761.94/1164: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:43 p.m.]
2845. Chauvel, Director of Far Eastern Affairs, asked to see me today and gave me to read the text of a seven-page telegram sent on the evening of November 23 by Arsène-Henry, French Ambassador to Tokyo.
The telegram stated that the British Ambassador, the Polish Ambassador, and he himself (Arsène-Henry) were all so much disturbed by the negotiations in progress between the Japanese Government and the Soviet Government that they had decided that it was their duty to communicate their opinions to their respective Governments in identical language.
They stated in brief that they feared that if the present Japanese Government should be unable to reach an agreement with the Government of the United States through the conversations between Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Nomura the Abe government would be overthrown and replaced by a government of militarists which would conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union and would wipe out French and British interests in the Tientsin area and other areas in North China and perhaps also in Shanghai.
The three Ambassadors added that the German Government was doing everything that it could to bring about a rapprochement between [Page 87] the Japanese and Soviet Governments; and also was doing everything possible to increase ill feeling in Japan against the United States in the hope that a [contest] might develop between the United States and Japan of such dimensions that American supply to France and England might be cut off.
Chauvel added that on the receipt of this telegram which had arrived badly garbled and had therefore required repetition which had occasioned some delay, he had telegraphed to the French Ambassador in Tokyo suggesting that the British, French, and Polish Ambassadors in Tokyo should communicate their views to Ambassador Grew. He also had sent a copy of the telegram in question to Saint-Quentin1 instructing him to make such use of it as he might consider highly important.
Chauvel added that about 8 days ago he had sent a telegram to Saint-Quentin asking him to see the Acting Secretary and to call the attention of the Acting Secretary to the possibility that if Japan should be unable to reach an agreement with the United States the present Government in Japan might [resign?] and might be replaced by a government of militarists which would seek immediate agreement with the Soviet Union.
Chauvel went on to say that he hoped the Government of the United States understood that in making these communications the French Government in no way desired to alter the line of policy which had been followed of late by the American Government. The French Government was most happy that the American Government was following its present line. The French Government merely wished to be certain that the American Government was aware of the possibility of danger involved in the Soviet-Japanese conversations.
I asked Chauvel if he had any recent information with regard to Soviet supplies to China. He replied that he had, and that these supplies of late had been much greater than ever before.
I expressed skepticism as to the possibility of an agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union for the division of China. Chauvel said that he too was skeptical, but that, through a most private source, he had learned yesterday that the representatives of both Mitsui and Mitsubishi in Paris were now convinced that the Soviet-Japanese conversations would lead to an accord that would involve the cessation of Soviet supplies to China.
I asked him if he did not believe that even though the Soviet Government might make such a promise it would in reality continue to send supplies to China. He said that he agreed. He did not believe that the Soviet Union would keep its word to Japan but an [Page 88] agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan might have a surface appearance of reality sufficient to encourage Japan to take violent action against the French and British position in both North China and Shanghai.
I expressed skepticism on this point also citing the attitude taken recently by the Government of the United States.
Chauvel then said that the substance of his worry was the following: There were many persons in Paris who knew nothing about the Far East. Indeed there was almost no one who did know anything about the Far East. Such persons in and outside the present Government looking at the Far East superficially were arguing that since Russia was supporting Germany, France should make an agreement with Japan at the price of sacrificing China if necessary. He personally had to combat this point of view every day. The French Government had taken no step in this sense and he believed that any such step would be folly. He would be extremely grateful to me, however, if I could obtain from my Government a statement as to our view of the present situation in the Far East in order to give him some sort of a further weapon with which to combat those who desire a change in French policy. He went on to say that the successful Japanese attack on Nanning had provoked a new wave of arguments from those persons who desired the French Government to appease Japan at all costs.
I said that for my own part I was absolutely confident that our policy in the Far East was based on the fullest information which was both gathered and considered by our ablest brains in foreign affairs. I felt sure that our Government was taking no step in the Far East without the fullest possible consideration and I was confident that my Government would be careful to avoid provoking a Japanese attack on the British and French interests in China.
No doubt both Grew and Saint-Quentin have communicated to you the contents of the telegram of the three Ambassadors. If you can give me some sort of a message to pass along to Chauvel who is, I am convinced, entirely sincere, I should be obliged. If you do not care to give me such a message I hope that you will inform me the moment that you receive any information of a change in the French position since if informed in time I believe that I might have some influence with Daladier.2