860C.01/11–1144
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)
| Participants: | Jan Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador; Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of EE; Elbridge Durbrow, Assistant Chief, EE. |
The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He said that he had been asked by his Government to endeavor to ascertain the attitude of the United States Government towards the proposed territorial changes10 involving Poland which had been proposed to the Polish Government by the British Government in agreement with the Soviet Government. The Ambassador said that Prime Minister Mikolajczyk found himself, of course, in a very difficult position; that the Soviet insistence, with which the British concurred, on the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland with compensation in the west of German territory, East Prussia and Upper Silesia up to the Oder River presented the most serious problems to the Polish Government and that up to the present the United States Government had not made its attitude officially known in regard to these territorial changes. He said under the circumstances Mr. Mikolajczyk naturally wanted to know the attitude of the United States Government on these questions, [Page 1333] particularly whether the United States would support the proposed compensation in the west and also whether the United States would support the proposed transfer of German population from those areas and whether American assistance would be given in the economic reconstruction of the Polish State in the postwar period.
The Ambassador went on to say that because of the importance of these questions he would like very much to see Mr. Stettinius and also the President in order to discuss these subjects with him.
Mr. Bohlen said that the views expressed by the Ambassador and his request to see Mr. Stettinius and the President would be conveyed promptly to the appropriate quarters.
In reply to the Ambassador’s question Mr. Bohlen said that while he could not, of course, undertake to say what the United States attitude would be on the questions raised since they would be decided by the highest authorities, he personally felt that any question of an American guarantee for any specific frontiers in Europe would be in the highest degree improbable since it would contradict a very basic and traditional American policy; that if an international organization is set up and the United States was a member thereof, the United States responsibility would be on the basis of general security which would apply to the whole world.
Mr. Bohlen further pointed out that as the Ambassador knew, this Government earnestly desired to see a satisfactory, just and stable solution of the points at issue between the Soviet Union and Poland and that any agreement which might be reached between the three countries particularly concerned, namely, Poland, the Soviet Union and England, would be very much welcomed by this Government but that he could of course not undertake at this time to say what the definite attitude of the United States Government would be on any territorial question.
The Ambassador said he fully understood this but merely desired to emphasize the vital importance to Poland of Lwow and the oil fields southwest of Lwow. He said that unless this city and district were left within the future frontiers of Poland he personally did not see how the Polish Government could accept the proposed territorial settlement.
In conclusion Mr. Bohlen assured the Ambassador that he would immediately convey his request to Mr. Stettinius.11
- For illustration of proposed territorial changes, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, map facing p. 233.↩
- On November 16, 1944, the Polish Ambassador was informed by Mr. Stettinius that the President probably could not receive him within the following few days, and that it would be desirable “to postpone the formulation of the United States attitude on the Polish question until the President would have an opportunity to discuss it with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill provided that such a meeting was not too long delayed” (860C.01/11–1644).↩