740.0011 P. W./401
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Lord Halifax came to see me this afternoon at his request. He brought with him the new Minister-Counselor of the Embassy, Sir Ronald Campbell, whom I had known when he was in Washington before, some years ago.
Lord Halifax first read to me a telegram dated August 1 from the British Ambassador in Tokyo which expressed the belief that in view of the fact that the military element in Japan now had the bit firmly in its teeth, there was no hope whatever of arresting the expansionist movement South and North, except through a firm attitude on the part of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands which would involve a clear intimation that, should Japan proceed further, the United States would go to war.
The Ambassador then read to me a telegram sent by Mr. Eden to the British Minister in Bangkok dated August 2 which was in the nature of a preliminary reply to the first Thai request for assistance in the event that Japan used force to gain the concessions she desired. This message merely stated that the British Government was now in consultation with the United States as to what steps might be taken and that, pending such decision, the outcome of course would depend, in the British Government’s opinion, largely upon the measure of independence which the Thai Government showed in dealing with the Japanese demands.
[Page 255]The Ambassador then read to me a telegram dated August 2 which informed him that the British Government considered it highly doubtful that it could in fact give any military assistance to Thailand in the event that Japan undertakes to occupy it by force. The British Government went on to say that it is planning to give the Thais considerable economic assistance and is already supplying them with oil as if the trade agreement now under negotiation had already been concluded. This message from Mr. Eden stated that it was his opinion that economic assistance was of no real value, however, and that the issue was clearly whether force could be exercised by the other powers interested, should [the] Thai resist.
The Ambassador then read to me a final message dated August 3 in the nature of an instruction from Mr. Eden to the British Minister in Bangkok for communication secretly to the Thai Prime Minister. The Thai Government was informed that in the opinion of the British Government the Thailand Government should make it clear that they would resist if the Japanese Government attempted to use force. The opinion was expressed that in such event the Japanese Government would probably not use force, at least at the present moment, but would probably undertake various measures providing for the infiltration by Japan of Thailand, and that in such event the Thai Government should take every step necessary to prevent such infiltration. It was recommended that the Thai Government attempt to do everything possible to gain time without granting the concessions which were being demanded by Japan.
The British Government further said that the twelve pursuit planes requested by the Thai Government would not be given by Great Britain since they would not really provide any actual assistance to Thailand and would tend only to provoke Japan.
The British Government further stated that for the time being it did not believe that the raising of the British mission in Bangkok to an embassy was desirable and that they would not consider this step unless it was solely as a part of a total plan of cooperation between Thailand and Great Britain satisfactory to the latter.
I informed Lord Halifax of the nature of the statement which had been made this morning by Secretary Hull to the Minister of Thailand. I expressed the opinion that in the event that the Japanese persisted in their present policy of expansion and actually undertook acts of aggression against the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, a situation would be created which, if unchecked, would result in the creation of a complete military Japanese hegemony over the Far East and over the southern Pacific areas, and that this was a situation which could not possibly be tolerated either by the United States, by Great Britain, by the Netherlands, by China, or by other peace-minded and civilized nations. By this I said I meant that such a situation as [Page 256] that in my judgment would sooner or later inevitably result in war with Japan. I said that Lord Halifax was fully familiar with our constitutional system and that consequently no definite commitments or threats to this effect could officially be made. I said, however, that I intended to express this as my opinion to Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, when he calls to see me this afternoon before leaving in order to report to his Government.40
- See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, August 4, 1941, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 540.↩