760C.61/11–944: Telegram
The Chargé to the Polish Government in Ewile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 9—11:50 a.m.]
Poles 119. I saw Premier Mikolajczyk yesterday. He told me that following insistence from Mr. Churchill a week ago he gave a reply on the proposals advanced at Moscow. The Polish Government had reached a negative decision.
Mikolajczyk said that on November 2, Churchill had asked for a reply the Moscow proposals within 48 hours. He had said that otherwise he would wire Marshal Stalin that the Polish Government could not reach a decision. Mikolajczyk therefore next day called a Cabinet meeting which after considering all points decided that it could not accept because British clarification of certain points still left important questions open and because the Polish Government was awaiting a reply from Washington to certain inquiries.
Mikolajczyk recalled that at Moscow Stalin insisted that as a precondition to the settlement of other questions the Polish Government must accept the Curzon line as its eastern frontier and publicly announce its decision. Great Britain and the Soviet Union would agree to compensate Poland in the west up to the Oder. They would also guarantee the new Poland. A fusion of the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee was envisaged. On the Russian side the method was left vague. Churchill advocated a 50–50 basis.
Before undertaking to decide on the proposals, Mikolajczyk said the Polish Government asked the British (a) what would be the status in the west in [if] the United States did not agree on the Oder line, and (b) would the British guarantee the independence of Poland in its new frontiers?
On point (a) the British answered that they would continue to “advocate” the Oder line; and on point (b) they would guarantee the independence of the new Poland in conjunction with the Soviet Union pending the inclusion of the guarantee in an international security organization which it was hoped would be set up.
Mikolajczyk pointed out that this meant that the Polish Government would be expected to accept the Curzon line definitely at this time; that the question of its western frontier would be left open until the peace conference; that the British were only willing to give a joint guarantee with the Soviets, which meant that if the Russian guarantee failed the British guarantee would fall away; also that contrary to the understanding at Moscow the old Anglo-Polish alliance would be superseded. As for the question of fusion with the Lublin [Page 1332] Committee a 50–50 formula had no meaning as regards real independence. Whoever effectively controlled the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs would be the real governing force.
Mikolajczyk said that when he gave Churchill his decision Churchill was highly displeased and indicated that he might have to withdraw his support. Mikolajczyk said in that case he would have to resign and explain his reasons for doing so.
A couple of days later he saw Eden and Cadogan who indicated that it was British policy to leave frontiers until the end of the war unless two countries voluntarily agreed regarding their own frontiers. In the matter of a British guarantee the British would be willing to negotiate for continuance of the Anglo-Polish treaty. They would explain to the Soviet Ambassador (Gusev) the reason for delay in a reply.
Mikolajczyk told me that despite the pressure for him to return to Moscow he had told Churchill it would be useless for him to do so even if he personally agreed on the Curzon line unless he had the support of the Government and the Polish people.