860C.01/8–1144: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 12—1:25 a.m.]
2955. For the President and Acting Secretary. I called on Molotov this evening to obtain his reactions to the Mikolajczyk visit. He said that Stalin had cabled the President on the day of Mikolajczyk’s departure a full report of what had transpired and that he would give me the substance of this report.
Stalin had estimated the situation as a definite step forward. Although a basis for understanding between the London Government and the Polish Committee had not yet been found, hope had not been given up that agreement would be reached. In reply to my question Molotov said that the Soviet Government was very anxious to see a merger between the two parties. He asked me what I had learned from Mikolajczyk as to his attitude. I told him Mikolajczyk was hopeful that a solution could be found and that he was firmly convinced that the Russians desired agreement. Molotov replied, “Of course. Our minds would not be at ease unless an agreement were reached.”
Molotov said that he had found Mikolajczyk to be “a wise man” and that he had made a good impression. He continued that both sides wanted him to be Prime Minister. However, he held a conflicting position: He was ready to replace the President but was unable to do so under the Constitution and was reluctant to abandon the 1935 Constitution.
Molotov stated that, although Mikolajczyk and his colleagues did not approve of this Constitution, they maintained that the United States Government had insisted that it be adhered to. I endeavored to explain the background of the formation of the London Government and our recognition thereof, stating that the Soviet Government had also recognized it on this basis. Molotov said that both sides now preferred the 1921 Constitution and he could not understand why Mikolajczyk and his colleagues could not now revert to it.
[Page 1312]I commented that Mikolajczyk had not taken seriously the proposal of the Committee that the London Government be given only 4 seats in the new government and had assumed that a more equitable distribution between the various parties could be arranged. Molotov believed that agreement could be reached on this question.
The only sharp note in the conversation was that in conclusion he stated that the Poles had always been late “last year and even up to the present. Now they must make up their minds quickly or it will be too late.”
He spoke of the communication that the Polish Committee had addressed to the President regarding Professor Lange, which subject Stalin had referred to in his cable. He considered that Dr. Lange would have to renounce his American citizenship and asked whether the President would support it. I said that I could not speak for the President but that an American citizen had the privilege of renouncing his citizenship, that it was entirely up to Lange and that as we recognized the Polish Government in London, I did not believe that the President would wish to become involved in the matter.
I asked Molotov what he knew about Bierut. He said that he had never met him before these conferences. He mentioned that he spoke Russian fluently, and gave me a brief sketch of his background substantially as I have reported to the Department in my No. 2954, August 11, 11 p.m.75
In reply to my question he said that he understood Bierut had been a member of the Communist Party but had left it and he did not know whether he was a Communist now or not. He described Bierut as being broadminded, reasonable, reserved and a real Polish patriot, and one who fully understood the situation in Poland.
Finally, I asked Molotov about the fighting in Warsaw. He explained at great length that the resistance had started too soon on August 1 without any knowledge of the Soviet Government.76 The first they had heard of it was from a Reuter’s report on August 2. Stalin had promised Mikolajczyk to make every effort to assist in every possible way and plans were being made to drop a Red Army officer in Warsaw.
He said that they could not identify the Russian officer who was already there, a Captain Kalugin,77 who had unexpectedly showed up and claimed to be an officer in the Red Army. They were attempting to identify him. He explained that the premature move of the Poles [Page 1313] was embarrassing. It was too costly for the Red Army to make a frontal attack and it would take time to outflank the city.
Molotov left me without any doubt that the Soviet Government is most anxious that agreement be reached between the Poles but that the Soviet Government is going ahead with its plans to support the Committee regardless and that delay on the part of Mikolajczyk and his colleagues would work against their interests.