740.0011 P. W./276: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 22—9:30 p.m.]
1050. Your 394, July 14, 7 p.m.2 and my 1006, July 16, noon.
1. My British colleague is informed from London in strict secrecy that according to a report from a reliable but undisclosed source the Japanese Government is continuing its pressure on the Vichy Government to cede bases in Indochina and that if a favorable reply is not received by July 24 (the ultimatum having been extended from July 20) the Japanese will occupy such bases by force. I assume that the British Ambassador in Washington has already conveyed this report to you.
2. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East on July 21 strongly recommended to the War Office in London the issuance of a combined warning to Japan from London, Washington and Tokyo [Page 223] [Batavia?] that certain economic measures of reprisal will be enforced if bases in Indochina are taken by the Japanese. The telegram of the Commander-in-Chief continues (in paraphrase):
No threat is likely to induce Japanese withdrawal when once these bases have been occupied. Foreign reprisals would merely serve to intensify their propaganda. In any case the Japanese would thereby have greatly improved their strategic position for attacking British, American and Dutch interests in East Asia as well as to exert overwhelming pressure on Thailand. As reprisals there has been proposed restrictive economic measures by the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, including the embargoing of iron ore in Malaya. If a warning of these proposed measures were issued in advance, it might suffice to deter the Japanese from this movement, and it is unlikely that such an Anglo-American-Dutch warning would precipitate a Japanese attack. Operations in these areas are rendered improbable before October owing to the monsoon in Burma and the typhoon season in the area of the Philippines.
3. With reference to the foregoing telegram, my British colleague has today telegraphed to London that he fears that such a warning will now be too late but that if the warning is to be effective it would carry greater weight if issued in London and Washington only.
4. Without knowing the source of the report set forth in paragraph numbered 1 above, the fact that July 20 has passed without any development suggests that the new report might be taken with a degree of caution and reserve. I nevertheless alter the opinion expressed in the fifth sentence of paragraph numbered 3 of my telegram No. 1015, July 17, 11 a.m.3
5. If, however, in the light of the Department’s information the Government of the United States is prepared to carry out the procedure envisaged in the second sentence of the second paragraph of your 394, July 14, 7 p.m., I do not doubt that the Department has given careful consideration to the thought that more may be gained by letting the Japanese Government know of our intentions, privately and without publicity, preferably through Admiral Nomura if this has not already been done, before rather than after a Japanese occupation of bases in Indochina with or without the Vichy Government’s permission. A clear unambiguous statement of such intentions might conceivably exert a deterrent effect, but, once an occupation were effected, Japanese prestige would render subsequent withdrawal out of the question. It would seem to be a grave error to allow American-Japanese relations to advance one step further on the road to potential war through any possible misconception on the part of the Japanese Government as to the determination of the United States to take positive action in the event of certain contingencies.
- Not printed.↩
- Vol. iv, p. 1006.↩