people and, while there may be a
few true patriots among them, there are far more persons who
collaborated with the Italian and German invaders and who fled to
escape their just deserts. It would be too much to ask the present
regime to permit their return without careful screening which the
three powers have neither time nor means to provide. There may,
however, be a few former Albanian leaders whom the British seem to
favor, such as Medmed Konitza, former Albanian Minister to London,
whom the present regime might permit to come into the country
without molestation.
Second, there should be an exchange of notes
in which the Albanian authorities shall undertake, pending
negotiation of treaties, to guarantee to the diplomatic consular
representatives of the three powers, diplomatic rights and
privileges usually extended under international law. In view of the
peculiar situation existing in Albania some of these rights
mentioned in Section VI on International Relations should
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be specifically named so
that there will be no question about them. In addition, it should be
clearly provided in the exchange of notes that the diplomatic
representatives, including their staffs, shall be entitled to travel
freely about the country unaccompanied by government police or
guards.
2. Assistance to be Rendered
In discussing the question of recognition with the British and Soviet
authorities, it is recommended that the subject of assistance, joint
or separate, which they will render to the new government especially
in the fields of finance and economic reconstruction, be taken up.
Without such assistance there can be no economic stability in the
country and without such stability no government can continue long
in power. In according such assistance, advantage should be taken of
the opportunity to insist, as a quid pro quo,
that the regime reduce the size of its Army commensurate with its
resources and population. This last point is highly important
because the budget for this year, which was only made public on July
28, 1945, indicates that a little over half of the one billion franc
estimated revenue is to be devoted to the Army.
It might also be agreed between the three powers that this subject
will be submitted to their diplomatic representatives in Albania for
joint study and joint or separate reports as the situation may
require. This study should begin, however, as soon as possible after
recognition is accorded and the diplomatic representatives arrive in
Tirana. As stated above UNRRA may be able to take care of emergency
needs pending a decision on some long range program.
In connection with financial and economic assistance referred to
above, it is also recommended that irrespective of other
considerations immediate steps should be taken by the three powers
to restore postal, telegraphic and ordinary private financial
facilities between Albania and the outside world. Such restoration
is of great importance to the United States because of the large
percentage of the population, especially in southern Albania, which
has friends and relatives in the United States, with whom they wish
to communicate and from whom they badly need remittances which were
formerly the main support of many of them.
3. British-Soviet-Albanian
Relations
It is recommended that the Department of State confer with the
British Foreign Office and the Soviet Foreign Office with regard to
their real attitude and policy toward Albania, This approach should
definitely be made before a decision is reached with respect to the
question of recognition, as the results of those inquiries might
change the entire character of the recommendations.
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First, we should make a point-blank request
of the British Foreign Office for a clarification of its real policy
toward the setting up of an independent Albania and toward the
opposition groups in Albania and elsewhere. In other words, we
should know whether the British Foreign Office is really desirous
and prepared to support the establishment of an independent Albania.
We should make it clear that we know of utterances of certain
British officials who prefer to see the country divided up and the
southern part added to Greece. If the Foreign Office still supports
Anthony Eden’s declaration that there is to be an independent
Albania, that declaration should be reaffirmed and British policy
oriented accordingly.
Second, an inquiry should be made of the
Soviet Foreign Office with regard to its real policy toward Albania
and toward the Communist group in Albania. This may be a delicate
question but if there is to be any satisfactory solution of the
Albanian problems the United States, before according recognition,
should know whether the Russians and the Russian Communist Party
will refrain from exercising, through the Communist group in Albania
or otherwise, undue influence in forcing upon the Albanian people a
form of government which they do not want and a foreign policy which
is unacceptable to its people. In other words, we should expect the
Soviet Government to live up to its declaration at Yalta that the
Albanian people have the right to choose freely and without coercion
within or without the form of government under which they wish to
live.
4. Border Problems
There are three Albanian border problems, one with Greece (the most
urgent), one with Yugoslavia, and one with Italy, which should be
made the subject of discussions with the British and Soviet Foreign
Offices at the time the question of recognition is discussed.
First, with regard to Greece, we should seek
to persuade both Foreign Offices to agree to a definite policy,
which should be announced publicly, to the effect that there is to
be no change in the southern border of Albania in favor of Greece
unless and until at some future time before some duly constituted
international organization Greek claims can be considered in a calm
and peaceful atmosphere and decided upon their merit. If the three
governments wish to decide upon a more positive policy, they could
agree among themselves to suggest to the Albanian and Greek
governments the appointment of a commission consisting of one member
for each of the three powers, (possibly the diplomatic
representatives of the three powers at Tirana) together with Greek
and Albanian representatives, to proceed to the border and to decide
upon such minor adjustments as would be necessary to make the border
conform more to natural topography,
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with a provision that the boundaries, once
fixed, minorities on either side thereof shall be removed to their
own country whether they wish to or not.
Second, a somewhat similar discussion should
be had with respect to the boundary between Albania and Yugoslavia
in the Kossova region. As has been indicated in the section of this
report on Albanian international relations there are approximately
one-half million Albanians in the Kossova area of Yugoslavia. The
Albanian authorities have apparently acquiesced in Yugoslavia’s
position that no change in this boundary be made but it is well
known that this is due to the influence that the Tito faction has
had over the present regime. The apparent solution at the present
time on that basis is not a real solution as it has settled
nothing.
Although this problem is not urgent in view of the present regime’s
acceptance of the present status quo, it is
highly desirable that the matter be discussed with the British and
Soviet Foreign Offices and possibly an agreement reached that a
commission, possibly the same commission that would study the Greek
frontier problem, should study this problem with a view to making
recommendations along the lines of a settlement similar to the
settlement proposed for the Albanian-Greek frontier with the
exception, of course, that a larger territory in the Kossova region
would be ceded to Albania and populations transferred accordingly.
It is also evident that with respect to this matter the cooperation
and participation of the Yugoslav authorities would be
essential.
Third, definite agreement should be reached
that the Island of Saseno lying at the entrance of Valona harbor and
taken by Italy in 1920 shall be returned to Albania. It is so
obvious that Saseno belongs to Albania that no mention was made of
it elsewhere in this report and it would not have been mentioned at
all except for the fact that only recently Saseno was the subject of
inquiry from A.F.H.Q., at Caserta. Hence the brief recommendation,
which is the only logical one to be made.
5. Balkan Federation
There remains as a possible final subject for discussion the question
of Albania joining a Balkan federation.
It is believed that there is merit in the idea of a general Balkan
federation, provided that the terms of the federation agreement are
reached by the Balkan states concerned after a mutually friendly
conference of their representatives who would act and draft without
influence from outside powers. In other words, the three great
powers, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, as
well as France, which will also be influential in European affairs,
should
[Page 52]
stand absolutely
aloof and allow the Balkan states to work out their own solution in
this respect.
It is believed, however, that the present is not a propitious time to
attempt to arrive at a federation arrangement as there is obviously
too much friction existing in the Balkans for any such agreement to
be reached. Aside from the Albanian-Greek and Albanian-Yugoslav
problems, there are Yugoslav and Greek problems, Balkan problems and
so on. Probably, therefore, it would be best for the three big
powers to suggest to Albania and to Yugoslavia, the only other power
really concerned at the moment, that this matter should be dropped
for the time being as there are more pressing problems for the
authorities of each of these Balkan states to consider than the
problem of a federation. In due time, however, the idea should be
taken up.
xi. appendices20
- I.
- List of Cabinet Officers.
- II.
- List of Sections of Documentary Report attached.
- III.
- Table of Contents of this Summary.
