740.0011 European War 1939/11554: Telegram
The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 2—8:54 p.m.]
631. My 594, May 27, 4 p.m. and my 622, May 30, 7 p.m. In view of the recent developments in Crete and their consequent effect upon the British naval position in the Mediterranean and the military situation in North Africa and the Middle East, I submit the following personal observations with special reference to a British stand against German arms in Egypt: I have not noticed that isolated victories arouse enthusiasm in Germany but I do believe that the extension of battle areas even resulting in conquests affects adversely the German people for they realize that the winning of battles does not bring what they have been told they are fighting for, namely, peace. On the other hand the projection of German power over foreign countries without resorting to force of arms serves to reenforce the faith in the Nazi machine. Hence it is of prime importance to oppose Nazi arms at every point for any resort to force, however unsuccessful, is better than none as armed opposition assails the Nazi machine not only in the foreign field where it strikes but also within Germany where its power is generated.
It is true that in spite of the extreme gravity of the consequences of a Nazi victory in the Middle East the war will not be lost in this area but gains could have been and still could be registered here which would far outweigh the advantages of a so-called strategic withdrawal. To this end are essential an immediate stiffening of purpose to resist here and the utmost ingenuity and effort in strengthening the armed forces. As the Department is already aware all agree that the [Page 732] essential requirement here is and always has been for airplanes, tanks and motor transport but the immediate and emphatic stress is upon the need for planes and more planes. It is clear that in the case of tanks and motor vehicles delays in shipment can only be reduced but not overcome. As regards airplanes, however, it is impossible to rest under the assertion that with initiative, ingenuity and efficient organization a quantity of planes could not be flown here immediately with adequate equipment available to turn the balance at a crucial moment in the course of eventual operations. It may be that such a measure is practically impossible of accomplishment but so far as I can gather here the failure to make such an effort is not due to its practical aspects but rather to lack of initiative and a supine acquiescence the dilatory methods of bureaucratic procedure. It may also be that a long range view which is invisible here has inspired a farsighted plan which would render such drastic efforts at present unnecessary. Judging, however, solely from the immediate set up here and without intending to exaggerate the local situation beyond its proportion it would seem that unless something along the foregoing line is done or unless a miracle happens another failure is in sight and those who have held the profound conviction that Hitler might win battles but never win the war will be compelled to readjust their thought to the possibility that at the present rate he may be allowed to win so many battles that finally no one can win the war.