740.00119 Control (Italy)/5–1945: Telegram
President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)
44. Your No. 52, I agree that we cannot leave matters in their present state. It seems our immediate action should be to reject Tito’s answer as unsatisfactory and urge him to reconsider his decision. At the same time, I suggest we have Field Marshal Alexander, with assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately reinforce his front line troops to such an extent that our preponderance of force in the disputed areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs.
General Eisenhower has already communicated with Field Marshal Alexander concerning preparations for some such action. I suggest that we now direct General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Alexander [Page 1170] to proceed with the implementation of a show of force, both air and ground, and that the presentation in Belgrade of our rejection of Tito’s stand be timed, if practicable, so that our commanders’ troop movements will be already be evident to Tito.
There should be no question about our commanders taking essential precautions to prevent their forces from being placed in an untenable military position. However, I think we should make very clear to our leaders that this should be done with maximum precautions to insure that the overt act, if any, comes from Tito’s forces.
It may be that a heavy show of force will bring Tito to his senses. I question, however, that if hostilities should break out, it could be considered as frontier incidents.
In keeping with the foregoing, I therefore propose that you and I issue the following instructions to Alexander and Eisenhower:
“In connection with the problem of occupying Venezia Giulia and portions of Austria, Marshal Tito’s reply to our proposals is unsatisfactory, and he is being urged to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Alexander is directed, with maximum practicable assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately to reinforce his troops in the disputed areas so that our preponderance of force in those areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. Special precautionary measures will be taken so that an overt act, if any, will be by Tito’s forces and will not be based on some local display by a few turbulent individuals.”
I must not have any avoidable interference with the redeployment of American forces to the Pacific.