860C.01/8–1244: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 13—9:05 p.m.]
2972. Supplementing my 2923, August 10, 2 p.m. For the President and Acting Secretary. When Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow he told me that it was his belief that the Soviet Government intended to communize and Sovietize Poland and the National Council [Committee] for Liberation was an instrument for this purpose. At our first talk the British Ambassador and I told him that our evidence did not conform to this opinion, and shortly afterward when he expressed the same opinion to a group of American newspapermen several of the more responsible took strong exception to it.
As a result of his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Mikolajczyk’s opinion appeared to change and the British Ambassador suggested that he put the question directly to Stalin in his last talk. Mikolajczyk told me that he raised the question indirectly, first by repeating a story he had heard of a statement by an Austrian prisoner of war to the effect that Germany had been beaten in the war but would now achieve her objective through other means. Germany would denounce Communism and because of her higher intellectual power would get control of Russia. Stalin commented “Communism fitted Germany as a saddle to a cow”. Mikolajczyk then asked Stalin how he viewed the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. Stalin, after explaining his fears as to the possible rebirth of militarism in Germany within 25 years, said that to avoid this danger the Soviet Union and Poland must “march together” each leaving to the other country its own internal affairs. He emphasized also the need for the development of close relations by Poland with the United States, Britain and France.
Mikolajczyk, however, is still worried that the majority of members of the Committee of Liberation are determined to communize Poland and to use him and others to that end. When Bierut said that the [Page 1314] parties didn’t count and that he, Bierut, represented the feeling of the masses, Mikolajczyk felt that he was following a Communist line. He respects Bierut’s ability but fears him.
I questioned Mikolajczyk in some detail on his discussion with Bierut about Bierut’s objection to recognition of the parties and was not entirely convinced that Mikolajczyk’s deductions were correct or whether Bierut was pointing out that the war had deeply affected Polish popular opinion and that old party lines were no longer playing the role in Polish thinking that they had in the past.
In my talks with Morawski whom Mikolajczyk also classifies as a determined Communist he told me that he was a socialist not a Communist. He said that there was no danger of Poland becoming Communist, the Peasant Party was the strongest in Poland, the peasants were wedded to their individual ownership of the land and the population was so largely Catholic.
Mikolajczyk’s suspicions were further aroused by a private talk he had with one of the members of the Committee whom I took to be General Rola-Zymierski who urged him not to return to London but to accept the proposition of the Committee and go to Warsaw saying, “If you don’t they will take control and it will be too late”. Here again Mikolajczyk inferred that Rola feared the leading members of the Committee were determined to seize power and establish a Communist regime while they had the support of the Red Army.
After questioning Mikolajczyk, I felt that these remarks of Rola’s might well have been intended as personal advice to Mikolajczyk, and that Rola felt more confidence in the stability of the situation if Mikolajczyk and some of his colleagues were to participate in the new Government.
I am spelling this out in such detail as it is my impression that Mikolajczyk’s deep-seated suspicions and fears of Communism will play a part in decision that he and his associates take on his return to London.
Although it is impossible to foresee how events will develop in Poland, I believe that at this time Mikolajczyk and his associates must put suspicion aside and earnestly attempt to make a reasonable settlement, being prepared (after their return to Warsaw) to fight out any situation with which they are confronted.
Mikolajczyk in his conversation with me indicated that he was weighing the advisability of joining forces with the Poles here as against allowing the situation to run its course. He seemed to be convinced that the Committee were so unrepresentative and inexperienced in government affairs that they would get into great difficulties and that it might be more advisable to delay action on the part of the London Government until this was proved to be the case.
[Page 1315]I cannot disagree too strongly with this reasoning. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government wants to see a settlement now and it is obvious that the Committee feel they need the help of Mikolajczyk and some of his colleagues but there is no way to predict how successful the Committee alone will be, but to the degree that they are unsuccessful in establishing stable conditions in Poland that war effort will suffer. If Mikolajczyk is sincere, which I believe him to be, in stating that his primary present objectives are to achieve the earliest liberation of Poland and to insure a truly free election, his policy is clearly indicated, namely that he should make every effort to work out a merger of all Polish factions at this time.
By his visit to Moscow he has gained a major advantage in the acceptance by all of his leadership as Prime Minister. He has also attained a major success in obtaining Stalin’s recognition for the first time of his underground forces fighting in Warsaw and agreement to assist them.
It is my earnest hope that the British Government bring full pressure on Mikolajczyk and his associates to act quickly and realistically, and I recommend that we support this position.