Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

890D.01/637: Telegram

The Consul at Beirut (Gwynn) to the Secretary of State

Beirut, September 1, 1942—10 p.m.
[Received September 2—4:02 p.m.]

325. In amplification of my 319.⁵⁵

1. After reading the five communications transmitted as my 320 to 324⁵⁶ I remarked that we had made very little progress. De Gaulle replied we had made none as far as Franco-British relations were concerned which had seriously deteriorated. We then engaged in a long conversation which I hope will be thought of sufficient interest to justify another long telegram.

2. I asked him if he could not conceive of some less drastic manner than that indicated in his telegram of September 1 to Casey of settling this most unfortunate and untimely dispute, if for example he might not feel inclined to ask the American Government to use its good offices or mediate.

3. He replied that he would state frankly that he was not so inclined as he did not have confidence in the policy toward the Fighting French movement followed now by the Department of State. The latter had for a time seemed well inclined toward his movement and this attitude had culminated in the declaration by the Department that appeared in radio bulletin July 9^56a which was satisfactory to him. Since that time, however, he had perceived evidence of a change in the Department’s attitude, and this he attributed to projects entertained by the American Government to launch an attack or attacks on French Africa at Casablanca or Dakar or both in the near future and to its intention of doing so independently of him. He was to be disregarded because the American Government had been advised, mistakenly in his opinion, that the garrisons and populations of these regions would offer little resistance to the Americans alone but would resist bitterly if the Fighting French were a party to the attack. This he thought was a grave error: He would willingly admit that the French in Vichy, France and Colonies had much more friendship for the Americans than for the British; however, he had most reliable information that they looked to him as their real leader. The thing that would turn these French people definitely against the English and Americans would be the conviction or the mere suspicion that these latter were inclined to belittle him and his movement and to disregard or jeopardize the rights of France whose champion he is. Such an attitude would throw the French into the Vichy and German camp, and the Americans if they then attacked would be painfully surprised at the reception they would receive.

4. He went on to criticize most openly the American policy toward the Vichy Government. He would have us frankly break with Vichy and recognize him as the only legitimate spokesman for France. Our whole policy he said was badly inspired by the advice of Admiral Leahy,⁵⁷ Bullitt⁵⁸ and Donovan⁵⁹ who were well intentioned but mistaken. I objected that we had, I thought, accomplished much in following the policy we had pursued. He interjected “What for example” I said that after all the French Navy had not attacked the British in the Mediterranean. He replied that if I thought our attitude had had any influence in the matter I was very much mistaken; the French Fleet had remained quiet because Laval⁶⁰ and Darlan⁶¹ would never dare for fear of the French people order it to attack the enemies of Germany. I attempted to protest further but soon saw that it was vain.

5. He having spoken derogatorily of our maintaining an Embassy in Vichy and keeping a Vichy Ambassador at Washington I asked him if he did not think if [it] useful to preserve that means of communication and influence. He replied that certainly Hitler must find it advantageous, otherwise he would immediately have our Embassy closed.

6. He said that he was somewhat disappointed by the phrase in the Department’s telegram to London (136, August 21, 4 p.m., to Beirut⁶²) to the effect that the time to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon might only come in many years. I told him that the fault if any was my own, that I had so understood him, and that I had purposely given him a paraphrase of the Department’s message so that he might make his observations, which he had done without raising that point (my 306⁶³). He went into a long and complicated explanation of the independence which had been granted but which must be organized and protected later (see his broadcast speech of August 28).

7. He was thus not inclined to ask American help in settling his present difficulty with the British.

8. I then asked if he did not think that some such step as declaring that General Spears was no longer persona grata might not be sufficient to accomplish his purpose. He replied that he might do this in the near future but that this step would not be sufficient, the problem is deeper, it is the policy here of the British Government as exemplified in Churchill’s recent messages that must be changed.

9. He therefore felt that the step he had taken was necessary, that nothing less would do, and implied that more might be needed.

10. I then asked what he thought the British reaction might be. He cast his eyes to the floor, thought some time, and changed the subject with a malicious but not unpleasant smile. I asked him what he thought was to become of the British now in this territory. He replied that they might stay, that he would not interfere with them but added warmly “but they must not bother me”.

11. I of course said and repeated that it seemed to me inconceivable that the present friction should degenerate into an open conflict particularly at this time when the enemy has resumed his attacks in Egypt. De Gaulle said that no one could deplore more than he did the necessity which he found himself of adopting the attitude he had that he was the only champion of France and in the defense of her rights he would be uncompromising to the last. If this led to his fall he would go down with his banners flying, and one day, perhaps after many errors, the United States would realize that it is he whom it should support.

12. In concluding the long interview I assured de Gaulle that the correspondence he had just put into my hands would be immediately transmitted to the Department where it would doubtless be attentively considered and asked him in what way the United States might be most useful. He said in one way only, in supporting firmly his request to the British that they live up to their promises, which did not seem too much to ask.

13. I shall see him again in a few days at the dinner given for Mr. Willkie⁶⁴ if not before.

14. I venture to refer again to the subject of our aviators at Rayak (paragraph 14 of my 289 of August 16, 9 p.m.). About 1,000 have arrived, more I understand are expected soon, there and possibly elsewhere (Mezze field near Damascus). Possibly the Department may wish to contemplate a statement along similar lines to that made in radio bulletin No. 190 of August 12⁶⁵ concerning our forces in India, should worse come to worse.

15. Repeated to Cairo.

Gwynn

55. Dated September 1, 1 p.m., p. 626.
56. None printed.
57. See Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1942, p. 613.
57. Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; formerly Ambassador in France.
58. William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador in France.
59. William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services.
60. Pierre Laval, French Chief of Government, Vice President of the Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
61. Adm. Jean Frangçis Darlan, Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces.
62. See footnote 49, p. 619.
63. Dated August 24, 5 p.m., p. 621.
64. Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President in 1940, on his tour around the world.
65. See Department of State Bulletin, August 15, 1942, p. 697.