Office of the Historian

761.94/1163: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 27, 1939—9 p.m.
[Received November 27—2:50 p.m.]

631. The following telegram was drafted early last week during my absence in Kobe but in view of the importance of the subject matter was held against my return. I am forwarding it with my approval.

1.
The following comment is offered on the possibility of there being concluded some special political arrangement between Japan and the Soviet Union, a subject which is now being widely discussed in informed circles but not in the press. In our 482, September 18, 6 p.m. the opinion was expressed that in view of certain basic and long term considerations Japan would not conclude any such arrangement with the Soviet Union. My information today is not what it was when that estimate was made, notably in respect of relations with the United States, and the fact is that there has recently developed a movement of strong proportions favoring the coming to terms with the Soviet Union.
2.
A friendly Ambassador with whom we have close relations informed us some time ago that the Vice Chief of the General Staff had told him that there are taking place exploratory conversations with the Soviets which might perhaps lead to some working arrangement between Japan and the Soviet Union with regard to China. Members of my staff subsequently met informally officers in the General Staff who have served in the United States and the latter confirmed the holding of such conversations. They said that the General Staff is also equally divided on the question whether a working arrangement should be made with Russia. Our informants themselves are opposed to it. They said that it was plain to them that the Russians are trying to play with the Japanese the same game that they successfully played with the Germans, that is, to lull the Japanese into feeling secure against any possibility of danger from Russia in order that Japan might be emboldened to take against the United States, an attitude calculated gravely to impair relations between the latter countries. These officers stated that the General Staff as a whole has been aware of the danger of flirting with the Russian representatives but that there is a growing faction which believes that the Soviet Union can be maneuvered around in some way as to promote the bringing to an end of the hostilities in China.
3.
The Foreign Office, although emphasizing the importance of settling various standing issues with the Soviet Union, continues to deride the possibility of there being concluded any arrangement [Page 86] would in effect bring Japan closer to Germany and the Soviet Union at the expense of her relations with the United States and Great Britain.
4.
The Department will appreciate that we have not been alarmist with regard to this matter and we do not desire to convey the impression that some special arrangement with Russia or Germany or with both has already secured the support of the predominant part of those who formulate Japanese policy. In fact, so long as members of the Government continue to emphasize the importance of Japan’s continuing an “independent policy”, the probabilities are that any such arrangement is a project of the minority. Nevertheless the receptiveness which the idea finds in the General Staff, the fountain head of opposition to Russia and to Soviet thought, at a time when pessimism more prevalent with regard to relations with the United States, requires modification of our earlier opinion excluding the likelihood of any such arrangement being made.
Grew