875.01/11–1344: Airgram
Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State
[Received November 20—6 p.m.]
A–50. Reference is made to the Department’s telegram 346 of November 8 [6], 4 p.m., 1944. Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, representative of this office at Bari, Italy, has reported under date of November [Page 286] 10, 1944 a conversation with Abas Kupi and details of the collapse of opposition to the FNC in Albania, as follows:
Last spring the British foresaw that the rise of the FNC might well upset the political balance in Albania and bring to power a group more friendly to Russia than to England. British liaison officers had been active ever since the German occupation last fall in all parts of the country, but aid in the form of gold or promises of support were mostly given to the so-called nationalist leaders, who in the past had been the tribal chiefs, politicians and rulers of the country. The policy of aiding any groups who fought Germans was gradually applied (perhaps unwillingly at first) to FNC’s Army of National Liberation, culminating in an agreement for coordinating action against the Germans and delivering military supplies, which was signed in Bari, Italy, in August, 1944.*
However, in order to counteract the growing political strength of the FNC movement, the Foreign Office evidently decided last April to try to create a Nationalist bloc around Major Abas Kupi, with whom they had been dealing since 1940 and who, at that time, was free of any taint of collaboration with the Germans. Such a bloc would, after successfully fighting the enemy and enjoying British support, draw off the moderates from the FNC and emerge as the future government of Albania.
Unfortunately for British policy, they underestimated the appeal and effectiveness of the FNC organization and overestimated Kupi’s strength. Those they hoped would rally around Kupi or join his Movement of Legality could not resist German gold and promises of arms, nor could any of the nationalists either evolve a constructive program to attract the peasant or submerge their individual ambitions. There was nothing to hold them together but British support—and there was very little real evidence of that.
The tendencies of the nationalist groups to collaborate with the Germans, their lack of cohesion, their unwillingness to fight with only promises of British support, destroyed whatever small hope there was in forming a bloc, and the attack of the LNC First Division on Kupi just as he was about to attack the Germans on his own, pointed up the danger of a civil war if Kupi should then be given military supplies.
After several months of vacillation, during which time the British kept their officers with Kupi, thereby infuriating the FNC, who were by now accusing him of open collaboration with the Germans, directives were issued from London to withdraw all support from Kupi. [Page 287] Subsequently, the entire mission was withdrawn, as well as the officers with Gani Kreysiu, an Albanian chief in the north, who even the FNC admits has been fighting against the Germans. This has brought about the collapse of all opposition or potential opposition to the FNC, since any such opposition depended on either German (now withdrawing) or British support. Kupi and Said Kreysiu are now political refugees in Italy. Attempts are also being made to evacuate Gani. The Ballists,54 who have as a group been collaborating, are fleeing with the Germans and will be killed if caught. Several have been able to go over to the FNC. The only resistance remaining is in the Catholic district in northwestern Albania around Scutari, but it is not thought that they will fight it out with the FNC once it has dominated the rest of Albania.
In a conversation I had with Abas Kupi yesterday, he freely admitted that there is now no possibility of forming any opposition to the FNC as a political power unless there is intervention by the Allies to disarm the ANLA55 and to control the gendarmerie. He firmly believes that the FNC is completely dominated by Communists and is taking orders from Moscow while getting inspiration from Tito. He recognizes the validity of the argument that arms be given to those who will kill Germans, but he believes that the Partisans have assiduously avoided the Germans when there was any real risk and that their contribution has been minor. He therefore feels it was shortsighted to put arms in the hands of those who will now use them to liquidate all those in Albania who look West not East. He would prefer to see a sphere of influence set up in the Balkans since he feels that then only would the British be able to set him and his kind back in power. He believes his former followers and the peasants in the section of Albania he controlled will not accept the authority of the FNC—or, as he put it, “Anybody who has guns”.
The important conclusion to be drawn from talking to Kupi and to those BLOs who have attempted to create the nationalist bloc and failed is merely that it is now an inescapable fact that:
- 1.
- The FNC are now dominant in over half of Albania and soon will dominate it all.
- 2.
- This will be accomplished by ruthless force or threat of force and the elimination of its political opponents. And mostly because the majority of people now know that the organization has the backing of both the Soviets and lately the British.
- 3.
- That the government will be controlled by Communists and will follow the Tito line for the south Balkans.
- 4.
- That there is nothing left for the British to do but recognize this government and pretend to like it.
- In fact not until September did Radio Bari begin to give a band to the Partisans and only after the head of the Albanian section of P[sychological] W[arfare] B[oard] and a sinister character named Gyokova, who seems to have Fascist connections in the past, were removed. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Members of the Balli Kombetar, Albanian Nationalist organization with a Western orientation.↩
- Albanian National Liberation Army.↩