Office of the Historian

793.94/9534: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, August 20, 1937—7 p.m.
[Received August 20—1:20 p.m.]

288. Embassy’s 287, August 20, 6 p.m.

1.
The following information was gained by the Military Attaché through an interview with the secretary of the Minister of War at 3 o’clock today.
a.
No Japanese Army units have left for Shanghai although troops are ready and prepared to go.
b.
The War and Navy Departments have been under great pressure from Rightist organizations to take some decisive action at Shanghai, but the sending of large reenforcements has been delayed in the hope that they might not be necessary.
c.
The secretary of the Minister of War gave as his “personal opinion” that a peaceful solution of the situation in Shanghai is improbable due to the pressure on both Chinese and Japanese Governments of public opinion.
d.
As regards the British proposal for the complete withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese forces, the secretary of the Minister of War thought it entirely unacceptable as it would be very humiliating to Japan to entrust the safeguarding of its nationals to troops of other countries.
e.
He said that he thought the only solution agreeable to Japan would be a return to the situation prescribed in the truce agreement of 1932, the violation of which by the Chinese was responsible for the present Shanghai incident. Due to the large numbers of Chinese troops in the Shanghai area, to the comparatively poor control over them by the Central Government and the pressure of Chinese public opinion, he thought it would be very difficult for the Nanking Government to arrange for a withdrawal of its troops from the area prescribed in the 1932 truce agreement.
f.
The situation in North China remains comparatively quiet with the reinforcement of Chinese concentrations limited to that near Nankow.
2.
With reference to paragraph b, well informed Japanese officers uniformly explain the reluctance to send army units to Shanghai as due to the necessarily prolonged dispersion of forces involved and the difficulty and costliness of extensive operations in the Shanghai area.

The Military Attaché is of the opinion that the Japanese Army desires to avoid sending troops to Shanghai primarily because units sent there will be occupied for an indefinite period at a time when the settlement of the North China situation is the Army’s objective during the accomplishment of which all available troops are wanted for protection against possible interference by Soviet Russia.

Repeated to Nanking.

Grew