500.CC/9–3044
The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 37
785. You will wish to read the following telegram I have received from Smuts.38
Begins: I feel deeply perturbed over deadlock with Russia in World Organisation Talks. This crisis in any case comes at a most unfortunate moment before final end of the war. I fear we are being rushed at break-neck pace into momentous decisions and not in this case only. International aviation, Telecommunications etc. all tell the same fate. Here however consequences may be particularly disastrous. I may therefore be pardoned for sending a warning note about this impasse.
At first I thought Russian attitude absurd and their contention one not to be conceded by other great Powers and inevitably to be turned down by smaller Powers also. But second thoughts have [Page 837] tended the other way. I assume that the Russian attitude is sincerely stated by Mr. Molotov and correctly interpreted by Moscow38a and Cadogan as one involving honour and standing of Russia amongst her Allies. She asks whether she is trusted and treated as an equal or is still an outlaw and Pariah. A misunderstanding here is more than a mere difference. It touches Russian amour propre and produces an inferiority complex and might poison European relations with far-reaching results. Russia conscious of her power may become more grasping than ever. Her making no attempt to find a solution shows her reaction and sense of power. What will be her future relations with Germany and Japan and even France, not to mention lesser countries? If a World Organisation is formed with Russia out of it she will become the power centre of another group and we shall be heading for World War 3. If no such organisation is formed by the United Nations they will stand stultified before history. The dilemma is a very grave one and the position into which we may be drifting should be avoided at all costs.
In view of these dangers smaller Powers should be prepared to make concessions to Russian’s amour propre and should not on this matter insist on theoretical equality of status. Such insistence may have most devastating results for the smaller Powers primarily. Where questions of power and security are concerned it would be most unwise to raise theoretical issues of sovereign equality, and the United Kingdom and the United States should use their influence in favour of common sense and safety-first rather than status for the smaller countries.
On merits there is much to be said for unanimity amongst the Great Powers at least for the year [years?] immediately following on this War. If in practice the principle proves unworkable the situation could be reviewed later when mutual confidence has been established and a more workable basis laid down. At the present stage a clash should be avoided at all costs. If unanimity for the Powers is adopted even including their voting on questions directly concerning their interests, the result would be that the United Kingdom and the United States will have to exert all their influence on Russia, to be moderate and sensible and not to flout world opinion. And in this they are likely to be largely successful. If Russia proves impossible the World Organisation may have to act but the blame will be hers. At the worst the principle of unanimity will only have the effect of a veto, of preventing action where it may be wise or even necessary. It will be negative and slow down action but it will also make it impossible for Russia to embark on activities disapproved of by the United Kingdom and United States.
[Page 838]Where the people are drunk with newly-won power, it may not be so bad a thing to have a brake like unanimity. I do not defend it, I dislike it, but I do not think it at present so bad that future world peace and security should be sacrificed on this issue.
The talks have so far been on an official advisory level although no doubt there may have been intervention on a higher level. I think before definite decisions are reached on highest level the whole situation should be most carefully reconsidered in all its far-reaching implications and some modus vivendi, if only of a temporary character, should be explored among the Great Powers which would prevent a catastrophe of the first magnitude. We simply must agree and cannot afford to differ where so much is at stake for the future. Ends.
- Paraphrased copy of telegram transmitted by the British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State in his letter of September 30, 1944 (not printed).↩
- Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.↩
- The text printed in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 212–213, reads “Clark Kerr” instead of “Moscow”. Other Variations are due to paraphrasing.↩