893.01 Manchuria/1377
Report by the Military Attaché in China (Stilwell)6
On Saturday, August 29, 1936, the Military Attaché interviewed Mr. Ohashi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo, at Hsinking. Among other questions on similar lines, Mr. Ohashi was asked his opinion on the following matters, and replied as indicated:
Q. Is banditry in Manchoukuo now under control?
A. Banditry is still a serious question in Manchoukuo. All along the eastern and north-eastern borders, in the difficult wooded and mountainous country there, groups of bandits exist under a communist [Page 300] organization. They are hard to get at on account of the nature of the country, and they are supplied with arms and ammunition by Russia. They even have Russian instructors, and follow Russian tactics when in action. As long as this support is available to them, they will be a menace, although their numbers are not large. Perhaps 20, 000 would be an ample estimate, although we have no definite information. Banditry will probably be a serious matter in this region for some years. Elsewhere, it is well under control.
Q. Can the Manchoukuo Army now handle the bandit question, or must the Japanese Army assist in combating it?
A. The Manchoukuo Army is not yet in condition to do it alone. Perhaps after five years or so they may be able to.
Q. In your opinion does Russia still hope to expand farther in the Orient?
A. Most certainly. Everything that has happened goes to prove it. Stalin calls himself an Asiatic. Europe offers no such easy road to expansion as does Asia, and the communist party has definitely decided to expand toward the east. Already the center of gravity of Russian industry is being moved east of the Urals. The Tashkent railway has been finished, and feeders for it are reaching out toward Sinkiang. The colonization and industrialization of Siberia are proceeding at a rapid pace. The trans-Siberian railway is now double-tracked throughout. The Siberian garrison has been heavily reinforced and large quantities of stores accumulated for it. Soviet influence has been extended over Outer Mongolia. Great secrecy is maintained east of Lake Baikal,—no one is allowed to see anything. The Russians are so unreasonable about such things that when I went to Khabarovsk and Chita recently, General Blücher refused to see me at all. Of course the Russians intend to expand farther,—what do you imagine motivated the Chinese revolution in 1926? The Russian Bear wants to disrupt Manchoukuo, and if that should come to pass, then Korea would go too, and Japan, defeated, would have a revolution. This situation is extremely critical for Japan. We must unite the nation. We are all that stands between Russia and her goal of the sovietization of Asia; Manchoukuo gone and Japan defeated, China would fall an easy victim. Japan now faces a terrible crisis,—in the next five years I expect to see this matter decided one way or the other. Cannot the world see how Japan simply must go to the limit of her strength to defend Manchoukuo in order to save herself as well as China from communism?
Q. Do you believe there is now any determined effort being made by Russia to extend communism in the Far East?
A. Certainly. The Russian Communist Party has some understanding [Page 301] with the Kuomintang. How far it goes we do not know. Probably a promise from Russia to keep her hands off China proper and even to give assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in consolidating his power, as a return for inaction on the part of China in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. Russia is prepared to make big concessions in Europe to get a free hand in Asia; her dream is a big Asiatic Russia, not a European Russia.
The communist armies in China are the puppets of Moscow. Moscow pulls the strings and they respond. They were ordered out of Kiangsi Province to help Chiang Kai-shek. Their whole long trek has been planned and ordered. They went to Szechwan to give Chiang an excuse to consolidate his power there. They went to Shensi for the same purpose. They crossed to Shansi for the same purpose. I told Yen Hsi-shan last fall that they would come to his province and in March they arrived. (And you notice that the Central Government put its troops in Shansi, and that they are still there.) Then Moscow ordered them out and sent them west. They will go where they are sent,—poor deluded idiots. A sorry crew who cannot see how they are being used.
Oh, yes, the Russian purpose is quite plain and the crisis is approaching rapidly. In Japan we can see this cloud gathering and we realize that it will take all our strength to withstand it. And it is of course directed first against us. Until the Manchurian incident, Great Britain was marked out as the principal enemy, but now we have become the target and the propaganda is all directed against us. Do you know how much money Russia is about to spend on propaganda in your country to poison your people against Japan? I am surprised that the Americans cannot see through them.
Q. What is the future of the Mongol race?
A. Independence. Even though apparently dominated by Russia, the Outer Mongols feel their identity as a people. All Mongols remember Genghiz Khan and long to re-establish themselves as a unit. They are intensely obstinate, though stupid and slow, and ultimately they will drift together. Why not? Who wants their country? There is nothing there—no grass, no wood, no water. Nothing. Why should Russia want them? We don’t. Let them get together and be a nation again if they want to.
Q. Will continued Chinese immigration into Manchoukuo be encouraged?
A. There is still plenty of room here. The country could support 300 million people. About 500,000 a year are coming in now. Yes, they can come; we expect them, because we have established law and order.
[Page 302]Q. Has Japanese influence been extended far enough in North China to make that flank secure in case of a war with Russia?
A. That is a strategic question about which I do not know anything. But any Japanese control in North China is for defensive purposes only—no one is going to cross the Gobi desert to attack,—an army could not exist there.
(Note: Mr. Ohashi’s meaning was that the Japanese would go as far as they thought necessary in North China to ensure that no action direct north from Central China could threaten the left flank while a major effort was being made in the north of Manchoukuo.)
In this talk Mr. Ohashi conveyed the impression that in the Japanese mind a war with Russia is inevitable within five years, that it will be a most serious matter requiring every resource available, and that Japan considers herself the champion of constitutional government in the struggle with communism. The Chinese situation by comparison is insignificant, and can be handled at any time; although they would like to have it settled now on a basis of co-operation, if not Japanese domination, they consider it very secondary in view of the Russian threat.
Mr. Ohashi has had long experience in foreign relations and has probably studied these matters as seriously as any Japanese. His conclusions may appear extreme, but they are, I believe, his real opinions, and as such are a clue to future Japanese policy.
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Colonel, Infantry
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the War Department; received October 28.↩