740.00119 Control (Italy)/6–2545
The Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to the Acting Secretary of State
The Italian Ambassador present his compliments to the Honorable the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to bring to his knowledge the following:
The Italian Government has just received from Admiral Stone communication of the tracing of the so-called Morgan line75 established by the Alexander–Tito agreement on the demarkation of the respective occupation zones.
This communication is to the effect that the aforesaid line starts from Mount Binialuz at the Yugoslav border, follows the left side of the Isonzo river until Mount Vodice when it runs southeast as far as Aidussina and then, turning southward through San Giacomo, Divaccia and Erpelle, reaches the coast south of Trieste below Muggia. According to the said communication, no indication is given in regard to the harbor installations mentioned under articles 1 and 3 of the British-American agreement; neither is there any mention of Pola, the occupation of which is, however, assured within a radius of 6 kilometers around the town.
The Italian Ambassador, under instructions received from his Government, has the honor to submit the following considerations on the subject.
1) The line contemplated by the Alexander–Tito agreement, being even more unfavorable to Italy than the Wilson line especially in the section north of Trieste, does not contain any protective provision whatsoever as far as the Istrian region is concerned. Yugoslav control would thus extend to such a territory which, in the area of the [Page 1190] western coast and together with the Lussino island, is populated for the far greater majority by Italians, totaling over 150.000.
It is therefore hard to perceive that the Morgan line follows any principle, be it geographic, military, ethnical, economic, historical or administrative.
2) The demarkation line in question, in spite of its provisional nature, represents to a 9/10 extent, the confirmation of the Tito’s “fait accompli” which is in contrast with the point of view previously expressed by the Allies, according to which and according to the engagements taken through the armistice terms and subsequently, the entire Italian territory within the 1939 frontier, would be administered by the Anglo-American authorities, pending the decisions to be reached at the Peace Conference.
Even granting, however, that reasons of general politics, expediency might suggest the adoption of a compromise solution, it is unquestionable that the solution represented by the Morgan line is absolutely unfavorable to Italian interest and doesn’t seem to take into any account a fundamental element, that is the ethnic composition of the region.
Such a decision, while not providing any guarantee whatever for the Italian populations of that area, exposed—as they are—to Yugoslav reprisals and animosity (of which recent events have unfortunately given sufficient evidence) represents a clear tactical advantage for Yugoslavia which is meantime in a position to bring the zone under her subjection and consolidate her hold on it in prevision of the moment when the controvery will be discussed in its whole for its final disposal.
3) The Italian Government is perfectly aware of the difficulties of an international order which the Yugoslav question involved and of the dangers which might have derived from a matter that evidently exceeds the terms of the Italo-Yugoslav dispute, but touches upon the relations amongst the greater Allies.
The Italian Government therefore expresses its full recognition of the effort made by the Allied Governments—and particularly by the Government of the United States—in order to find a solution as satisfactory as the situation permitted, and its deep appreciation of its attitude of comprehension and sympathy in favor of the Italian cause which corresponds to principles of equity and international morality.
On its side, the Italian Government, in its awareness of the present delicate stage of the international situation, and in spite of the pressure of its public opinion, has so far avoided declaring its views on the question. At the same time, it has exerted a conciliatory action through the press, and intends not to depart from such an attitude [Page 1191] which is inspired by a sense of political responsibility and by its confidence in the aims of justice pursued by the Anglo-Americans.
The Italian Government cannot, however, ignore the present situation and the settlement which is being given to purely Italian territories which, except for a mere aspect of prestige, have absolutely no meaning, either from the economic or the military standpoint for the Yugoslav people, while forming on the other hand, an integral part of the Italian national territory.
4) The Italian Government is well aware that the definitive assignment of the territory in question is not compromised by the Alexander–Tito agreement and that the final disposition of this area is to be made on the basis of those principles of justice and democracy for which the Allied Nations have fought and won this war.
If, however, the agreement recently reached had to be considered as the basis for a future definite settlement, the Italian Government would since now emphasize that such a settlement could not be considered either satisfactory or acceptable, but that it would, on the contrary, represent, from all viewpoints—including the defence of the national territory and of western civilization—an illogical and painful mutilation of Italian soil, which certainly would have a definite influence on the future Italian interior and foreign policy.
5) It would, at all events, be of great comfort for the Italian people to have confirmation that these considerations are present in the mind of the United States Government and that they will not be forgotten in the framework of the settlement to be given to Europe in the spirit of justice and democracy.
- Line separating zones A and B projected in Belgrade Agreement but not clearly defined until Duino Agreement, June 20.↩