761.9315 Manchuria/35: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 31—2:55 p.m.]
39. The usual emissary of the Kremlin who in past conversations has been in the habit of minimizing the importance of Soviet-Japanese dissensions in the Far East stated to me yesterday substantially as follows:
The feeling which had hitherto prevailed in the Soviet Union that Japan would be too deeply occupied with completing its conquest of North China to attempt any aggressive action against the Soviet Union in the near future was being replaced with an uneasy feeling that on [sic] the outbreak of a Japanese-Soviet conflict in the spring or summer of the present year was quite within the realms of possibility. The desertion into Soviet territory on January 29th (as reported in the Pravda of January 30th) of a whole company of Manchurian soldiers, together with a Manchurian lieutenant and several non-commissioned officers, was the very type of an incident which the Soviet Government feared might serve the Japanese as a pretext for opening of hostilities. It seemed that the company after having killed its Japanese officers fled into the Soviet Union with a considerable amount of military equipment. It was disarmed and sent into the interior for internment. The Soviet Government was concerned lest a number of such incidents might result in insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that the deserters be extradited and charges that the disturbances were the result of the activities of the Comintern.
The anxiety of the Soviet governmental circles was sharpened by the fact that they were inclined to believe reports recently published to the effect that Germany and Japan had entered into an alliance directed against “the activities of the Comintern”. They feared that if Japan should launch an attack under the pretext that it was crusading against the Comintern this alliance might serve as a basis for a simultaneous German attack from the West. They also felt that it was possible that influential groups in other countries which otherwise would have no sympathy for Japanese or German aggression might be inclined because of their dread of the spread of Communism [to support such attacks.]
The Soviet Government believed that of all the great powers Great Britain was in the best position to exercise restraint upon Germany. Undoubtedly Litvinov56 while in London would discuss the matter with the British Government.
- Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩