Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume II

711.008 North Pacific/429: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 19, 1938—3 p.m.
[Received December 19—1:36 p.m.]

792. Department’s 421, December 16, 7 p.m., Alaska salmon question.

1. I appreciate very much the further opportunity which the Department has given me to express my views. However, in recommending in my 727, November 15, 10 a.m., that this question be brought within the field of high general policy I endeavored to set forth as clearly as I could present them the difficulties in the way of a solution which inhere in the respective position of the American and Japanese Governments. There is no indication that those difficulties have lessened. To rediscuss them would merely serve to confuse the issue.

2. There is, however, one point with regard to which my opinion needs to be clarified. I obtain the impression from paragraph 1 of the Department’s telegram under reference that the Department entertains some hope that, if the Japanese Government were made aware of the possibility of legislation prejudicial to the Japanese position and detrimental to American-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government might be disposed to conclude an agreement along the lines proposed. It would be entirely reasonable to believe that if the complete divergence between the United States and Japan in attitude and policy toward China did not exist, the Japanese Government would not permit, compatibly with preserving Japanese interests in the Siberian fisheries, the Alaska salmon question to jeopardize the important economic relations of Japan with the United States. But when American-Japanese relations are steadily retrograding in step with Japanese actions in China, and when the character and tone of those relations are being determined in the ultimate analysis by events in China, the Japanese Government would not, I think, be so ingenious [ingenuous?] as to suppose that by merely making the desired fishery concessions, those relations could be restored or the retrogression now in process could be arrested.

3. I have reported in several recent telegrams on the Japanese reaction to reports from the United States and elsewhere of the possibility of evidence in retaliation against Japanese actions in China and to the grant of the credit loan to the Chinese.³³ The Japanese habitually go far afield to look for political motives. When the leading paper in the country declares, as it did yesterday, that the loan to China and similar action by Great Britain were decided upon at this time in order to profit by the difficulties which Japan is now having with Russia over the Siberian fisheries, I think that it would not be extravagant to assume that if the Alaska fisheries question were raised by us at this time by a formal proposal that Japan make the desired concessions, such action would be regarded here as another manifestation of American reaction to the situation in China, if not an outright method of retaliation.

4. It is my opinion that given the best of good will there nevertheless exist circumstances in each country which would prevent the conclusion of any mutually satisfactory solution. To make a definitive approach to the Japanese along the lines proposed in the Department’s instruction 1589³⁴ would, I think, be certain only to do much harm. I would much prefer the lesser horn of the dilemma and to proceed along the course now suggested by the Department, namely, that set forth in paragraph 3 of the telegram under reference. I do not modify the opinion that agreement is unlikely at this time, but the latter course would have certain definite advantages: (a) the question whether or not negotiations looking toward a definitive arrangement would be left to the Japanese Government to decide, and thus the Japanese Government would be less apt to assume that our approach was motivated by the Far Eastern situation than if fresh negotiations were definitely and formally proposed by us; (b) it might be possible for the Japanese Government, in the likely event of its unfavorable response, to keep from the public the fact that an approach had been made by us; (c) if the proposed law were enacted, the chances are that such enactment would not have been preceded by (probably) acrimonious and abortive negotiations conducted in an atmosphere charged with suspicion and resentment, and it would thus be less likely to affect the general body of relations than the course first proposed.

5. In the light of the considerations set forth above, it would appear that our proposed approach and memorandum to the Japanese Government would in effect merely serve to confirm the previously explained position of the American Government in anticipation of possible legislative action in the coming Congress. In order to create maximum effect I think that I should make the approach directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.³⁵

6. Replying to the Department’s specific inquiry in paragraph 3 of its 421 as to whether this modified procedure would seriously prejudice my relations with the Japanese authorities in other matters, my opinion must be purely conjectural. The reported deadlock in the current negotiations for renewal of the Soviet-Japanese provisional fishery agreement as indicated above is just now causing daily and acute discussion in the press and among the public and is seriously worrying the Government. A present approach by us would almost certainly be interpreted by the Government as carefully timed to coincide with the difficulties raised by the Soviets. The effect on our diplomacy would, I think, be obvious. But even if the negotiations with the Soviets should shortly result in a favorable settlement, I still would not feel justified in assuring the Department that adverse repercussion would not accrue from the modified course which the Department proposes. I recognize the existence of a dilemma and can only indicate the course which, in my opinion, would be beset with fewer disadvantages.

Grew

33. See Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. iii, pp. 519 ff.
34. October 17, p. 191.
35. Hachiro Arita.