Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 12, 1936.

1. The Committee of Three met with the Paraguayan delegates at 12:30 today (postponed from 10:00 a.m.). There were also present [Page 89] the Brazilian Minister in Asunción, José Roberto de Macedo Soares, Major Bastos (one of the Military Attachés to the Brazilian delegation), Murtinho (Secretary of the Bolivian delegation), and Dr. Bunge (Argentine delegate and Secretary General of the Conference).

2. Dr. Soler said that he had talked on the telephone to Foreign Minister Stefanich, who had sent his regards to the Committee and requested that we make our proposals more concrete. It was pointed out to Dr. Soler that the quickest way to arrive at more definite plans would be to have Dr. Stefanich present, otherwise we remained in something of a vicious circle. Dr. Soler said that he still had hopes that Dr. Stefanich could come to Buenos Aires. (Apparently Macedo Soares has practically decided to visit Santiago; he and Cruchaga therefore feel that Stefanich’s trip need not be hurried since he can make it any time before Macedo Soares’ return to Rio. Of course, were they to ask the Paraguayan Foreign Minister to meet with them in Santiago Dr. Saavedra Lamas would be enraged.)

3. There was considerable discussion of a “puerto libre” (free port), (as typified by the Peruvian use of Arica) versus a “puerto franco” (as typified by the Bolivian use of Antofagasta). We told the Paraguayan delegates that under any circumstances maximum port privileges should be accorded the Bolivians since we will have the greatest difficulty in getting them to desist from their ambitions for a sovereign port.

Macedo Soares and Cruchaga feel that we have made a definite advance and, as the former says, “are in the second stage of our negotiations since it is evident that the Paraguayans will be willing to concede either a ‘puerto libre’ or ‘puerto franco’”. I cannot share their enthusiasm on this point since the Paraguayans always have accepted this solution. During the conversation Soler made the flat statement that Paraguay would never be willing even to talk about a “sovereign port”.

4. In order to arrive at a proper method for fixing a permanent boundary Cruchaga suggested that the authorized geographical societies of the six mediatory countries be instructed to study the geographical, historical and economical antecedents of the Chaco, their findings to be transmitted to The Hague Court who would not make a decision but merely give an opinion, which in turn would be transmitted to the Chaco Peace Conference in order for that body to make the final decision. This suggestion was not rejected by the Paraguayans but did not meet with any enthusiasm on their part.

Cruchaga and Ramírez held forth on the great wealth in the Chaco, which I contested as inaccurate and because our negotiations will not be eased by the propagation of such beliefs.

5. By this time it was nearly two o’clock and it was agreed that the Committee would submit to the Paraguayans a more concrete definition [Page 90] of a “free port” and a plan showing our suggestion for a permanent boundary.

The (Chaco) Peace Conference met this afternoon at four o’clock with the Bolivian delegates. Finot stated that Bolivia would not press her project (atttached to this morning’s memorandum) providing he and his government were satisfied that definite steps, looking to the settlement of the control and vigilance (policing) question, were being taken by the (Chaco) Peace Conference, and that, in particular, the Special Military Commission as soon as possible should proceed to the Chaco to adjust these questions. The matter was left on this basis, which is not entirely satisfactory since it will be physically impossible for the Special Military Commission to reach any concrete results prior to the closing of the M. of P. Conference. Thus a door will be left open for Finot to reverse his present position and insist upon the submission of his project. However, it seemed inexpedient to call this fact to the attention of the Bolivian delegates and we may hope that our negotiations in the Committee of Three will progress sufficiently or that a further understanding with Finot may be reached so that he will not insist again upon the presentation of his project.

1. Saavedra Lamas called me into his office alone before the afternoon session and told me that yesterday afternoon, with an Argentine engineer present, he had discussed a possible boundary line with the Paraguayan delegates and that he would like to have me meet with him, the Paraguayans and the engineer in his home at 9:30 tomorrow morning. When Macedo Soares and Cruchaga arrived he likewise invited them. Macedo Soares was perturbed because he felt, with some reasons, that Saavedra Lamas was trying to force the negotiations back into his own hands and to eliminate the Committee of Three. He and Cruchaga therefore insisted that the Paraguayans must not be present at tomorrow’s meeting, to which Saavedra Lamas assented.

2. Saavedra Lamas’ nervousness over the Committee of Three is also demonstrated by the fact that he complained to Macedo Soares that he was not informed as to what was being done by the Committee and requested that Bunge be permitted to attend its meetings as an observer.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 14, 1936.

1. Macedo Soares is determined, alone or through the Committee of Three, to conclude a final Chaco peace treaty within the next few weeks. Saavedra Lamas resents the intervention of the Brazilian [Page 91] and Chilean Chancellors and is bound that he will keep his hand in the negotiations. Cruchaga is confused on the whole situation but prefers any leadership other than that of Saavedra Lamas. My concern of the moment is to avert, if possible, a serious clash between Macedo Soares and Saavedra Lamas. Our negotiations are hampered by the parties being told one thing in their discussions with the Committee of Three and another by Saavedra Lamas. Of the three chancellors Macedo Soares has the clearest vision of the situation but even he is handicapped by an ignorance of many of the details.

The Paraguayans continue to procrastinate and are capitalizing to some extent on the latent dissension between the Foreign Ministers. The Bolivians would like to conclude the whole question promptly but above all insist that the “control and vigilance” be settled before the end of the M. of P. Conference …

2. With reference to page 4 of my December 12 memorandum, that same evening I urged upon Macedo Soares that he and Cruchaga not attend the Sunday morning meeting at Saavedra Lamas’ house even though Saavedra Lamas had promised not to have Ramírez present. Therefore, at 9:30 yesterday morning I was the only member of the Committee to meet with Saavedra Lamas and his engineer, Dr. Revuelto. Saavedra Lamas “complied” with his promise not to have Ramírez present by having him arrive an hour later at 10:30.

3. The Minister first agreed with Ramírez that the large area lying to the north of the intermediary line “should also be considered in our deliberations”. (Hitherto the Paraguayans have shown little or no desire to obtain possession of this territory nor even to include it in an arbitration.) Saavedra Lamas further delighted Ramírez with the assertion that “Paraguay had shed her blood and the lives of thirty thousand men to reach the intermediary line and that, in effect, she was therefore entitled to retain that line as a permanent frontier unless she acquired additional territory through the arbitration on the above-mentioned area to the north”. I objected that the mediators as signatories to the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Pact62 (and, incidentally, to the August 3 declaration63) could not accept any such thesis. Saavedra Lamas tried to brush my remarks aside. I insisted that if the area to the north were to be arbitrated then a large portion of the Chaco lying to the south and east of the intermediary line also should be submitted to arbitration, adding that the Paraguayans should not object to this procedure since Ramírez had just held forth at length on how confident he was that their titles would be recognized by any court.

4. Ramírez remarked that he had drafted a “reglementation” respecting “control and vigilance” but that he had not yet received his [Page 92] government’s approval thereto. I urged that he obtain this approval immediately, if necessary flying to Asunción to get it since I was sure the Argentine government would lend him an airplane for this purpose, to which Saavedra Lamas agreed.

Ramírez said he would hurry matters and, as usual, promised that a modus vivendi along the Villa Montes road and covering the control and vigilance question would be arrived at within a few days. In my opinion his promises must be largely discounted.

5. If we can satisfy the Argentine Foreign Minister that the Committee of Three is not likely to succeed he will interfere less with its efforts. I therefore told him I was pessimistic about a solution being reached rapidly and implied that he was the only “genius” capable of such an accomplishment.

6. Saavedra Lamas said that he had been summoned by President Justo who said: “What is the matter? You are my Foreign Minister and should be handling the Chaco business; nevertheless, the Brazilian and Chilean Foreign Ministers came to see me.” Saavedra said he had explained that he was very busy with foreign relations in general and the M. of P. Conference in particular, but promised that “he would collaborate with the Committee of Three,” hence our meeting with Ramírez. For Macedo Soares to enlist President Justo’s assistance in order to influence the parties and better to control Paraguayan deportees in Argentina is sound. But for Macedo Soares merely to appeal to the President in an attempt to keep Saavedra Lamas out of the negotiations may prove counter productive and perhaps cause trouble.

7. … Also last night Macedo Soares said he wished Cruchaga and me to accompany him in an interview with President Justo today. I suggested that an interview now was perhaps premature and that we should save our influence with the President until it was more needed. However, I am now informed that he has made an appointment to see President Justo alone tomorrow at three p.m.

8. Macedo Soares wisely has discussed the boundary settlement with Estigarribia and hopes that at a given moment the General may be induced to approve same, thus helping to force acceptance from the Franco government. Macedo Soares also summoned Elío but the latter’s influence will count for very little presently.

9. We have had a little difficulty in despatching the Special Military Commission to the Chaco as per our bargain with Finot since General Martínez Pita felt that he should have been consulted before this trade had been made with the Bolivian chancellor and also was anxious himself to negotiate on the fundamental question. In a meeting this morning at 11:15 we finally persuaded the General that (1) he and other members of the Commission should leave by airplane for the Chaco tomorrow; (2) under no circumstances should he discuss [Page 93] the fundamental question with anyone; and (3) if he found it necessary to go to Asunción or La Paz he should first obtain the approval of the Conference.

General Martínez Pita and Bunge were informed last night by Finot that if the Special Military Commission did not leave immediately for the Chaco he personally would withdraw from the M. of P. Conference and return to Bolivia.

10. Our Military Observers state that there have been no recent complaints from the Bolivians with respect to treatment accorded them by the Paraguayan police stationed along the Villa Montes road. Rumors of Paraguayan concentrations of troops continue and the Military Observers are unanimous in their belief that they should be supplied with a neutral airplane in order that they may adequately supervise both the Bolivians and Paraguayans, particularly as the former claim, with some justice, that the Observers have almost exclusively exercised a control over their forces.

[Enclosure 3—Extract]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 15, 1936.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Macedo Soares and I went over various Chaco plans and possible boundary lines that have been discussed hitherto. As a result Major Bastos, Military Attaché to the Brazilian delegation, was instructed to prepare two maps, one to be submitted to the Bolivians and the other to the Paraguayans:

The map for the Bolivians will show the maximum Paraguayan claims and a “suggested boundary line” approximately coinciding with the present intermediary line excepting that it will run through Capirenda, Carandaiti and Mandeyapecua, thus placing the Villa Montes road within prospective Bolivian territory. The small area thereby acquired by Bolivia will be offset by locating the Paraguayan boundary along the Parapiti river. Also from the Parapiti river the boundary will run somewhat to the south of the present intermediary line and will cut the Paraguay river at Bahía Negra, 50 to 60 kms. south of where the intermediary line now intercepts it.

The map for the Paraguayans will show the approximate line of forts held by Bolivia in the Chaco prior to the war and will offer a permanent boundary running from Bahía Negra on the Paraguay river to Linares on the Pilcomayo river, i. e. the line previously suggested by General Peñaranda and Colonel Toro. Linares is located on the Pilcomayo river approximately 200 kms. to the southeast of [Page 94] D’Orbigny, which was the terminal point for the boundary proposed on October 15, 1935, by the (Chaco) Peace Conference.

Both parties will indignantly reject these respective proposals, which are offered merely as bases for subsequent conversations. Although it is Macedo Soares’ hope that the parties might be induced to accept the two proposed boundary lines as definite delimitations of their respective territories, leaving the area comprehended between these lines for arbitration either by The Hague Court or in the manner suggested by Cruchaga (see paragraph 4 of my memorandum dated December 12, 1936). I am not as optimistic as the Brazilian Foreign Minister with respect to the willingness of the parties (especially Paraguay) to arbitrate this afore-mentioned area. Also, I still feel that in the final analysis the Paraguayan fear of internal political repercussions will only be outweighed by a cash consideration.

3. The Committee of Three is scheduled to meet this afternoon at 5:00 o’clock, the Bolivians to be called in at 5:30 and the Paraguayans at 6:00.

4. The Paraguayan delegation yesterday informed the (Chaco) Peace Conference that Colonel Irrázabal, Military Attaché in Buenos Aires, had been named as the representative of the Paraguayan government to treat with General Martínez Pita and the S. M. C.64 in the Chaco. Accordingly, it was arranged for Colonel Irrázabal to accompany General Martínez Pita in the airplane today. Ramírez stated that the Colonel had full instructions; however, this morning the airplane was supposed to leave at 8:00 a.m. but Colonel Irrázabal did not show up until 10:00 a.m. when he informed General Martínez Pita that he was not going but that Colonel Paredes (Commander of Paraguayan forces in the Chaco) would carry on the conversations with him. I anticipate that General Martínez Pita will have to visit Franco and Stefanich in Asunción if he is to meet with any success in his mission.

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[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 16, 1936.

1. The meeting of the Committee of Three at 5:00 p.m. yesterday afternoon was attended by José Roberto de Macedo Soares, the Brazilian Minister in Asunción, and Colonel Bastos. The maps showing “suggested boundaries” were submitted respectively to Messrs. Ramírez and Soler at 5:30 p.m. and Messrs. Finot, Alvéstegui and [Page 95] Romero at 6:30 p.m. The map for the Bolivians had been altered so that the proposed boundary did not intercept the Paraguay river at Bahía Negra but instead terminated on the Brazilian frontier near Fortín Galpón. It was explained to each of the ex-belligerent delegations that the Committee’s proposals were purely preliminary, made in order to initiate the negotiations in the hope that the parties would frankly express their views thereon and make counter suggestions. The proposals were not rejected as violently as had been expected. Both delegations stated that they would not dare transmit our suggestions to their governments, to which we replied that we had not expected them to do so until our conversations had advanced to a point where the Bolivian and Paraguayan aspirations were in closer approximation to each other.

2. Ramírez expressed his astonishment that we should even suggest a boundary which so completely ignored Paraguayan rights and the results of the war, and he argued that the mediators instead of attempting to negotiate a boundary line should devote themselves for some months to an exhaustive study of all the historical, geographical and juridical antecedents of the case and thereafter arrive at a “continental solution”. Two or three times when we tried to commit the Paraguayans to a definite statement that our proposals were “unacceptable” Ramírez emphasized that “he did not say they were unacceptable but that he merely thought them so preposterous that he could not communicate them to his government”.

3. The Bolivians, on the other hand, flatly rejected our proposal, Finot saying that Bolivia would rather have another war than permit a Paraguayan frontier on the Parapiti river and with reason he pointed out that our present indication was not as good as the October 15, 1935, Conference suggestion which had been rejected. I told him this rejection had been made purely because Paraguay likewise had refused to consider the Conference proposal but, based on conversations with Bolivia’s former delegations, I had reported to the State Department that the La Paz government would accept our October 15, 1935, proposal. Alvéstegui contended that I erred in this statement but Finot said I was “more or less right” and admitted that he had been consulted at the time and had recommended acceptance.

4. Macedo Soares injudiciously told the Bolivians that Saavedra Lamas and the Argentine Government advised the acceptance of the suggested line. Finot expressed his surprise saying that he had gathered from his discussions with Carrillo65 in La Paz that Argentina considered the Villa Montes-Santa Cruz highway important for Argentine-Bolivian trade and also planned to finance and construct a railroad from Yacuiba to Santa Cruz (through Villa Montes), therefore, [Page 96] if Bolivia did not forcibly eject the Paraguayans from their occupation in proximity to these lines of communication, then Argentina would do so.

5. The Bolivian delegation said their prime consideration was a port on the Paraguay river and that when we had suggested their having a free port instead of a sovereign port they had expected to receive in compensation a much larger slice of the Chaco.

6. Finot said that at an appropriate moment Bolivia would protest to the (Chaco) Peace Conference the Paraguayan fortifications constructed in Capirenda and Carandaiti. I remarked that they had put in plantations, built roads and some other public works but to the best of our knowledge not fortifications. Alvéstegui said: “They are not what you would call fortifications but they nevertheless would be of service in the event of hostilities.”

7. The Bolivian delegation also was disturbed by the receipt of a note yesterday morning signed by General Martínez Pita stating that he was leaving for the Chaco “to carry on conversations” with respect to the control and vigilance problem. I replied that strictly speaking the General should not have directed a note to them, in addition to the official communication by the Secretary General of the Conference and I added that the General had definite instructions: (a) The S. M. C. should prepare as rapidly as possible a recommendation covering the control and vigilance question which would serve as a basis for a Conference resolution in the particular, (b) Under no circumstances was the General to discuss the fundamental territorial question. At this juncture a copy of the following telegram received by the Secretary General arrived and was unwisely shown to the Bolivians by Macedo Soares:

“Situación inalterable. Debido mal estado caminos estación actual nuestra observatión limitóse inmediaciones Villa Montes durante semana pasada. Coronel Valenzuela.”66

Finot and Alvéstegui immediately seized upon this telegram as evidence that the Military Observers were supervising only the Bolivians and not the Paraguayans. I explained to them that it was merely a question of transportation, pointed out that they had been unable to supply the Military Observers with adequate facilities, that the Argentine automobile was old and in need of repair, that I had urged several times that the Conference (i. e. mediatory nations) purchase an automobile for our Observers and consider the acquisition of an airplane, but due to the fact that Dr. Saavedra Lamas and all the other delegates, excepting myself, had been occupied since the [Page 97] first of the month with the M. of P. Conference we simply had been unable to attend to details of this nature.

8. The Committee of Three is to meet with the ex-belligerent delegations this afternoon.

[Enclosure 5]

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Buenos Aires, December 17, 1936.

1. The Committee of Three held a four and a half hour session yesterday afternoon which was attended by José Roberto de Macedo Soares, Major Bastos and the Brazilian Minister in Asunción.

2. Foreign Ministers Macedo Soares and Cruchaga finally are convinced that (a) it is well nigh impossible to negotiate successfully with Ramírez; (b) the only way in which we may hope to reach a final peace treaty is by means of a cash consideration.

At yesterday’s session Ramírez was … intransigeant and there were several fairly violent exchanges between him and Macedo Soares. On the other hand, Finot, without any prompting, stated that in his personal opinion the easiest and wisest way to obtain a final settlement was through a cash payment by Bolivia to Paraguay.

3. Since Sunday there has been no evidence of any further activity on the part of Saavedra Lamas with regard to the Chaco. If this condition continues to prevail then the following steps seem desirable: (a) endeavor to induce Stefanich’s presence in our discussions and to eliminate Ramírez; (b) through the combined pressure of President Justo and Macedo Soares to force the Paraguayan deportees to adhere to any peace treaty which we may negotiate and not to make a political issue of the Chaco; (c) to explore further the question of a cash consideration.

4. Yesterday’s session may be summarized as follows:

(a) Ramírez made his usual speeches about Paraguayan “loyalty” and “generosity” but insisted that the manner in which the Committee of Three was approaching the situation was utterly wrong, that the Chaco must be considered as a geographical unit and that the only hope for success lay in following one of two procedures: (1) carefully to review and study all of the historical, geographical and juridical antecedents of the Chaco problem, thus more or less automatically uncovering a solution; (2) to arrive at a final treaty through a method of mutual compensations.

(b) We suggested that the two ex-belligerent nations definitely agree now that Bolivia’s sovereignty be recognized in all territory lying to the west and north of the intermediary line, the location of that line being slightly changed so as to leave the Villa Montes road [Page 98] definitely within Bolivian territory but giving Paraguayan occupation access to the Parapiti river; and that Paraguay’s sovereignty be definitely recognized in all territory lying to the south and east of a line drawn from Bahía Negra to Linares and that the ownership of the remaining occupied area be determined through direct negotiation or by arbitration; if by arbitration then Macedo Soares suggested that three of the mediatory nations undertake to act as arbitrators and that the other three assume the administration of the area under discussion. Ramírez attempted to argue that the lack of constitutional government in both countries prevented the acceptance of any such plan. We told him that on the contrary it made it more feasible. Ramírez then said that he “did not reject” but “simply refused to consider” our formula. …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(d) We then submitted to the Bolivian delegation the same proposal made to the Paraguayans excepting that we substituted the line from Bahía Negra to D’Orbigny for the Bahía Negra–Linares line, also observing that this proposal had been definitely rejected by the Paraguayans. Finot suggested that the definite delimitation of Paraguayan territory should be no further west than the Bahía Negra–Linares line and then remarked “that in the final analysis he thought the best and wisest procedure would be for Bolivia to make a cash payment to Paraguay in return for a port on the river and a better territorial settlement”. Finot added that he had not consulted with his colleagues and suspected that Alvéstegui did not favor the cash payment. The latter said that Finot had taken him by surprise, but, in fact, he did not like the idea. I then said that I had for months past continuously insisted that the only solution to the problem would come through the cash payment. Finot said that he knew I liked the idea since it was practicable and therefore would appeal to an American.

(e) Finot said that he did not like to leave any territory subject to discussion because that meant dealing with the Paraguayans and he did not want to have any traffic with them whatsoever. We then discussed the cash payment further. Finot, in reply to a question of mine, said that Argentina and Bolivia had signed a protocol whereby the former government would guarantee the construction (and presumably, operating) company which would build the railroad from Yacuiba to Santa Cruz. He also said that the Paraguayans had told President Justo that they were delaying the negotiations because the present Bolivian government was expected to fall shortly, hence it was futile to negotiate with it.

(f) Elío has agreed with Macedo Soares that he will not oppose nor openly criticize any peace treaty we may negotiate with the Toro government.

[Page 99]

(g) Due to the absence of Cruchaga in Montevideo our next meeting is scheduled for 7:30 tomorrow afternoon.

(h) I recommend that, taking advantage of Dr. Feis’s67 presence in Buenos Aires, we consider a possible program looking to the smelting and refining of Bolivian tin ores in the United States. Any progress which might be made along this line might be helpful in inducing Bolivia to make a cash payment.

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Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1936, The American Republics, Volume V

The American Delegate (Braden) to the Secretary of State

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)

Memorandum by the American Delegate (Braden)