Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt ⁸⁶

London, 20 February, 1944.

585. My immediately preceding telegram.⁸⁷ Following is text of telegram which I have sent to Marshal Stalin.

1. The Foreign Secretary and I have had numerous long discussions with the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I shall not attempt to repeat all the arguments which were used but only to give what I conceive to be the position of the Polish Government in the upshot.

2. The Polish Government are ready to declare that the Riga Line no longer corresponds to realities and with our participation to discuss with the Soviet Government as part of the general settlement a new frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union together with the future frontiers of Poland in the north and west. Since however the compensations which Poland is to receive in the north and west cannot be stated publicly or precisely at present time the Polish Government clearly cannot make an immediate public declaration of their willingness to cede territory as indicated above because the publication of such an arrangement would have an entirely onesided appearance with the consequence that they would immediately be repudiated not only by a large part of their people abroad but by the underground movement in Poland with which they are in constant contact. It is evident therefore that the Polish-Soviet territorial settlement which must be an integral part of the general territorial settlement of Europe could only formally be agreed and ratified when the victorious Powers are gathered round the table at the time of an armistice or peace.

3. For the above reasons the Polish Government until it has returned to Polish Territory and been allowed to consult the Polish People can obviously not formally abdicate its rights in any part of Poland as hitherto constituted but the vigorous prosecution of the war against Germany in collaboration with the Soviet Armies would be greatly assisted if the Russian Government will facilitate the return of the Polish Government to the territory of liberated Poland at the earliest possible moment: and in consultation with their British and American Allies as the Russian Armies advance arrange from time to time with the Polish Government for the establishment of the Civil Administration of the Polish Government in given districts. This procedure would be in general accordance with those to be followed in the case of other countries as they are liberated. The Polish Government are naturally very anxious that the districts to be placed under Polish Civil Administration should include such places as Vilna and Lwow, where there are large concentrations of Poles, and that the territories to the east of the demarkation line should be administered by the Soviet Military Authorities with the assistance of representatives of the United Nations. They point out that thus they would be in the best position to enlist all such able bodied Poles in the war effort. I have informed them and they clearly understand that you will not assent to leaving Vilna and Lwow under Polish administration. I wish on the other hand to be able to assure them that the area to be placed under Polish Civil Administration will include at least all Poland west of the Curzon Line.

4. At the frontier negotiations contemplated in paragraph 2 above, the Polish Government, taking into consideration the mixed character of the population of eastern Poland, would favour a frontier drawn with a view to assuring the highest degree of homogeneity on both sides while reducing as much as possible the extent and hardships of an exchange of populations. I have no doubt myself, especially in view of the immediate practical arrangements contemplated by the Polish Government as set out in paragraph 3 above, that these negotiation[s] will inevitably lead to the conclusion you desire in regard to the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but it seems to me unnecessary and undesirable publicly to emphasize this at this stage.

5. As regards the war with Germany which they wish to prosecute with the utmost vigour, the Polish Government realise that it is imperative to have a working agreement with the Soviet Government in view of the advance of the liberating Russian Armies onto Polish soil from which these armies are driving the German invader. They assure me emphatically that they have at no time given instructions to the Underground Movement to attack “Partisans”. On the contrary, after consultation with the leaders of their Underground Movement and with their accord they have issued orders to all Poles now in arms or about to revolt against the Hitlerite tyranny as follows:—When the Russian Army enters any particular district in Poland the Underground Movement is to disclose its identity and meet the requirements of the Soviet Commanders, even in the absence of a resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. The local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian Underground Authority, will meet and declare to the Commander of the incoming Soviet Troops that, following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remain faithful, they are ready to coordinate their actions with him in the fight against the common foe. These orders which are already in operation seem to me, as I am sure they will to you, of the highest significance and importance.

6. For the first time on February 6th I told the Polish Government that the Soviet Government wished to have the frontier in east Prussia drawn to include, on the Russian side, Konigsberg. The information came as a shock to the Polish Government who see in such a decision a substantial reduction in the size and in economic importance of the German territory to be incorporated in Poland by war [way?] of compensation. But I stated that in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government this was a rightful claim on the part of Russia. Regarding as I do this war against German aggression as all one and as a 30 years’ war from 1914 onwards I reminded Monsieur Micolajczyk of the fact that the soil of this part of east Prussia was dyed with Russian blood expended freely in the common cause. Here the Russian Armies advancing in August 1914 and winning the battle of Gumbinnen⁸⁸ and other actions had, with their forward thrusts and with much injury to their mobilization, forced the Germans to recall two Army Corps from the advance on Paris, which withdrawal was an essential part in the victory of the Marne.⁸⁹ The disaster at Tannenberg⁹⁰ did not in any way undo this great result. Therefore it seemed to me that the Russians had an historic and well founded claim to this German territory.

7. As regards the composition of the Polish Government, the Polish Government cannot admit any right of a foreign intervention. They can however assure the Russian Government that by the time they have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government, they will include among themselves none but persons fully determined to cooperate with the Soviet Union. I am of opinion that it is much better that such changes should come about naturally and as a result of further Polish consideration of their interests as a whole. It might well be, in my opinion, that the moment for a resumption of these relations in a formal manner would await the reconstitution of a Polish Government at the time of the liberation of Warsaw, when it would arise naturally from the circumstances attending that glorious event.

8. It would be in accordance with assurances I have received from you that, in an agreement covering the points made above, the Soviet Government should join with His Majesty’s Government in undertaking vis-à-vis each other and Poland first to recognize and respect the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of the reconstituted Poland and the right of each to conduct its domestic affairs without interference: secondly, to do their best to secure in due course the incorporation in Poland of the free city of Danzig, Oppeln, Silesia, East Prussia, west and south of a line running from Konigsberg and of as much territory up to the Oder as the Polish Government see fit to accept: thirdly, to effect the removal from Poland, including the German territories to be incorporated in Poland of the German population: and fourthly, to negotiate the procedure for an exchange of population between Poland [and] the Soviet Union, and for the return to their mother country of nationals of the powers in question. All the above undertakings to each Kingdom should, in my view, be drawn up in such a form that they could be embodied in a single instrument or exchange of letters.

9. I informed the Polish Ministers that should the settlement which has now been outlined in the various telegrams that have passed between us become a fact and be observed in the spirit by all parties to it, His Majesty’s Government would support that settlement at the conference after the defeat of Hitler, and also, that we would guarantee that settlement in after years to the best of our ability.

86. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park. N.Y.
87. In telegram 584, February 20, 1944, the Prime Minister said that this telegram to Stalin had been “textually agreed with the Poles” and he called the attention of the President to the fact that it achieved, without actually saying so, the essentials of “the settlement outlined at Teheran”. The Prime Minister then added: “Anything you can do to commend its acceptance to the Soviet Government will be of great assistance.”
88. A significant Russian victory over the Germans, August 19–20, 1914.
89. During the period between September 5 and 12, 1914, the German advance into France was here thrust back.
90. The complete defeat of a Russian army occurred here between August 26 and 30, 1914.