761.94/1162: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 27—9:57 a.m.]
626. 1. My British colleague today handed me the text of a telegram which he states that he together with the French and Polish Ambassadors sent to their respective Governments on November 22nd. Craigie says that the three Ambassadors had wished to consult with me before sending the telegram but that owing to my absence in the Kansai they felt that they could not delay it until my return yesterday.
2. In this connection please see another telegram which I am sending shortly on the subject of a possible Japanese rapprochement to Soviet Russia.99
3. There follows a close paraphrase of the telegram mentioned in paragraph 1:
Despite the fact that Soviet-Japanese diplomatic exchanges have only reached the stage of preliminary soundings regarding such matters as the delimitation of frontiers, fisheries, the Saghalien concessions, et cetera, as well as the amelioration of commercial relations, a growing tendency exists for Japanese-Soviet relations to move toward a détente of a general political nature.
Information of which the accuracy is difficult to assess here indicates that Soviet Russia, with a view to maintaining a free hand in Europe, has in contemplation a political and economic improvement of its relations with Japan possibly including an understanding concerning China at the expense of the latter country. The Soviet Union, seizing as a pretext the present dissensions between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang, would be prevailed upon temporarily to maintain an attitude of detachment toward Japanese action in China, it being understood however that the position and influence already acquired there by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists would remain safe and unimpaired. In the event that a plan of this nature for the division of China into spheres of Soviet and Japanese influence should be successful, Generalissimo Chiang would find himself without allies or other support, and the prospects of a success of the projected Wang Ching-wei regime would be enhanced to that extent.
Today the liquidation of the war in China constitutes the first objective of Japanese policy, to promote which Japan might even be prepared to go so far as to cooperate with the Soviet Union by assuming an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward Germany.
Propaganda emanating from Germany is busy in Japan preparing the ground for Soviet overtures and seeking to direct them along lines of a specifically political character. In form, this would constitute a sort of triple alliance designed to increase the resistance [Page 84] of Japan to foreign pressure in China, at the same time in effect relinquishing the non-communist areas of China to Japan. The additional incentive is being held out that, once in the position of having safeguarded her northern flank through the reaching of an understanding with the Soviet Union, Japan would be in a better position at the opportune time to make an attack against the East Indian possessions of the Netherlands.
In Japan the atmosphere is confused and favorable to such suggestions as the foregoing. Pending the opening of the Diet the Government’s position is not too strong, for the financial and economic situation is undergoing an increasing strain. The desire is universal to liquidate the China affair but no one knows how to achieve this end. As a result of the increasing cost of living as well as of the growing lack of essential commodities there is much popular discontent. Although the army is of course normally anti-Soviet, opinion therein is taking an increasing interest in the plan for an understanding with the Soviet Union as subordinated to offering the speediest method of liquidating the war in China without undue detriment to the immediate political and economic objectives of Japan. If this attitude should ultimately prevail in the army it seems probable that the Cabinet not [now?] in power, once it had prepared the ground for a new policy by disposing of the monetary issues that are now being discussed, would sooner or later resign in order to make way for a Cabinet ready to take more extreme measures. It should be remembered constantly in this regard that the Japanese Army is desperately desirous of liquidating the China affair before its prestige at home, which is waning, has seriously undermined its hold on Japan [and?] that in exchange for an understanding with the Soviet Union which would allow it to attain its objectives in China at an early date the army might even be prepared to see the future mortgaged. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the opinion of the army if it is sufficiently united will in the long run be the determining factor in this particular matter. In fine, notwithstanding admitted improbability that the Government here would rashly commit itself to Soviet Russia by the conclusion of a general political entente therewith or of some compromise in China of a dangerous nature, we cannot overlook the possibility that at this moment undue pressure from the democratic countries might result in driving Japan in that direction. After the expiration of the American Treaty and with the danger of the imposition of an American embargo—should no concessions satisfactory to the United States meanwhile be obtained from the Japanese Army in China—the difficulties of the situation will increase.
It may be asserted finally that in default of early steps to improve relations between Japan and the Western democracies, the danger exists that the foreign policy of Japan may fall into the control of extremists without experience. In that event an internal political situation of a grave nature would ensue, carrying with it repercussions in China from which the Soviet Union alone could profit.
- See telegram No. 631, November 27, 9 p.m., infra. ↩