Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General, Volume I

Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary

Extract from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

Twenty-ninth Day, Thursday, September 21, 1944.

9:30 Meeting in the President’s Bedroom with the President and the Secretary

I met the Secretary, [and] Messrs. Dunn and Pasvolsky met Admiral Willson and General Embick, downstairs in the White House promptly at 9:30. Mr. Hull and I were invited upstairs first.

I presented to the President the document as it stands this morning, reflecting the changes agreed upon at yesterday’s Joint Steering Committee meeting and told him that this was the complete draft and that it had been cabled last night to London and Moscow. I said that he and the Secretary were the only two on the American side who could suggest further changes but that we would of course be glad to take up with the other Governments any amendments which either of them might wish to suggest.

I then handed to the President the memorandum outlining the changes which had been made in this final draft from the September 15th draft³⁰ which he had. He took this memorandum and promised to study it.

I then presented to the President the memorandum which the American Group had prepared in their all-day session yesterday³¹ which he went over carefully and then inquired, “Where are we at?” In answering this question, I referred to our conversation on Sunday³² in which I had outlined the formula for a possible recess, for publication of the document, and simultaneous announcements by the four governments stating that their representatives would meet again at a later date to settle the open questions. The President said he recalled the conversation. I then said, “You have a decision to reach and in making it there are important political and military considerations which should be taken into account”. I told him that General Embick and Admiral Willson, representing the Joint Chiefs, were downstairs and wished to make a statement to him on the military considerations. The President immediately commented that he did not think there were serious domestic political implications in the matter. He said this was in reality a preliminary working paper and that it was natural that it should take considerable time to work out such an important matter, and that it would naturally need to be reviewed in detail by the chiefs of the other major powers. He added that the whole subject was one to which Churchill had not yet given his attention and that he knew, from his recent conversations with him, that he would take some time to make up his mind on some of these issues. The President said that he would be glad to see the General and the Admiral.

The President and Mr. Hull then exchanged views on the whole subject. The President expressed the tentative opinion that the only course to pursue was to follow the recommendation of recessing as quickly as possible. I made it clear to him, however, that we could not do this until we heard from the British and Russian Governments and that Gromyko did not expect to hear until Monday. They discussed in some detail future plans for special meetings and the like. I found that there were no plans for an immediate meeting. This brought up the question as to whether we should mention a date in the communiqué for another meeting or leave the question entirely open. The President and Secretary seemed to feel that it would be all right to state November 15 or soon thereafter. The feeling seemed to be that it would be most difficult to settle the major open question except at a meeting between chiefs of states or between foreign ministers.

During this discussion, I told the President pointblank that I heard a rumor that he and Churchill had sent or were planning to send a joint cable to Stalin relating to world security and other matters and that it would be most helpful to us in the Department to know if such a message had been sent. He replied that a general wire of this nature had been sent, mainly on strategic military questions,³³ but that it had mentioned that there were certain very vital matters on the world organization which would have to be settled between the three of them. He added that nothing in the way of a compromise or any new formula had been suggested. He said he would ask Admiral Leahy to send us a copy. (This was never received.) In view of this discussion, I did not bring up the question of his sending a further wire to Stalin today. At this point, I again referred to the group waiting downstairs and suggested it would be helpful for them to join us. However the President and the Secretary were so engrossed in their discussion that they continued it for a while. I finally managed to get the group up and before taking them in reviewed quickly and generally the course which the discussion had taken. I then told the President that I thought he would be interested in hearing a statement on this matter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Embick made a very direct and satisfactory statement, expressing General Marshall’s view that it was important that whatever course was followed it be handled in a harmonious and workable way so that there would be no prejudice to cooperation with the Soviet Union. He said that the President’s idea of postponing consideration of the major open question to a later meeting was agreeable. Admiral Willson expressed his concurrence in the General’s statement.

In the course of the meeting I again called the President’s attention to the latest draft of the document and said that as there had been changes from the draft which he had previously reviewed I thought it was important for him to look over it. He indicated that he was pressed with a speech scheduled for Saturday which he hadn’t yet written, but I feel that he will read the document and let us hear from him on it. I suggested to the President that in one of his major campaign addresses he might wish to cover certain aspects of the world security developments. He agreed that this was important and asked me to communicate with Judge Rosenman³⁴ on the matter. He asked me to send the Judge a memorandum immediately saying that he had suggested this and that he felt the Judge should talk it over with us. (I called Judge Rosenman on the phone and arranged for him to see Pasvolsky and Ben Cohen.)

I mentioned to the President how disappointed we were that we had not yet succeeded in getting the human rights and fundamental freedoms statement in the document but that we had and would continue to press the matter as hard as we know how. I told him that we had obtained agreement that Cadogan and Gromyko would raise this as a special matter with their Governments and he was gratified by that. On leaving I told the President that I hoped that we would not have to bother him again on this.

During the conversation, the President repeated that Eden is thoroughly familiar with the plan and that he was pleased with Eden’s understanding of it and approach to it. Eden had told him that he had told the Prime Minister that the matter was in good shape and that he would have a copy for him to study on his return to England. Eden told him that he hoped that shortly thereafter they could both take it up with their War Cabinet. The President also repeated what he had told me Sunday—the fact that he had been unable to arouse the Prime Minister’s interest in this question at any time when they were together. The Prime Minister kept saying to him that he had not reached this yet and that it would have to be discussed with the War Cabinet. The President was impressed by Cadogan’s attitude and approach to it as he was with Eden’s.

I told the President and the Secretary that I felt we must publish the plan even if the Russians and British should not agree. The Secretary and the President both felt this was very important.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30. See progress report of September 20 for outline of changes, p. 828.
31. Infra.
32. See progress report of September 17, p. 816.
33. Presumably the telegram of September 19, 1944, from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin (Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 161). This message dealt only with military operations, however. It is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations.
34. Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Counsel to President Roosevelt.