The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 91
587. 1. My telegram number 585. While the Polish Ministers cannot formally authorise us to proceed on this basis, they are ready that we should do so on their behalf and assure us that they will not subsequently [Page 1263] disavow our actions. For the reasons explained in my message they cannot however themselves come out formally and publicly at this stage in the sense of this message. There is the further difficulty that three of the four parties represented in the Polish Government, i.e. all except the Peasant Party, refuse to authorise Monsieur Mikolajczyk to go as far as we would have wished. The present proposals therefore represent agreement with Monsieur Mikolajczyk, Monsieur Romer and Count Raczynski for which they would hope subsequently to secure the support of the Polish Government and the Polish underground movement in Poland if it proves acceptable to U.J.
2. You will see that my message goes very far to meet Soviet requirements in so far as
- (1)
- Orders have already been issued to the Polish underground movement to cooperate with the Soviet forces (see paragraph 5 of my telegram):
- (2)
- The Polish Government will accept a position under which the Soviet Government hand over to them for administration only those areas of Poland west of the Curzon Line (this abandonment of large Polish agglomerations in Vilna and Lwow areas means a great sacrifice to them):
- (3)
- The Polish Government agree and are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities. They realise that while reserving their formal rights their acceptance of a demarkation line based on the Curzon Line in fact prejudges the future frontier about which they are ready and indeed anxious to open negotiations soon. It has been made very clear to the Polish Ministers in this connection that His Majesty’s Government regard the Curzon Line as the appropriate future frontier and will support this at the postwar settlement.
3. Clark Kerr has been instructed to emphasize the above points when communicating my message to U. J., and also to stress the necessity for reserving the formal settlement of future Polish frontiers until we are in a position to deal with the western and northern as well as the eastern frontiers.
4. Clark Kerr has also been asked to draw Stalin’s attention to the great public and parliamentary interest and anxiety here regarding Polish-Soviet relations, pointing out the importance of reaching some early practical arrangements on the lines suggested in my message to calm public anxiety and to avoid grave embarrassment to the United Nations war effort as a whole. Ambassador is to add that we also have to consider the effect of what we are now doing upon the Polish divisions which have now gone into action in Italy or are preparing to go into action from the United Kingdom and upon the Polish Air squadrons and Navy who have already rendered notable services to the United Nations.
[Page 1264]5. Instructions to Clark Kerr conclude: The Polish Ministers have recently shown great restraint by refusing to enter into polemics as a result of the bitter and unjustified attacks upon them in the recent Pravda article. They are showing realism and courage in enabling us to proceed on the present basis despite the contrary view held by large sections of the Polish Government and population in Poland and abroad and despite their own misgivings regarding the overwhelming Soviet power. We doubt very much whether we can push them any further and we should feel alarmed about the effect upon opinion here and in the USA, and therefore upon the United Nations war effort, of a Soviet refusal to give sympathetic consideration to the present proposals. You should make use of the above arguments in you[r] representations to Marshal Stalin.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.↩