Office of the Historian

793.94/9537: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, August 20, 1937—6 p.m.
[Received August 20—3:03 p.m.]

287. Embassy’s 283, August 19, 11 p.m., paragraph 4.

1.
The French Ambassador called this morning and gave me the following additional facts:
(a)
On August 17 he called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to express the hope that the Japanese warships would be withdrawn from [Page 453] in front of the French Concession in Shanghai as they constituted a danger. (They were later withdrawn.)
(b)
The Ambassador took this occasion to say to Hirota that without any desire or intention to interfere he would be glad to know whether the Japanese Government would welcome an effort by the powers to neutralize the international areas in Shanghai. To the Ambassador’s surprise Hirota “simply jumped at the suggestion.”
(c)
The Ambassador accordingly cabled to his Government and received instructions to support the British proposal for neutralization and for the protection of Japanese nationals in the international areas by the concerned powers, with the understanding that the French forces would remain within the French Concession. The Ambassador carried out instructions in a note to Hirota.
(d)
The Ambassador subsequently learned of the statement of the Vice Minister to the British Chargé d’Affaires that Japan would not accept the British proposal. (Embassy’s 283, August 19, 11 p.m., paragraph 1.) As this statement by the Vice Minister appeared to be diametrically at variance with the attitude of Hirota, as expressed to him, the Ambassador today sent his counselor to Horinouchi to inquire the precise attitude of the Foreign Office.
(e)
Horinouchi replied that Hirota, in his conversation of August 17th with the Ambassador, had not accepted any proposition of neutralization: that he had merely promised to give any such proposition, if presented by the powers, his sympathetic consideration (the telegram of the Ambassador to Paris, which was later read to us, reported that the Foreign Minister had stated that he was “in favor of that proposition and would be prepared to give it sympathetic consideration”). Horinouchi then stated that, with regard to the British proposal, the Japanese Government had (a) serious doubt whether the Chinese forces at Shanghai would conform to instruction from Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from Shanghai; (b) that it had doubt whether the foreign powers had sufficient forces at Shanghai to make effective any guarantee to protect the lives of Japanese nationals; (c) that it can not delegate to other governments its responsibility for the protection of the lives of Japanese nationals.
2.
Both the French Ambassador and Dodds appear to have difficulty in distinguishing between a proposition of neutralization, such as that put forward by the French Ambassador, and the British proposal with regard to assuming responsibility for protection of the lives of Japanese nationals. Whereas one of the results of making effective any neutralization plan would be to afford protection to Japanese nationals and whereas, conversely, it would perhaps be difficult to make effective the British plan unless there were established a neutral zone, we feel that the two plans are essentially different and involve essentially different sets of consideration. It seems to us to be evident that the two ideas have given rise to misconception and muddled thinking in various quarters.

Repeated to Nanking.

Grew