Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 4, 1936.

During a two hour talk at a luncheon today to which I invited Messrs. Ramírez and Soler of Paraguay, the former spent much time expounding upon the assured titles which Paraguay had to the Chaco. Hitherto he has always insisted that his country was entitled to all of the area included within the Paraguay, Pilcomayo and Parapiti rivers, in other words, practically their present occupation with a slight addition in the northwest, and has suggested that Paraguay only would submit to arbitration territory to the north and west of these limits. Today he at least conceded that Paraguay might even submit to arbitration some of the points held within the afore-described area.

I steered the conversation into a discussion of (1) President Roosevelt’s speech54 which both my guests previously had praised; (2) the all prevailing will throughout America for a definitive peace. I declared that the opportunity was unique for Paraguay to recover the position of favor in the public eye of America which she had formerly occupied and I counselled that the Paraguayan government give their very serious consideration to “striking while the iron was hot” and making some move which would guarantee beyond peradventure that within a reasonable time the Chaco territorial dispute would be adjusted. I indicated that Paraguay had an opportunity to accomplish [Page 78] this in various ways: (1) by an immediate adjustment of the Villa Montes road question; (2) by Paraguay rather than the mediators suggesting that if within a reasonable time neither a direct agreement nor an arbitral compromise had been drafted, as per the Protocols, that then the delimitation of the territory to be arbitrated be established by the Chaco Peace Conference mediators. Messrs. Ramírez and Soler, of course, had a good deal to say about Bolivian failure to accept a double or successive arbitration as suggested by the Mendoza Conference55 but maintained that while Paraguay at that time had been amenable to such a plan subsequent events must be taken into consideration. I assured them that at least I, as one of the mediators, if left to delimit the territory to be arbitrated, would take into consideration all of the many angles; that I would particularly give importance to the practical considerations but would not neglect historical and geographical antecedents and the “situations of fact” which existed as a result of the war; that since we were all in accord that Paraguay desired peace a move such as I suggested by Paraguay would win the sympathy of all, force Bolivia to accept and since the Paraguayans were so completely confident of the strength of their case they had nothing to fear in the ultimate result; and that furthermore, in making such a spectacular move for continental peace they would completely disarm their political opponents who would not dare stand up against continental opinion in a matter of this gravity. I assured them that all the time necessary for the presentation of their complete case would be afforded them, but that under the surroundings and circumstances resulting from President Roosevelt’s visit and the Maintenance of Peace Conference it was essential that this hemisphere be assured that no renewal of hostilities possibly could occur in the Chaco, but that instead a final settlement could be foreseen definitely even though the exact provisions of that settlement could not yet be determined.

During this part of the conversation Ramírez inquired as to whether I had discussed the Chaco Conference and problems with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. I replied that I had, although not in great detail. Ramírez then inquired what Secretary Hull thought about Dr. Stefanich not coming to Buenos Aires. I told him that the Secretary was profoundly disappointed by his non-appearance, that he was most anxious to meet and talk with the Minister and that the latter’s absence had created a bad impression. Ramírez, with some nervousness, asked whether I thought this feeling was general. I replied that it was and that Paraguay had sacrificed the favored position which she had previously occupied in the public opinion of [Page 79] America, that Stefanich’s non-appearance was widely criticised, that in talking with some of the incoming delegates to the Maintenance of Peace Conference I had endeavored to explain his absence on the score of the recent railroad strike but that these delegates were unwilling to accept any such excuse and that even President Franco’s letter to President Roosevelt and the dinner given by Dr. Stefanich celebrating the inauguration of the Maintenance of Peace Conference had been interpreted generally as further examples of Paraguayan evasion.

Previously during the conversation I had told Messrs. Ramírez and Soler that the mediatory nations were opposed to the consideration of the Chaco situation in the Maintenance of Peace Conference excepting for some general expression of confidence. I added that Bolivia wanted it considered and there always was the danger, which could not be avoided, that some ambitious orator would provoke the issue, as long as Paraguay remained under a cloud by reason of Stefanich’s non-appearance. Ramírez reverted to my previous remarks and asked whether I could assure him that if Dr. Stefanich were to come to Buenos Aires for a few days that the Chaco problem would not be actively considered in the big conference. I told him that I could do so, that we were most anxious to have Minister Stefanich come to Buenos Aires, that his visit would greatly redound to the benefit of Paraguay, not merely in public opinion but in other ways, and that I was authorized to state to him that if Dr. Stefanich made the visit the Chaco would not be taken up in the Maintenance of Peace Conference excepting that a resolution might be passed expressing appreciation and approval of the work done to date by the (Chaco) Peace Conference, confidence in it and a desire that the parties should continue in their earnest collaboration to bring about an early settlement. I added that the only Chaco discussions which Dr. Stefanich need have in Buenos Aires would be those with Secretaries Hull and Welles, Macedo Soares, Cruchaga Tocornal with some of the rest of us and that these would be private conversations held in my house in such a manner that neither the press nor anyone else other than those participating would be informed of them.

Both Ramírez and Soler agreed that Paraguay’s prestige had suffered recently and said they thought that on the basis I outlined they could induce Dr. Stefanich to come to Buenos Aires at least for two or three days. I urged them to take the matter up with him immediately and they have promised to cable him.

Also Ramírez suggested that he would like to argue the territorial question face to face with Alvéstegui and said that he did not think that the present method of holding meetings in the Foreign Office was productive. I agreed with him in his latter statement but said [Page 80] that I thought that rather than having the personal meetings with Alvéstegui, for the time being, it would be preferable to carry on our work as we did in the prisoners committee, with daily sessions, morning, afternoon and frequently in the evening, and that this was one of the details which might be adjusted during Dr. Stefanich’s stay in Buenos Aires.

Ramírez was exercised about a statement issued to the press by Dr. Finot which declared that President Toro made the adjustment of the Villa Montes road question a condition precedent to the interchange of consuls. He pointed to this as a violation of the August 25 agreement renewing diplomatic relations. Other than the remark that the Conference had no official knowledge of Dr. Finot’s declaration I did not discuss his protest.

Ramírez also was somewhat irked because he had left cards upon Alvéstegui, Finot and other members of the Bolivian delegation to the Maintenance of Peace Conference but as yet had received no cards in return.

Ramírez had called upon Macedo Soares at the latter’s request but said the conversation touched on nothing of importance.

My impression from the afore-described conversation is that both Paraguayan delegates are fearful that under the auspicious surroundings of the Maintenance of Peace Conference their cause may suffer unless they adopt a more conciliatory attitude. They are nervous and the exertion of some pressure on them, and if possible Stefanich, at this time may prove beneficial.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 8, 1936.

1.: The Chaco Peace Conference met at the Foreign Office this morning at 11:30 under the presidency of Dr. Saavedra Lamas. Those attending were Foreign Ministers José Carlos de Macedo Soares and Cruchaga Tocornal; delegates José Roberto de Macedo Soares (Brazil); Manini Rios, Martínez Thédy (Uruguay); Marros Borgoño, Nieto del Rio (Chile); Barreda Laos (Peru); Bunge56 (Argentina) and myself. José Roberto de Macedo Soares explained that during the M. of P. Conference57 he would replace Ambassador Rodrigues Alves as president of the Brazilian delegation.
2.: Dr. Bunge read a short statement summarizing Conference work since August 21 to date.
3.: Dr. Bunge reported the constitution of the Special Military Commission under the presidency of General Martínez Pita, the first session having been held yesterday afternoon.
4.: Dr. Bunge read a note addressed to the Conference by Dr. Ramírez, president of the Paraguayan delegation, which principally reaffirmed statements made to the Conference in the Paraguayan note of October 9 last, but also claimed that in a note dated November 5, 1935, Dr. Elío, as president of the Bolivian delegation, had accepted the thesis that there was only one line of separation.
5.: Dr. Saavedra Lamas took approximately twenty or twenty-five minutes to review and praise the “patient work of the Chaco Peace Conference” and to counsel against the Chaco being permitted to come up for discussion in the big Conference. He stated that the presence of several Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires should be helpful but that their efforts in connection with the Chaco should be within the Chaco Peace Conference and not the M. of P. Conference. Dr. Saavedra Lamas’ speech was conciliatory and reasonable.
6.: Minister Cruchaga repeated over several times his absolute faith in the Chaco Peace Conference and admiration for its patient labors. He then concluded by suggesting that January 1, or at the latest January 5, should be declared by the Conference as the final date for the conclusion of the direct agreement on the territorial question and that if by either of those dates a settlement had not been arrived at then the parties should be summoned to draft the arbitral compromise.
7.: Dr. Manini Rios then said that he felt that the Peace Conference had done all that it could in connection with direct negotiation and therefore should forthwith declare that it was useless to attempt any further direct negotiation and to summon the parties immediately to the drafting of the arbitral compromise.
8.: Ambassadors Nieto of Chile, Barreda Laos of Peru and I pointed out that the proposition made by the Conference to the parties on October 15, 1935, looking to a territorial settlement had been described at the time as of a preliminary nature and that it was understood by all concerned that no real work had been done by the Chaco Peace Conference as yet on the fundamental question. Therefore, we must explore the possibilities of reaching a direct agreement and that it would be counter-productive to place any time limit on our efforts in this particular, and that we must continue to exercise the same patience which had advanced the Chaco Peace Conference to the present stage. This procedure was approved.
9.: It was suggested that any M. of P. Conference resolution on the Chaco should only be passed after some concrete action had been taken by the Chaco Peace Conference. After discussion it was decided [Page 82] that as of today we would summon the parties to negotiate on the fundamental question. The exact form of this resolution will be submitted to us tomorrow afternoon for approval.
10.: Press announcement of today’s meeting of the Chaco Peace Conference will state that it was held in the presence of the attending Foreign Ministers who had unanimously expressed their categorical approval of everything done to date by the Chaco Peace Conference.
11.: In order to explore possibilities for direct settlement of the territorial question and a satisfactory adjustment of the Villa Montes road and the excess of effectives questions it was decided to have another session tomorrow with the Foreign Ministers present; this meeting is called at six o’clock, Foreign Minister Finot invited to attend at 6:30 and Dr. Ramírez at 7:00 p.m.

Yesterday at luncheon Ambassador Rodrigues advised me that he had had most encouraging conversations with Drs. Finot and Ramírez yesterday morning which led him to believe that a satisfactory adjustment of the Villa Montes road and the excess of effectives matters could be readily made at this time. I spoke with Dr. Ramírez last night and today lunched with him, Dr. Soler and Dr. Laconich (Secretary of the Paraguayan delegation) and it is my opinion that Ambassador Rodrigues Alves is mistaken. I found that the nervousness of the Paraguayans (reported in my memorandum of December 4) has apparently worn off and they are again in the same intransigeant, stubborn mood that has characterized them for some months past. They informed me that Dr. Stefanich says he cannot leave Asunción now but might come to Buenos Aires later on, providing that he were advised in advance of exactly what concrete proposition was to be submitted for his consideration. During our meeting this morning I suggested that “by some stroke of genius of the Foreign Ministers present in Buenos Aires a solution to our entire problem might be arrived at providing Dr. Stefanich were induced to come to Buenos Aires”, but Messrs. Saavedra Lamas and Macedo Soares were convinced that he would not come and that it was futile to make any further requests of him in this connection.

As you are aware, Ramírez has more or less continuously protested the Bolivian excess of effectives. Today at luncheon he again brought up the subject, claiming that Paraguay should not have to make any concession in connection with the road since according to the official report of the Argentine Military Attaché in La Paz, Bolivia now has over 11,000 men in her army. I replied that we had received an official declaration from the Bolivian delegation to the effect that that country had only 5,000 effectives, but that Dr. Finot had twice offered to have the Conference Military Observers go anywhere in Bolivia any time and themselves check the exact number of effectives. [Page 83] And I added that since we could follow this procedure with Bolivia we should do the same with Paraguay and the whole question of effectives would be settled. Ramírez immediately objected and said that since Paraguay had formally stated to the Conference that they had only 4, 300 effectives the Conference should accept that declaration and that it would be an infringement of Paraguay’s sovereignty for us to check in the method I suggested. I made the obvious rejoinder that if Paraguay objected to such a check then they must accept Bolivia’s word and that the question of effectives therefore might be considered as settled. Since Dr. Ramírez is accustomed to regard such personal conversations as of no official weight I will endeavor to have this conversation repeated during our session tomorrow if an appropriate opportunity presents itself.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 10, 1936.

1. At 3 p.m. today our committee of three met (Macedo Soares, Cruchaga Tocornal and myself) with José Roberto de Macedo Soares present.

2. … Macedo Soares’ formula is as follows:

“Bolivian and Paraguayan public opinion must be satisfied in order to obtain a lasting agreement.

“Paraguayan public opinion would be satisfied if they did not have to give Bolivia a port on the Paraguay river.

“Bolivian opinion would be satisfied if they obtained control of the Villa Montes–Boyuibe road.

“While Bolivia wanted a sovereign port on the river most of the Bolivian public would not know the difference between a sovereign port and a free port, therefore Paraguay should give Bolivia a free port which would satisfy both public opinions and all practical needs.

“These proposals are to be submitted respectively to the parties with the further request that they each draw up their own proposition regarding a permanent boundary across the Chaco.”

Macedo Soares believes that with the combined pressure of the ABC powers,58 supported by the United States, Bolivian and Paraguayan acceptance finally will be forthcoming.

3. In reply to my query regarding how the political situations in the two countries would be handled, and especially in Paraguay where the government was afraid to take any stand for fear that they would be upset through the criticism of their opponents, Macedo [Page 84] Soares said that he had arranged an interview for the three of us with President Justo, as he was the only man who could do this job, and that we would get Justo to call in Ayala, Zubizaretta, Estigarribia, etc., submit the general terms of the plan to them, at the same time telling them that Argentina, Brazil and Chile would not brook any political activity on their part if the Franco government were to accept this plan and that were they to make any adverse moves their asylum in Argentina would be withdrawn and they could not obtain asylum in either Chile or Brazil.

Macedo Soares added that this approach to Justo also had the advantage that the President could give us able advice and assistance and that it would liquidate (eliminate) Saavedra Lamas from the Chaco picture so that he could not interfere with our labors.

4. We called on President Justo at approximately 4:30 and he agreed to give us every assistance. He did not specifically agree to call in the Paraguayan deportees but gave us to understand that word of his interest in the matter would be conveyed effectively to them and to the Paraguayan delegates. President Justo was not so confident of the success of this program as were Macedo Soares and Cruchaga.

5. Finot is to meet with us at Macedo Soares’ residence at 7:30 p.m. Later we shall see Ramírez.

6. President Justo doubted whether the Paraguayans would be willing to give Bolivia a free port, however, I have discussed this subject with both the present and former Paraguayan delegations and they always have expressed their willingness to do so. I think that Paraguay would be delighted to make a deal whereby they would relinquish the road to Bolivia, providing the latter dropped all claims for a port. While Finot admits that a port would be of no practical use to Bolivia he has always held out for the “psychological port” and Alvéstegui has insisted on a sovereign port.

7. The general terms of this formula have been discussed frequently in the past, both as a whole and in sections, without our receiving any encouragement from the parties, however, the Macedo Soares program should be tried: (a) President Justo may be able to control the liberal deportees and to convince the present Paraguayan government that they will suffer no political repercussions from their acceptance of this or a modified plan; (b) the united pressure of Justo, Macedo Soares and Cruchaga may induce both sides to accept terms which they would not under other circumstances; (c) Macedo Soares agrees with me that if we are to get anywhere it must be by dint of staying in almost continuous session with the Bolivians and Paraguayans in order to wear them down. I have urged such a course previously with Saavedra Lamas and my other colleagues but have never been able to induce them to give this concentrated effort to the matter, excepting when, as president of the prisoners committee, I was in a [Page 85] position to call meetings myself at will; (d) excepting for the irritation which may be aroused in Dr. Saavedra Lamas I do not see that any harm can come from making the attempt; and (e) if we are unsuccessful in getting the territorial settlement at this time we may at least, as a compromise, be able to adjust satisfactorily the control and vigilance question.

8. I urged that we must periodically inform our Peruvian, Uruguayan and Argentine colleagues of our progress. Macedo Soares assented to our advising them of the program as soon as we had submitted it to Finot and Ramírez.

9. We shall probably see President Justo again tomorrow or the next day and as frequently thereafter as appears necessary.

[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 10, 1936.

1. The (Chaco) Peace Conference met yesterday afternoon at 5:30. Those in attendance were the same as on December 8 with the addition of Minister Cisneros of Peru59 and Secretary Hull,60 who attended for a few minutes and stated his approval of the work of the Conference under Dr. Saavedra Lamas.

2. Bunge, Nieto and I had prepared a project of resolution summoning the parties to direct negotiation (see paragraph 9 of my December 8 memorandum). It was felt by Foreign Ministers Cruchaga and Macedo Soares that this resolution, if published, would show definite progress in our negotiations, thus justifying the passage of an appropriate resolution by the M. of P. Conference commending the work of the (Chaco) Peace Conference. In the preamble of our draft resolution there was included a recitation of the (Chaco) Peace Conference accomplishments to date. After some minor corrections were made in this draft resolution the Bolivian delegates, Messrs. Finot, Alvestegui and Romero, were received. Finot denounced Paraguay for not proceeding in good faith or at least in not cooperating as wholeheartedly with the Conference as had Bolivia. When the subject of the proposed resolution was mentioned he insisted that Bolivia could not consider the fundamental problem or any other matter until the control and vigilance question had been adjusted in accordance with the Conference resolution of August 20, and he referred to a public statement to this effect made by President Toro. After some discussion Finot finally consented to the passage of the [Page 86] resolution providing it contained a definite statement that “the Conference had not been able to enforce the security measures”. When there seemed to be some disposition to meet Dr. Finot in this particular I objected twice, insisting that as per the Protocols we had obtained the practical compliance with the security measures and that I thought Dr. Finot’s denunciation of Paraguayan concentration of troops and of incidents occurring in the Chaco were very much exaggerated if not entirely based upon rumors without foundation, as had frequently happened with both sides in the past; that our August 20 resolution was an administrative act of the Conference and was being put into effect through the Special Military Commission and by other Conference measures. I held that as an administrative act it even could be rescinded by the Conference and that actually the parties could not refuse to comply with provisions of the Protocols simply because an administrative measure was not being put into effect as promptly as they desired, and that under no circumstances could or should the Conference assert that it had failed to comply with any provisions of the Protocols. As a result of my insistence we finally decided that there should be no formal resolution of the Conference but that the minutes would show that the mediatory delegations had requested those of the ex-belligerent nations (with the intervention of the Conference) to enter into negotiations looking to the settlement of the territorial question.

Dr. Finot agreed that he would endeavor to induce President Toro not to insist upon his above expressed stand and that instead he would permit the negotiation of the fundamental question to proceed.

3. Following the departure of the Bolivian delegation the Paraguayan delegates, Drs. Ramírez and Soler, arrived. Ramírez in an involved self-contradictory argumentation held at first that the fundamental question could not yet be discussed but he concluded by promising Paraguay’s fullest cooperation in any such negotiation.

4. Several times during the meeting Dr. Saavedra Lamas tried to leave on the excuse that he had to attend the reception at the American Embassy but was prevented from departing by Minister Macedo Soares and Dr. Bunge.

5. It having been agreed by all concerned that discussions of the fundamental question were to be undertaken and actively pursued during the presence in Buenos Aires of Secretary Hull and Foreign Ministers Macedo Soares and Cruchaga, Saavedra Lamas suggested that these discussions should be carried forward by a small committee of the Conference. This proposal having been accepted Foreign Minister Macedo Soares said that as a tribute to Paraguay and the Paraguayans he volunteered to serve on the committee. Cruchaga immediately followed suit and the Brazilian Minister suggested that perhaps the committee should consist only of the two. Dr. Manini [Page 87] Rios and some of the other delegates immediately suggested that I be named as a third member of the committee, a move which Saavedra Lamas warmly welcomed. Our first meeting is scheduled for three p.m. today.

6. Appreciating that Saavedra Lamas would be greatly disturbed to have the matter left in the hands of the two Foreign Ministers whom he jealously regards as dangerous rivals who are attempting to filch the Chaco leadership from him, I took occasion to tell the Argentine Foreign Minister as soon as I could speak to him at the American Embassy that it would be necessary for me to have entree to him at any time that I deemed it necessary in order to keep in intimate contact with him, our chief, on Chaco matters. He told me he would receive me at any time, day or night, I desired. This arrangement has the further advantage of giving me ready access to him on other than Chaco affairs.

7. Saavedra Lamas on his arrival at the Embassy expressed a desire to speak to Secretary Hull with me. He urged that the Secretary should become more active in Chaco affairs, calling attention to the fact that “Brazil recently had negotiated a treaty on petroleum with Bolivia, that Chile, like Brazil, was moved not so much by a desire for peace as by reason of special interests which they had with the ex-belligerent nations, and it therefore was essential that the balance be preserved through the disinterested and just intervention of the United States”. Translating for Secretary Hull I told Saavedra Lamas that the Secretary desired “me to do the actual work although whenever it seemed essential for him to intervene I would advise him so that he could do so”, and that, of course, I would keep them both informed as to developments.

8. Even in the face of my assurances to Saavedra Lamas he probably will be extremely suspicious regarding the activities of this committee of three and we may expect some difficulty with him unless he is carefully handled.

9. Macedo Soares promises this afternoon to outline to Cruchaga and myself a formula which he is “absolutely satisfied will settle the entire Chaco question” and on which he has felt out, in a preliminary way, both of the ex-belligerent delegations.

[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 11, 1936.

1.: The committee of three met at Macedo Soares’ house at 7:30 p.m. yesterday with Messrs. Finot and Alvéstegui. Others present were José Roberto de Macedo Soares and the Brazilian Ministers in Asunción and La Paz.
2.: Cruchaga outlined the bases upon which the committee hoped that an accord could be reached. The Bolivian delegates instead of indignantly rejecting the proposal took it calmly, although Finot stated that prior to his departure from La Paz the Junta had voted unanimously that Bolivia could consider no proposition which did not give that country a sovereign port on the Paraguay river. They also said that the control of the road was not a sufficient compensation for the relinquishment of a sovereign port. The Bolivian delegates stressed the practical reasons which required their having a sovereign port rather than a free port. The mediators pointed out that for all practical purposes a free port would be just as valuable as the sovereign port. The “Macedo Soares plan” therefore has been accepted by the Bolivians as at least offering a starting point in the discussion.
3.: Saavedra Lamas apparently is somewhat nervous over the activities of the committee of three, as demonstrated by the fact that he has called a (Chaco) Peace Conference session for five o’clock this afternoon. Bunge advises me that there is no special word from the Chaco, La Paz or Asunción but that the Foreign Minister says he has something of particular importance to convey to the Conference.

Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The American Republics, Volume V

The American Delegate (Braden) to the Secretary of State

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)