893.01 Outer Mongolia/77
The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)57
Sir: I have the honor to submit further observations on the opinion, set forth in the Consulate General’s despatch No. 192, dated January 27, 1936, (No. 300 to the Department)58 that the higher authorities of the Kwantung Army do not at the present time desire serious complications with Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia, although an incident in the hands of an officer on the “front” may cause them to take action.
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To turn to Manchuria and Soviet Russia, all Japanese civilians, both officials and merchants, to whom the subject has been broached, were agreed that the Kwantung Army does not desire war with Russia at the present time. General Minami and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Nishio, are said to be of this persuasion. On the other hand, it is common gossip that many of the younger officers in Manchuria, among whom may possibly be included the Vice-chief of Staff, Major-General Itagaki, openly advocate waging war on Soviet Russia at the earliest opportunity. It is believed that many of these malcontents have been sent to Manchuria expressly to get rid of their troublesome activities in Japan, and that as a consequence the ratio of nationalistic zealots among officers of the Kwantung Army is even higher than in the army at home. The theory has been advocated that one reason for the lack of concentration of large bodies of Japanese troops at any one point near the border—as is reported to be the case—is to minimize the possibility of an officer involving the Kwantung Army in large scale operations.
An enlightening incident, illustrating the ideas of this type of officer, and at the same time showing that some officers have different opinions from their superiors and are willing to make public that fact, took place recently. Mr. Impey, Far East correspondent for the Daily Mail (London), had an interview with Major Shun Aki-kusa, second in command of the Harbin Special Service Mission. The Major, upon being asked whether Japan and Soviet Russia would soon be at war, replied most emphatically that the two countries would be at war within a few months. His chief, Major General Rinzo Ando, said the following day, when asked the same question [Page 35] by the same man, that war was not envisaged by the Kwantung Army; he added, however, that there were many fanatics on both sides. According to rumor in Japanese circles in Harbin, General Ando, who is far from well, has been criticized for not being able to control his subordinates, although he himself has been described as being a conservative. Not only has Major Akikusa publicly expressed opinions on matters of policy opposite to those of the Kwantung Army, but his superiors appear to be powerless either to discipline him, or to have him transferred elsewhere.
The danger of serious developments on the Outer Mongolian frontier has probably increased since the reported military agreement reached at Moscow recently between Soviet Russia and Outer Mongolia, as there has been evidence of an increase in Mongolian resistance to the presumably aggressive tactics of “Manchukuo” border outposts. It has also come to light that they are supplied with automobiles, have at least one airplane, and have developed a rapid system of telegraphic communication from the border to Urga and Moscow.
Thus, although it is believed that the present policy of the Kwan-tung Army is to avoid hostilities, it remains to be seen whether sufficient discipline can be maintained to keep the younger officers in check.
Respectfully yours,