740.0011 P. W./275: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:50 p.m.]
921. Embassy’s telegram 919, July 21, 4 p.m. Ostrorog, who is now informed of the Japanese demands and the French reply, said this afternoon that the former were accompanied by a personal message from Prince Konoye to Marshal Pétain. This message assured the Marshal that the Japanese intend to reiterate their assurances of full respect for the integrity of Indochina and French sovereignty thereover as set forth in the accord of August 30, 1940. Ostrorog further feels that the Japanese Government will therefore presumably give the public assurances requested by the French in yesterday’s reply.
Ostrorog went on to say that it is all very well to speak of symbolic resistance and the effect thereof on France’s moral and legal position with respect to Indochina after the war is over.
On the other hand, it is certain that a refusal to agree to Japanese occupation of bases in Indochina at the present time or any attempted resistance against such occupation would mean internment of all French forces in the colony, the eviction of all French civilians, the declaration of the “independence” of Annam, and the assumption of full sovereign rights over the territory by the Japanese from which they could in the future be expelled only by force. In other words, he holds to the same line of reasoning which the French Government adopted at the time of Japanese mediation in the Thailand dispute, namely, that the most important question for France is to remain with some authority on the spot regardless of how restricted such authority may be or how humiliating its curtailment. The Department will recall from the third from the last paragraph of the Embassy’s telegram 256, March 1, 8 p.m., that Chauvel defended this policy at some length (and his indication at that time that the Japanese might “leave Indochina alone for another month or two,” incidentally, has proved prophetic). The Department will also note that it is in contrast to [Page 222] the earlier position taken by Chauvel at a time when Japanese pressure was less. He said on February 12, as reported in the last sentence of the Embassy’s telegram 187 of that date:2 “I feel that our moral position in any future post-war readjustment will be much stronger if we lose Indochina in attempting to defend it than if we lose it piecemeal without resistance.”
The “disturbing feature” of the Japanese demands in his personal view, Ostrorog said, is the fact that they have not given any precise indication of just how extensive their occupation, or “joint defense” as the Japanese prefer to call it, of the colony will be. He is also personally convinced that the Germans must have known—and approved—of the Japanese demands.
News of the receipt of the demands (which were originally made, we now learn, on July 13) and of the French yielding thereto is confined here to extremely limited circles and, contrary to what happens to most Vichy secrets, has not yet transpired to the larger groups of government officials. The French military, says Ostrorog, as well as the French Ambassador at Tokyo, continue to expect a move against Russia and point to Japanese military activities in that direction.
The French are not informing the Chinese Embassy here as yet either of the Japanese demands or of the French acceptance.
Repeated to Algiers.
- Not printed.↩