500.CC/9–2144
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State
In the conversations with the Russians and British we have reached agreement except as to: [Page 835]
- 1.
- Procedure of voting in the Security Council;
- 2.
- Determination of initial members;
- 3.
- Treatment of matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states;
- 4.
- Provision for amendment of the Charter; and
- 5.
- If present efforts for agreement fail, promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The problem with which we are most concerned is whether a permanent member of the Council should vote on matters relating to a dispute to which it is a party and, in consequence of the unanimity rule, have the power of veto. The Soviets insist that they should have this right and that permanent members should have the power of veto on all questions, except procedural matters, including the question of whether a dispute may be considered in the Security Council. The British maintain that no state party to a dispute should be entitled to vote. In the document we presented on July 1835 we stated that a special procedure for voting in such cases should be worked out. During the conversations we have, under instructions, taken a position similar to that of the British.
Confronted by the choice between continuing the conversations in the hope of getting an early compromise on this issue, which appears unlikely at the technical level, or of adjourning, the American group has considered, among other serious questions, the following:
- 1.
- Whether adjournment without agreement on this issue could be placed in such a light as to avoid unfortunate domestic repercussions and unfavorable international consequences, both military and political;
- 2.
- Whether the consequences of such adjournment would adversely affect present and future military cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- 3.
- Whether such adjournment would make necessary a public statement by this Government of its position on the voting question;
- 4.
- Whether the ensuing public debate would make more difficult subsequent acceptance of a compromise formula by this Government;
- 5.
- Whether the repercussions of such debates in other countries would make more difficult subsequent agreement between their governments and ours;
- 6.
- Whether the resulting delay would undermine public support for an international organization and jeopardize our participation through the building up of isolationist and other opposition here; and
- 7.
- Whether postponement of agreement, with opportunity for world debate, might in fact lead to a strengthened public support of a, satisfactory compromise and to less difficulties with small states, or whether the need for a compromise might so dissatisfy the small states as to be injurious to the establishment of the proposed organization, and to our Inter-American relations.
Having in mind the foregoing consideration, the American group, on balance, suggests that, subject to agreement among the three powers:
- 1.
- The conversations with the Soviets and British should be adjourned;
- 2.
- At that time a communiqué should be issued stating that the draft proposals have been submitted to the Governments who in due course will make a statement;
- 3.
- Conversations with the Chinese should start promptly;
- 4.
- At the conclusion of the conversations with the Chinese, any additional points requiring consideration should be submitted to the Soviet Government;
- 5.
- The proposals so agreed upon should thereafter be published as soon as possible and identic statements be made by the four Governments pointing out that these proposals cover most of the principal matters and that the Governments are continuing their consideration of remaining points; and
- 6.
- Since an acceptance of either extreme position on voting in the Council now appears highly improbable, an effort should be made at a higher level to reach agreement upon a compromise formula at the earliest moment, if possible before a public statement on the subject becomes necessary. Such a compromise might be along the lines of the formula projected on September 13, with possible improving amendments. Copy attached.36