890E.01/157: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 29—12:42 a.m.]
4820. I have discussed with Eden on several occasions in the light of your unnumbered telegram of August 24, 10 p.m.,52 and previous, the serious situation which has arisen in Syria and the Lebanon and its unfortunate dangers for the prosecution of the war. Eden promised to keep me posted on developments as the British see them, and has just sent me a memorandum which I am quoting below. In his brief covering letter he said that, in the light of recent exchange of telegrams between General de Gaulle and the Prime Minister “We do not seem to be getting any nearer to a solution and we shall therefore probably be asking the General to come back to this country as soon as possible for further discussion”.
The Foreign Office memorandum reads as follows:
“In a letter to General de Gaulle dated the 25th July, 1941, covering certain agreements concerning collaboration between the British and Free French authorities in the Middle East, the Minister of State said:
‘Great Britain has no interest in Syria or the Lebanon except to win the war. We have no desire to encroach in any way on the position of France.’
Later, on the 9th September, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons:
‘We have no ambitions in Syria. We do not seek to replace or supplant France or substitute British for French interests in any part of Syria. We are only in Syria in order to win the war.’
The intention of these statements was to make it clear to the Free French that we did not seek any advantages for ourselves in Syria, that we did not propose to annex the Levant States or to attempt to expel the French and take their place ourselves. But they did not mean that we were content to allow the Free French to deal with the Levant States as they saw fit and confine ourselves to the role of spectators. On the contrary, Mr. Lyttelton’s letter to General de Gaulle continued:
‘Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. When this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the dominant privileged position in the Levant among all European nations.’
Similarly, the Prime Minister’s statement continued: [Page 624]
‘However, I must make it quite clear that our policy, to which our Free French Allies have subscribed, is that Syria should be handed back to the Syrians, who will assume at the earliest possible moment their independent sovereign rights.’
It is made clear in these passages that Great Britain has a responsibility towards the Levant States in that she has guaranteed the fulfillment of the pledge of independence given to them by the Free French.
The Free French appear now to be taking their stand on the first statements quoted and to ignore the rest. They therefore resent any interference by British authorities in the affairs of the Levant States. General de Gaulle himself is afraid that if he accepts His Majesty’s Government’s point of view, the belief may spread in France that French interests in Syria are being abandoned by the Free French just as definitely as French interests in Indochina were abandoned by Vichy. In spite, therefore, of the statement in his letter of the 28th November, 1941, to the League of Nations, announcing the independence of the Levant States—‘L’indépendence et la souveraineté de la Syrie et du Liban ne comporteront en fait d’autres limitations que celles qui resultent des exigences de la guerre’, General de Gaulle has tended in recent months to lay more and more emphasis on the continued existence of the mandate and to insist that the policy to be followed in the Levant States is the sole concern of the Free French.
This view was set out in a telegram of the 14th August, addressed to the Prime Minister. Mr. Churchill replied to this telegram on the 22nd August pointing out that, while we did not seek to undermine the French position in the Levant, our principal concern was to win the war, and we must therefore be in a position to ensure that no policy is adopted which may jeopardize our military security. We had in addition the responsibility arising from our re-guarantee of the French guarantee of independence. General de Gaulle has replied to the Prime Minister’s telegram explaining that he is unable to accept our point of view. In these circumstances we think that the best course will be for General de Gaulle to return to this country as soon as possible for further discussion. A copy of the Prime Minister’s message and translations of General de Gaulle’s telegrams are attached.”
To this memorandum Eden has attached de Gaulle’s telegram of August 14 to the Prime Minister (in translation), the Prime Minister’s reply of August 22 and de Gaulle’s further telegram (in translation) of August 24. These telegrams read as follows:
Translation of General de Gaulle’s telegram of August 14 to the Prime Minister:
[For paraphrase of General de Gaulle’s telegram of August 14, see telegram No. 289, August 16, 9 p.m., from the Consul at Beirut, printed on page 613.]
Text of Prime Minister’s reply of August 22:
“I regret that I cannot accept your contention that our representatives have been interfering unduly in the affairs of the Levant.
Syria and the Lebanon are part of a vital theatre of war and almost every development there affects our military interests directly or indirectly. [Page 625] This involves constant consultation between our representatives and the French authorities and contacts with Syrian and Lebanese administrations to whom His Majesty’s Minister is accredited.
We are pursuing no political aims of our own in the Levant and we have not sought to undermine French position there. We fully recognize that in political matters the initiative must rest with the French authorities. Our principal concern in the political sphere is to ensure that no policy is adopted which may jeopardize our military security or interfere with our prosecution of the war. It is for this reason that we expect to be fully consulted beforehand on major political developments.
We are concerned to ensure that our guarantee that the proclamation issued by General Catroux on June 9, 1941, declaring the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and promising that the mandate should be terminated, is effectively carried out. To this we are committed in the eyes of both the people of Syria and the Lebanon and the whole Arab world.
Apart from this the only affairs of the Levant in which we concern ourselves are those directly affecting our military needs and local British commercial or other interests.
None of the above interests constitute a violation of the letter or the spirit of the de Gaulle-Lyttelton agreements nor of the letters exchanged between Foreign Office and French National Committee. As regards the mandate it is fully understood that its technical termination cannot be effected at present. Nevertheless in my speech in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, I made it clear that the position of the Free French in Syria could not be that previously enjoyed by Vichy and you yourself in your letter to the League of Nations announcing your assumption of the responsibilities of the mandate stated that the independence and sovereignty of Syria and the Lebanon would not be circumscribed by any other limitations than those which were necessitated by conditions of war. I fully realize the importance of maintaining closest collaboration and unity of purpose between our respective representatives in the Levant and it is my sincere belief that with goodwill on both sides this can be accomplished. Our overriding object is to defeat the enemy and you can rest assured that any action by our representatives in Syria and the Levant is directed towards that end.”
Translation of General de Gaulle’s answer of August 24:
“I have studied with great care the telegram of August 23, which was communicated to me on your behalf, on the subject of British policy in the Levant States under French mandate.
I regret that I am unable to accept your point of view according to which political interventions of British representatives in Syria and Lebanon are compatible with the engagements entered into by His Majesty’s Government in regard to respect for the position of France and the continuation of her mandate. I must add that in my opinion these interventions in the form which they have taken are in contradiction with the regime of independence which Fighting France has granted to Syria and the Lebanon in virtue of and [Page 626] within the framework of the mandate as well as with the Franco-American Treaty of 1924.53
The presence of British troops on the soil of the Levant cannot in my opinion justify these interventions. The conditions of our military cooperation in the Middle East and those of British troops in the Levant were laid down by the Lyttelton–de Gaulle agreements which on our side we are applying scrupulously. Relations between purely military British and French authorities both in the battle of Libya and of Egypt and in regard to the defense of Syria and the Levant are moreover very good. For this reason I have agreed up till now to maintain troops belonging to the French Command under the orders of the British Command in Syria and Lebanon in spite of the fact that the former are at the present time superior in number to the British belonging to the British Command. According to the Lyttelton–de Gaulle agreement this should result in the transfer of direction of the Allied military affairs in Syria and Lebanon to the French Command.
Furthermore insofar as the war effort of the United Nations and in particular common action of Great Britain and France is concerned, the sort of conditions of rivalry which interference and friction between British representatives has created here, seems to me to be harmful to both owing to its effects on the Arab world in the Middle East and on public opinion in the French nation.
I would press you strongly to be good enough to reconsider this affair which as far as Fighting France is concerned, is urgent and vital. During my stay at Beirut I am personally quite ready to discuss the matter with Mr. Casey if he could find time to come and see me.”
- Actually the telegram was numbered 4017; see footnote 50, p. 620.↩
- Signed at Paris, April 4, 1924, Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. i, p. 741.↩